

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW



APRIL 1947

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The Editors.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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No. 3

OUR TREATY PROCEDURE VERSUS OUR FOREIGN POLICIES

By John Sloan Dickey

"It is not the atomic bomb that will destroy civilization. But civilized society can destroy itself — finally, no doubt, with bombs — if it fails to understand intelligently and to control the aids and deterrents to coöperation." — Elton Mayo

THE attention given by Americans to substantive policies in foreign affairs has increased greatly during the last thirty years, but the procedures by which our policies are made have received comparatively little attention.

During the first 150 years of our national history our major foreign policies were in the main unilateral in form, negative or merely declaratory in character and restricted in scope. Today they are dominantly coöperative, *i.e.*, contractual in form, and involve positive undertakings as to men and treasure. There is no place, there is no subject, not touched by our concern.

There is, moreover, another sharp contrast with the past. We have become the foremost advocate of international organizations in all fields. Twenty-five years ago we regarded international organizations as hardly safe for anything more controversial than coöperative letter-carrying and hunting icebergs. Today there is hardly a phase of life not covered by an existing or proposed international agency. Support of international organizations is a logical counterpart of being committed to the principle that national interests can best be advanced by reaching agreement with the countries concerned with the other side of the same matters. The international organizations we know today are essentially organized forms of international coöperation. They remain negotiating rather than legislative bodies; their success depends on agreements being reached by the agents of sovereign states and on those agreements being ratified and given effect.

The interrelationship between policy and procedure in human

affairs generally is recognized today. In the sciences, business and the professions, men have learned that the way you do things in large measure determines whether you really do them. Policy and procedure tend to fashion each other. Whenever policy and procedure get too far out of harmony, the interaction of one on the other usually works out a new equilibrium. But if this adjustment is left to time and "trial by battle," it is quite as possible that procedure will drag down policy as that policy will produce a more workable procedure.

The development of American foreign policies based on the principle of international coöperation, positive in content and carried out through international organizations, has both affected our procedures and created or revealed procedural inadequacies which are potential determinants of policy. The unending reorganization of the Department of State is one of the most obvious of many examples. Yet in the most important particular of all, policy and procedure are still badly out of harmony. The United States Government has yet to possess a regularly established and workable procedure for the democratic approval and legislative execution of international compacts.

This article is about the search for a treaty procedure which will serve our policy rather than determine or undermine it.

II. THE DECLINE OF THE TREATY PROCESS

The coöperative foreign policies of the United States are formulated today through three essentially different political procedures: 1. The treaty power, whereby the international compact must be approved by two-thirds of the Senators present. 2. The independent executive agreement, whereby the international compact is made by the executive branch without Senatorial or Congressional sanction. 3. The so-called joint resolution procedures, whereby the international compact is given prior authorization or subsequent sanction by a majority of both houses of Congress in some legislative form.

The perennial debate over these procedures centers around two different but related issues: whether and when the second or third procedure may be used instead of the treaty power; and whether the first, the treaty procedure, should not be changed by a constitutional amendment to make it more workable.¹

¹On the pro side of the first issue see McDougal and Lans, "Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy," 54 *Yale Law*

It is not possible to disregard entirely the first issue and the legal thickets which have sprung up around Section 2 of Article II of the Constitution which states that the President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur." But the primary purpose of this article is to examine broader aspects of the situation and to argue the second issue.

The first issue is not academic. The executive agreement and so-called joint resolution procedures are constantly used today. Their use has paralleled the growth of coöperative foreign policies. During the first 50 years of our national life we were a party to relatively few international compacts, and of these more than two-thirds were handled by the treaty procedures; during the second 50-year period we had substantially more international undertakings, and the other procedures came to be used on the average a little more frequently than the treaty power; in the third 50 years of our history we entered into at least 15 times as many compacts as we had in the first period, and the ratio of the procedures used was reversed from two to one in favor of the treaty power to two to one in favor of the executive agreement and joint resolution procedures. Since 1939 both the policy and procedure trends have continued; the number of international compacts has sharply increased, and the ratio is now at least ten to one against the use of the treaty procedure.

This decline in use of the treaty procedure has not been limited to routine, unimportant compacts. Quite the contrary. The treaty power has increasingly been reserved for the routine, less controversial actions, with such notable exceptions as the United Nations Charter, acceptance of the Optional Clause of the International Court of Justice and the Peace Treaties. The Reciprocal Trade Agreements, the British Loan Agreement, American membership in the International Bank and the Monetary Fund, UNRRA, FAO, UNESCO and like matters of the largest import have recently been handled not by the treaty procedure but by

Journal 181 and 534 (1945); "Constitutionality of St. Lawrence Legislation," Memorandum submitted by the Department of State to a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.; and Wallace McClure, "International Executive Agreements," New York, 1941. On the second issue see *Hearings and Report on Amendment to Constitution Relative to the Making of Treaties*, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess.; Denna F. Fleming, "The Treaty Veto of the American Senate," New York: 1930; Kenneth Colegrove, "The American Senate and World Peace," New York: 1944. E. M. Borchard provides the main opposition literature on both issues today; see his "Treaties and Executive Agreements," *American Political Science Review*, August 1946, p. 729.

some form of executive agreement coupled with prior or subsequent legislative sanction given by a majority of both houses of Congress. Likewise there are notable instances of the current use of the independent executive agreement such as the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, a multilateral compact which contains precise commitments to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and against the making of a separate peace; the Lend-Lease agreements; the Yalta Agreements and the Potsdam Declaration. All of these are coöperative foreign policy acts of the greatest consequence to both the immediate and long-range interests of the nation. None of them was submitted as a treaty for the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senators present.

These instances illustrate the clear influence of policy on the development of political procedures and legal forms in the conduct of American foreign affairs. The mere fact of this development is little known, and certainly its implications are not understood, outside a small circle of professional students and practitioners. The average well-informed American assumes that these measures were handled as treaties.

Some among those better acquainted with this development have drawn the conclusion from this record that policy can take care of itself, and that the flood waters of public support for coöperative policies will cut through or carry around any procedural obstacles. Unquestionably this is largely true — so long as there *are* rising flood waters of public support. But it is likewise true that there is a long course ahead over which American democracy, and its coöperative foreign policies, must pass with reasonable smoothness and dispatch, and more often than not without the aid of public opinion at flood tide. We are at a point where necessary progress in world order requires that the processes of international coöperation, whether within or without international organizations, must approach the day-in, day-out workability and effectiveness of the domestic legislative process. It is nonsense approaching knavery to let a people go on believing that a nation can lead in world affairs today unless its government is equipped with clean-cut and effective procedures for reaching agreement with other nations. Do we have such procedures?

III. THE TWO-THIRDS RULE

The word "treaty" is arbitrarily reserved throughout this discussion for that procedure under Article II, Section 2, of the

Constitution whereby the President is authorized to make treaties with the approval of two-thirds of the Senators present. In the course of the controversy as to what can legally be done outside this procedure, much ado has been made to the effect that the word "treaty" connotes some particular kind of international compact. Without venturing into that tangle of words and imprecisions, one can say with assurance that there is no generally accepted definition of the term "treaty," as used in our Constitution, except an international compact which has been submitted by the President for the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senators present.

Certainly the treaty procedure is a clean-cut procedure, so far as the *approval* of the international compact is concerned. In fact, it is our only explicit constitutional means of approving international compacts. As will be seen, the joint resolution procedures in theory, and at their present stage of development through usage, are primarily lawmaking actions exercising some legislative power of the Congress. Only incidentally are they procedures for the democratic review and approval of international compacts, *per se*. Under the independent executive agreement there is, of course, no approval of the compact.

The treaty procedure is not, however, an equally clean-cut procedure for *giving effect* to the positive undertakings which today are the heart of most of our important international compacts. Leaving aside the legal frolics which have been had for 150 years around the question of whether treaties are "self-executing," it is now generally conceded that no important national commitments involving men, money and tariffs are going to be effective without legislative action by *both* houses of the Congress. This, of itself, is an inadequacy in the treaty power which has already rendered that procedure unsatisfactory for handling many of our most important international undertakings. And it is an inadequacy which will get worse rather than better as international relations improve and the content of international coöperation becomes ever more positive. To suggest that the answer lies in having *both* two-thirds rule action in the Senate and majority vote action in both houses, on all such international compacts, is a form of constitutional theology which has not been taken seriously since that formula was written into Section 4 of the Dingley Tariff Act of 1897 with the not unanticipated result, namely, nothing done.

Serious as is this defect in the present treaty procedure, it is as nothing compared to the inadequacy of the two-thirds rule as a workable political procedure for the democratic review of coöperative foreign policies.

Here one has to say honestly whether one believes the nation's interests will be best served by the further development of coöperative foreign policies. Those who lack confidence in these policies will probably regard the difficulties of the two-thirds rule as virtues. Such readers can make their own transpositions in the analysis from here on. The writer is of a contrary persuasion.

If the two-thirds rule is to be judged primarily on its statistical record, it comes off fairly well.² Fewer than a dozen treaties having the support of a majority have failed because they fell short of a two-thirds vote. But if one makes a qualitative analysis of what was defeated and how; of what was mangled and where; and most especially of what was left undone and why (not to mention for the moment some of the larger intangibles in executive-legislative relations and the conduct of American foreign affairs), the two-thirds rule comes off very differently.³

Important treaties which received a favorable majority in the Senate but fell short of the necessary two-thirds vote included the Treaty of Versailles and the League Covenant (1920); the World Court Protocol (1935); and the St. Lawrence Seaway Treaty (1934). The Versailles instance is so fouled up by the argument over the Lodge reservations that it is probably inaccurate to credit the two-thirds rule alone with a clean kill; but there is no doubt at all that it was in on the kill and helped to mangle the victim, which, incidentally, turned out not to be just the Treaty of Versailles but the entire range of American foreign policies for a quarter of a century.

Under the two-thirds rule each opponent of a treaty is, in effect, given two votes as against the single vote of each supporter. The record shows that this is a very serious handicap if the measure is at all controversial. In the normal course of things most treaties of any consequence will have some opponents who, regardless of party affiliation, have objections to the merits of the

² Cf. Royden J. Dangerfield's "In defense of the Senate," Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1933.

³ Cf. W. Stull Holt's "Treaties Defeated by the Senate," Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933. This is by all odds the best study of actual workings of the two-thirds rule. Cf. also DeWitt C. Poole, "Structural Improvements in the Administration of Foreign Affairs," *Proceedings of American Philosophical Society*, 1933, v. 72, p. 77.

proposal. This, of itself, creates a hard pull on a two-thirds vote grade. But add to opposition on the merits the weight of votes lost owing to partisanship and to unacceptable reservations having been tacked on, and you have a load from which even the stoutest political wheel horses may well shy.

The latter two types of "extraneous" opposition are found to some degree, of course, under almost any legislative procedure. But they are especially virulent under the two-thirds rule.

The problem of partisanship and the place of party responsibility in the formulation of American foreign policies need more penetrating attention than they have received so far. Over the long pull they are much tougher problems of American statecraft than the citizen is led to believe from the nonpartisan or bipartisan coöperation evoked in times of crisis. The general problem cannot be factored here, but it is well to emphasize that the relationship of the two-thirds rule to partisanship is but one aspect of the broader problem. There seems to be a tendency on the part of some to regard the two-thirds rule and bipartisan coöperation in foreign affairs generally as standing in a cause and effect relation. But neither the record nor reason supports the idea that the two-thirds vote procedure is a cure for partisanship in foreign affairs. Professor Holt's study leaves little leeway for argument on our past record.⁴ The theoretical argument assumes that the two-thirds requirement necessarily works against partisan politics by forcing greater unanimity than would otherwise be present. It would be incorrect to say this never happens; but it is bound to be a relatively rare phenomenon, and when it happens it is usually at the expense of strong policies. The advantage of bipartisan coöperation on foreign affairs, wherever feasible, can be secured without putting our international compacts over a political steeplechase such as the two-thirds rule.

Actually unless the treaty is noncontroversial because of its innocuous subject matter or because of an abnormally widespread and intense public opinion on the issue, the two-thirds rule can be a fertile breeder of partisan opposition. In addition to those who sincerely support or oppose a measure on the merits, there are others who go along for "party purposes." It is these partisan votes in opposition to a treaty which cause so much trouble under the two-thirds rule. Under a procedure where each "nay" counts

⁴ As to both the record and reason, it is of interest that the only other countries using a two-thirds rule on the approval of treaties are Guatemala and Liberia.

for two "yeas," it is no answer to say that there are both pro and con "partisan votes." It is this political handicap under the two-thirds rule which enables a fairly small but determined opposition in the Senate to turn almost any treaty issue into a close fight and thereby to some degree into a partisan issue. For partisan opposition does not usually come into full play unless there is a good chance that a treaty can be defeated and the President and his party thereby embarrassed.

During the World Court treaty fight in the Senate in 1935 these tactics were used by a small but skillful and determined opposition to help change the position of a few Senators who, while not previously opposed to American adherence to the Court, could not resist the opportunity which developed to join the "convinced opposition" and thereby give President Roosevelt and his party a political setback. In this instance it was a "promiscuous partisanship" on the part of a few opponents of the treaty. Nothing approaching a question of party responsibility was involved, since both parties were pledged to favorable action on the World Court and many minority Senators stood by the pledge. Under such circumstances the two-thirds requirement actually draws into our foreign policy decisions the most irresponsible type of partisanship by making any controversy on the merits a tempting chance for an easy political kill.

In the event of organized party opposition to a treaty, it is doomed. It is axiomatic that while the third or more of the Senate necessary to defeat a treaty may be held together for reasons of party, there is rarely even a theoretical possibility of getting two-thirds together to support a treaty on a party basis.⁶

No one can foretell the future rôle of the two-party political system in the formulation of American foreign policies. But an informed guess would certainly not leave out of the calculation either past experience or today's very large truth that there is no seamless web which is more seamless than American domestic and foreign policies. Perhaps politics will hereafter stop at the water's edge, but already there are many places in our foreign policies where it is difficult to know where the water begins

⁶ The fact that the framers of the Constitution did not foresee the rise of our two-party system is basic. "If the framers of the Constitution had realized that the members of the Senate would be divided into political parties to one of which the President would also belong, and that two-thirds of the members of the Senate would very seldom belong to the same party as the President, they would hardly have put the power of defeating treaties in the hands of one more than one-third of the members of the Senate present." Holt, *op. cit.*, p. 12-13.

and the land leaves off, and it is not going to get easier to tell as our coöperative policies become more and more positive in trade, finance, transportation, communications and similar fields. A foreign policy procedure which at best is workable only in a political vacuum, free from any threat of partisan infection, is not the best of all possible vehicles for the long pull ahead.

The other opposition technique whose virulence is increased by the two-thirds rule is the use of amendments and reservations to kill a treaty. As the Senate's rules have stood for many years now, amendments to a treaty may be attached by majority vote, but the final advice and consent resolution, *as amended*, requires a two-thirds majority. This technique can be used to whip-saw a majority favorable to the treaty. A majority, frequently made up of both supporters and opponents of the treaty, will accept one "pet" amendment after another for the purpose (so far as the supporters of the treaty are concerned) of trying to pick up enough votes for a two-thirds majority on the final vote. And then one of two things may happen: either the "amended treaty" becomes unacceptable to some Senators who were originally its supporters; or if the amended treaty is not thus defeated, the President may find that it is unacceptable to him or to the other country or countries involved. Many treaties, the cause of whose death remains officially undetermined, died in this manner. Moreover, the danger of death by amendment is particularly great in modern multilateral treaties, since such treaties, when "amended," must be renegotiated with not just one country, but probably fifty.

The principal objection to the treaty procedure, however, is not what happens to a treaty which actually gets to the Senate, but rather on the influence this procedure has in shortchanging the content of our coöperative policies and in weakening the operation of democratic processes in foreign affairs.

American Presidents and Secretaries of State, and their subordinates who perhaps worry most about these things, faced with a handicap procedure such as the two-thirds rule, have the following broad courses open to them: 1. Make few or no important international compacts; in short, abandon coöperative foreign policies. 2. Meet the nation's needs only in part, by diluting international compacts to the point where there is not a political cough in a carload. 3. Go underground with secret agreements and resort more and more to personal diplomacy

with its informal, imprecise understandings behind vague public communiqués. 4. Carry on extensive and intensive public information campaigns to provide flood-tide support for occasional major treaty projects, such as the United Nations Charter. 5. Develop and use alternative procedures to the two-thirds rule treaty procedure.

In practice these courses are not exclusive. At one time or another Presidents and their Secretaries of State have used all of them, and not infrequently the same administration has used all at the same time in different fields of policy. Naturally enough, the first three courses are rarely openly avowed, and often they are probably not fully recognized as such by those who are forced into them. But anyone who is familiar with the day-to-day workings of American foreign affairs knows that the threat of our cumbersome treaty procedure has frequently blighted policy thinking at its very source. Responsible subordinates soon learn that Presidents and Secretaries of State have little time and less political stomach for proposals which are likely to involve them in an interminable treaty fight in which from the outset they are handicapped two to one. This is a circumstance which is literally serious beyond measure, because it means that without knowing it the nation is shortchanged in its policy needs by the only persons in a position to propose adequate coöperative foreign policy measures — our negotiators and their aides.

No elaboration is needed of the possibility that the Executive, faced with the necessity of protecting our vital interests by agreement, but impatient or despairing of an unworkable review procedure, may turn more and more to personal diplomacy with its imprecise understandings and secret undertakings.

Likewise there is no need to relate here the extraordinary precautions taken to assure safe passage of the United Nations Charter through the treaty procedure. It went through without controversy on a flood tide of public support which could not possibly be aroused for any significant number of treaties, however important. Public understanding and support of policy measures are necessary under any review procedure; they are not substitutes for a workable procedure.

The patent inadequacy or inadvisability of these courses as solutions of the Executive's problem of conducting coöperative foreign policies under the two-thirds rule has led over the years to the use of alternative procedures.

IV. ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES TO THE TWO-THIRDS RULE

A President has two such alternative procedures: (a) independent executive agreements; (b) the so-called joint resolution or legislative agreements.

Independent executive agreements⁶ go back to the earliest days of the country. The constitutional authority for them is implicit rather than explicit, and the most stable sanction behind them is the record of usage over the past 150 years. They clearly have a place in the conduct of American foreign affairs, particularly in respect to the military responsibilities of the Commander-in-Chief and the essentially ministerial and routine responsibilities of the President as the sole organ of the Government in international negotiations. But their rôle as a policy-formulating procedure is and ought to remain limited.

There is serious legal question as to the extent of this power. It is therefore a technique on which neither this nor any other government wishes to rely for major commitments, beyond the wartime powers of the Commander-in-Chief. Without either prior or subsequent Congressional sanction the agreements cannot in peacetime go far, if at all, into the stuff of positive coöperative foreign policies: men, money, and such things as tariffs.

While not wholly undemocratic, it is the least democratic of our foreign policy procedures. Except for the fact that the President is an elective official, it provides no opportunity for either prior or subsequent participation by the people or their legislative representatives in formulating coöperative foreign policies. It is therefore the weakest of our procedures for creating public understanding and support of our foreign policies. Congressional authorization or review of international compacts requires that the public and the legislature receive adequate information concerning our foreign affairs. Neither an *unused* treaty procedure (e.g. the two-thirds rule on many occasions) nor the independent executive agreement does this; and the resulting lack of public understanding and sustained support is serious beyond exaggeration. Contrast, for example, the precarious stability of the Atlantic Charter, of the United Nations Declaration of 1942, of Yalta, of

⁶ The lack of a uniform terminology is a symptom of the uncertainty and instability pervading the problem. The term "executive agreement" as used here is reserved for all international undertakings which are not submitted for the advice and consent of the Senate under the two-thirds rule. The word "independent" is used to identify those which do not rest upon either prior or subsequent Congressional sanction.

the Potsdam Agreements, with the public understanding of and support for even such technical policies as the Reciprocal Trade Agreements and the British Loan Agreement where there was prior or subsequent Congressional authorization; not to mention the United Nations Charter which went through the Senate.

The use of independent executive agreements to avoid an unworkable treaty procedure or the controversial joint resolution aggravates Executive-Congressional jealousies. And, as noted, it lends itself to secret agreements and the imprecise understandings of an unstable personal diplomacy. It is manifestly not a suitable instrument for major policy formulation under our system; it is a dangerous last resort to which, in the interest of stable policies and democratic processes, the Executive should not be forced.

The so-called joint resolution or legislative agreements have a common characteristic: they are subject to prior or subsequent Congressional action by a majority vote of both houses. The nature of this action has frequently not been closely analyzed in the arguments regarding either the constitutional theory or the precedents on which the joint resolution procedure rests.

It is not the purpose of this article to argue the constitutionality issue, though some mention of it is necessary. There are many possible causes of mental disturbance these days, but few assaults upon human reason can equal in effectiveness the legal arguments surrounding the question as to which international compacts are "treaties" requiring the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senators present and which can be sanctioned by a majority of both houses.⁷ Although some assert that the independent executive agreement may theoretically deal with any subject,⁸ few, if any, claim that as things stand today an international compact of this Government gets greater constitutional validity from being "authorized" or "approved" by joint resolution of both houses unless the agreement relates to a field covered by one of the legislative powers of Congress. By and large, the theoretical argument for the joint resolution procedure rests upon the view that Congress is simply legislating.

⁷ They have now reached the point where a protagonist of the two-thirds rule explains away certain joint resolution precedents with that magical word "waiver" — the *femme fatale* of the first-year law student and the last resort of the practitioner. The suggestion that constitutional usage may be rebutted by viewing past departures from the two-thirds rule as "waivers" by the Senate of a constitutional requirement is surely the acme of neo-New Dealism or novelty in constitutional law. Cf. E. M. Borchard, "Treaties and Executive Agreements," *American Political Science Review*, August 1946, p. 732, and his argument against the St. Lawrence Agreement.

⁸ See McClure, *op. cit.*

If the argument concerning the joint resolution procedure is kept narrowed down to a debate on the issue of constitutional power, the writer stands with those who uphold the legal power of the President and Congress together to act, internationally and domestically, as to any matter within the legislative powers of the Congress; and he believes the indications are clear that the courts take this position. But the question of the adequacy of the procedure as the basic policy-forming technique of American foreign affairs is broader and harder. The principal difficulty with the joint resolution procedure is that there is no commonly accepted understanding of just what it is or can be. *Thus, every coöperative foreign policy action which rests on the joint resolution procedure is an actual or potential subject of political controversy on procedure as well as on its substantive merits.* In so far as it has a defined existence, this alternative to the treaty procedure is a creature of usage. It is best understood, as it is best justified, by reference to what has been done under it.

There are three principal ways in which this procedure has been used to provide either prior authorization or subsequent sanction, explicit or implicit, for our international compacts.

First, there is the situation, for which the precedents are most numerous, where Congress exercises its legislative powers to give a prior sanction and domestic effect to agreements to be made by the President within bounds and policies laid down by Congress but without any subsequent reference of the concluded agreements to the House or Senate. The Trade Agreements Act of 1934 is the prime illustration of this type of action.

Second, there is the situation illustrated by the UNRRA agreement where the Congressional sanction took the implied and oblique form of incorporating the concluded agreement in the joint resolution authorizing an appropriation for the purpose. The Bretton Woods Bank and Fund Agreements and the British Loan Agreement were handled in basically the same way except that other legislative powers, in addition to the appropriation power, were involved; and, as is unquestionably better practice, these agreements, although previously negotiated, were not made effective as to this Government until after the Congressional action. In this type of action there is no explicit Congressional "approval" of the compact, as such.

Third, there is what might be designated the most advanced form of the joint resolution procedure whereby an international

agreement, concluded by the Executive on an *ad referendum* basis as in the case of "treaties," is submitted for the explicit "approval" of Congress. As yet precedents for this "advanced form" of the joint resolution technique are rare. The pending St. Lawrence Seaway Agreement of 1941 is such a case.

The prior authorization technique is especially useful for joint Congressional-Executive action in the formulation of coöperative foreign policies. More effectively than any other technique available under our system, it gives the legislative branch an opportunity for taking a positive initiative in foreign policy formulation (rather than mere review) and thereby assures the Congress of an active voice in policy. In fact, this technique well applied is perhaps as close as we can come under our present practice to the advantages of the parliamentary form of government in the conduct of coöperative foreign policies where the responsibility and authority of the negotiator are at a premium. Its usefulness is limited, of course, by the fact that it is not a feasible method for all foreign policy problems. It is of especial value in technical fields such as the tariff, where bounds and general policies can be laid down for the negotiator and where legislative wisdom can operate more effectively and more courageously on questions of broad policy than it can, for example, on the multitude of complex actions in a concluded trade agreement.

The second, and especially the third, forms of joint resolution action are important because they provide subsequent Congressional review and sanction of important international compacts made on the initiative of the Executive and usually reflecting exigencies which could not have been foreseen and covered in prior legislation. Functionally, this is the classical rôle of the treaty procedure. Our need is for a procedure which serves this essential function through a workable and generally accepted political form. Without such a procedure, the American Executive (our negotiator) lacks the responsibility and authority of the representatives of either parliamentary or totalitarian governments. His disadvantage will be reflected either in inadequate agreements or in the derogation of our democratic processes.

Functionally, the joint resolution procedures are adequate techniques. Legally, the weight of the argument seems to be with those who uphold the power. But there is a great political flaw. As things stand, there is a perennial argument about bypassing the two-thirds rule; and the weight of that procedural argument

falls, sometimes imperceptibly, sometimes with a dull thud, but always in the same place, that is to say, on the *content* of our coöperative foreign policies.

Here is the crux of the matter: there is no definition of general application as to form, scope, content, duration or legal consequence which can distinguish those international compacts which must be submitted to the Senate as "treaties" under the two-thirds rule, and those which may be treated as "agreements" and be given effect domestically by joint resolution action of both houses by majority vote. At least as to the vast majority of our important compacts which today touch some area of Congressional legislative power, the choice as between the treaty procedure and the joint resolution course can in truth be nothing but a political question. That being the case, there will be constant political objection in the Congress, especially in the Senate, to letting a President have a choice as to whether he proceeds by two-thirds rule or joint-resolution majority vote in submitting important international compacts for review and approval. And that objection, on grounds of prerogative and unconstitutional procedure, will be expressed in political opposition to many joint resolution agreements.⁹ So long as that condition exists, the joint resolution procedure is not and cannot become a routine, clean-cut method for the even-handed democratic review of coöperative foreign policies. It, too, is a handicap procedure, involving not the treaty procedure hurdle of a two-thirds vote, but the added weight of an extraneous political controversy over procedure and prerogatives. It, too, is in conflict with policy.

To sum the situation up:

The two-thirds rule procedure is neither workable nor does it enable the legislative branch to participate adequately in the formulation of positive foreign policies. It is a handicap procedure under which coöperative policies sufficiently consequential to involve some controversy are, in all probability, either stillborn within the Department of State; smothered to death by delay,

⁹ The two dominant Republican figures in the Senate have been very clear that there is a serious issue here, and that the President does not have a choice. In reply to Senator Hayden's argument in connection with the Connally Resolution of 1943 that an agreement setting up a general international organization could be approved by joint resolution as well as by two-thirds of the Senate as a treaty, Senator Vandenberg stated: "I wish to make it totally plain that if I accepted his interpretation of the resolution . . . I would not vote for it, and if any President accepted the interpretation which the Senator has given I would favor his impeachment." *Congressional Record*, November 5, 1943, v. 89, pp. 9315-9317. In 1942 Senator Taft thought, "The line is shadowy but there certainly is a line." *Congressional Record*, December 3, 1942, v. 88, p. 9280.

reservations or amendments in the Senate; or defeated by a combination of convinced opponents and opportunistic partisans, an obstacle which can rarely be overcome when each "nay" counts for two "yea" votes.

The independent executive agreement has its place, but it involves no review by the legislative branch and is manifestly unsuited as a general procedure for the formulation of positive foreign policies under our system.

The joint resolution procedure raises the issue of Executive circumvention of the Senate's prerogatives. Since it is impossible to know beforehand just how this political issue will be resolved in any particular case, it is difficult for the Executive to negotiate international engagements with any sense of security. It is a serious trouble-breeder, not only between the Executive and Congress, especially the Senate, but also between the House and Senate. Finally, the joint resolution method is limited by the fact that so long as the explicit two-thirds rule stands in the Constitution, this method, resting on implicit power, cannot be conclusively established as the regular, unquestioned means of submitting international undertakings for legislative review and approval. Even its greatly increased use, which is inevitable in the immediate future, cannot change the fact that this procedure will remain an escape hatch.

If the use of force in international relations is to be elevated to the rôle of a united police power, the interests of nations are going to be realized through persuasion and agreement — or they are not going to be realized, at least peacefully. That is the fact of international life today. No single factor in American foreign relations is at once both so seriously deficient and so exclusively and readily within our hands to remedy as the present state of our constitutional processes for reaching international agreement.

V. THE REPAIR OF THE "IRREPARABLE"

The heart of the trouble is the fact that so long as Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution says that the President "shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur," the authorization or review of international compacts by majority vote of both houses can never be completely removed from political controversy. The only remedy that can reach this trouble and correct it in time is a constitutional amendment.

There are several possibilities for changing the two-thirds rule by amendment. Some have proposed that the power be retained exclusively in the Senate, but that the "advice and consent" be by majority rather than two-thirds vote. This proposal has the merit of lowering the political hurdle, but it has serious deficiencies. It has no appeal for the House of Representatives, which must approve constitutional amendments by a two-thirds vote; and it would continue the existing inadequacy of the treaty procedure in matters where participation of the House is necessary to give legislative effect to positive undertakings.

The proposal with the widest appeal is that the "advice and consent" be given by both houses, by normal majority action. This proposal has a natural appeal to the House. Functionally, it is clean-cut and is adaptable. It eliminates the divergence between treaty and legislative procedures, thereby permitting, under the treaty procedure, full use of the present joint resolution techniques for either prior or subsequent legislative sanction of international engagements, as the circumstances may require. It corresponds to current practice and the inevitable trend toward greater use of the joint resolution machinery. This is of central consequence since it would mean a constitutional change which solved the problem by meeting rather than seeking to alter the natural course of affairs. It is based on the normal legislative process, and is thus a tried, proven and familiar political procedure. Few, if any, constitutional changes could involve less experimentation. It would assure more widely understood and more democratically supported foreign policies.¹⁰

John Hay regarded the two-thirds rule as the "irreparable mistake" of the Constitution. The historical explanation of the provision is still cluttered with more "good" reason than real ones, but today's evidence supports the following conclusions on

¹⁰ Among the more novel amendment proposals the most interesting is that whereby treaties which secure majority but fail to secure two-thirds approval in the Senate would go to the House and, if approved by a majority there, would become effective just as if they had secured a two-thirds vote in the Senate initially. Aside from its obvious advantages in removing the obstructive features of the present procedure, the main virtue of this proposal is its possible appeal to the Senate because it retains in part and in appearance the Senate's primacy. However, it is probably too novel and too complicated to have wide public appeal as an amendment; it may well have too little appeal to the House; and it is seriously deficient for the long range in that it would perpetuate and perhaps even widen the divergence between our legislative procedures for foreign and domestic policies, a gap which becomes more artificial each day and the continuance of which, of itself, will increasingly be a deterrent to straight thinking on national policies. Finally, it might result in our having two classes of treaties, legally and in degree of political prestige. There is, however, no reason why the doctrine of *Missouri v. Holland* need be disturbed by any of the amendments.

the two pertinent issues:¹¹ First, the treaty procedure was confined to the Senate exclusively because the treaty power was viewed as a right and concern of states, not of people, and accordingly the founders sought not a democracy of the people in treaty-making, but rather a continuation of the power in that body where the then "sovereign conscious" states were represented equally. Secondly, the treaty procedure was made subject to a two-thirds rule because under specific circumstances *then* prevailing (*e.g.* the Mississippi navigation and New England fisheries issues), the Constitution could not have been agreed on unless the continuation of a minority veto over treaties was assured.

The historical record cannot be analyzed here, but this can fairly be said: unless one holds¹² that this nation in the decisive years ahead can afford the luxury of minority sectional vetoes over its national interests and international policies, there are today no valid historical reasons for associating the Founding Fathers with those who for other than historical reasons now oppose changing the two-thirds rule.

Perhaps the most plausible objection to changing the two-thirds rule stems from the argument that since treaties, unlike statutes, cannot be "repealed," their approval should require an extraordinary majority. The argument rests on the assumption that the larger majority in the Senate will assure a sounder, more perfect treaty with greater political and popular support to assure its observance in the future. The point merits attention, but careful analysis of it illumines and confirms, rather than impairs, the case for the amendment proposal.

First, it is relevant to recall that the two-thirds rule was not intended as a device to assure widespread popular support; in actual practice, review by both houses of Congress is a far broader base for public understanding and popular support of a public policy than two-thirds action in the Senate alone.

Secondly, the long-run support of a treaty in the country depends more upon this popular understanding and support than upon the number of Senators (especially not the difference between a majority and two-thirds) which at some previous time approved the treaty. And carrying this point further — the true

¹¹ Charles Warren, "The Mississippi River and the Treaty Clause of the Constitution," 2 *George Washington Law Review*, 271 (1934). Cf. McDougal and Lans, *op. cit.*, p. 536-549.

¹² As apparently does E. M. Borchard, *op. cit.*

stability of international engagements is to be found in the quality of the treaty itself, *i.e.* the extent to which it really meets the international problem, and in the practical ability of the parties to adjust the treaty from time to time to meet changing needs and conditions to their mutual advantage. The latter is the only effective "repeal" remedy for unsatisfactory treaties.

As to the intrinsic quality of treaties, it seems reasonable to suppose that a handicap review procedure such as the two-thirds rule, which may force compromises involving inadequate or unsound answers to the problem, is not likely to produce as satisfactory treaties as a review procedure which does not require the life or the merits to be compromised out in order to give the treaty an even chance at ratification.

The greatest guarantee of the stability and enforcement of treaties, however, is the practical probability of adjusting the treaty by mutual agreement when changing circumstances require. And here the present issue comes to sharp focus. For us this "practical probability" is largely a question of getting a workable treaty procedure. With a workable, regularly established review procedure, treaties can be kept much more satisfactorily adjusted to the necessities of rapidly changing conditions than they can under a procedure which works to freeze a treaty or the lack of it into an unchangeable status quo. Frozen treaties are the ones whose enforcement causes trouble.

But the fate of an amendment is not likely to turn on such arguments. The convinced opposition to an amendment comes mainly from three sources: isolationism, state and sectional provincialism, and Senatorial "prerogativism." In addition, there are the opponents of any constitutional change; those who fear that certain Senators may be stirred to uncoöperative wrath if the issue is raised; and those who fear that the effort to get an amendment may cast doubt on the legality of the joint-resolution usages. There are even those who fear that a more workable treaty procedure might hamper the Executive's sway over foreign affairs because he would have to use it!

Isolationists are genuinely opposed to the further development of coöperative foreign policies, and there is only one honest line of argument, short of a complete conversion on policies, which ought to move them on this issue. They, too, have a stake in our democratic processes. No man who remotely understands the technical intricacies of this problem and the processes whereby

American foreign policies are "made" today, regardless of where he stands on policy issues, can have any doubt that the outlook for democratic control of our foreign policies is poor, indeed, if this trial by battle between procedure and policy is continued indefinitely. Our procedures for reaching agreement with other nations today range from the dismal probabilities of the two-thirds rule, through the uncertainties and perennial controversies of the joint resolution procedures, to the probabilities and necessity of greater resort by the Executive to independent executive agreements and personal diplomacy. This is both fact and trend.

The great majority of Americans are today staking the national future and their individual futures on the ability of coöperative foreign policies to develop the minimum essentials of world law and authority. These Americans are more concerned about the soundness and success of our foreign policies than they are with ordinary questions of sectional interests or prerogatives. They will support this reform ardently if they are made to understand its bearing on the great question they have at heart. And this understanding is something which will have to be achieved primarily by the efforts of private persons having a substantial acquaintance in American foreign affairs.

There has been more interest in the matter, both in Congress and by the public, in the past three years than ever previously. In 1945, for the first time, the amendment to provide for approval of treaties by majority action of both houses was endorsed by the House Judiciary Committee and received a two-thirds vote by the House. It was not acted on by the Senate Judiciary Committee. Because of an ill-considered change made on the floor of the House requiring an absolute majority of all members, the form of the amendment as proposed ought to be reconsidered in the House in any event.

The House proceedings attracted widespread attention, and in the spring of 1944 samples of press and popular opinion showed some 60 percent favorable to the approval of treaties by majority action of both houses. Many leading papers, national organizations and individual leaders support the change and a number of state legislatures have memorialized Congress in favor of it. As a Vice-Presidential candidate, President Truman was reported as emphatically supporting the proposed amendment.¹³

The political leadership for the amendment must come from a

¹³ *Christian Science Monitor*, October 4, 1944.

bipartisan leadership in the Senate which really understands the magnitude of the consequences of a refusal to meet the situation straightforwardly. There is a growing number of Senators who see the clear advantage to the Senate, as well as to the nation, in elimination of a rule which, as Senator O'Mahoney stated, "has operated to expand the powers of the Executive at the expense of the Senate by steadily broadening the field in which foreign relations are conducted by Executive agreement rather than by treaty."¹⁴ Perhaps the most serious deterrent to action now is the lulling effect of the U.N. Charter's untroubled passage and the probable passage of the Peace Treaties on the same flood tide. A look at the inventory of pending business and at the past record are healthy antidotes for complacency.

There have been few occasions in the past when the potentiality for enlightened bipartisan leadership on this issue was as good as it seems to be today. Neither the President nor the Secretary of State can safely take the initiative, or even be publicly candid about the problem. They have the heavy and urgent responsibilities of each day's business which must be put through as best it can with whatever procedures are at hand. They cannot be expected to jeopardize their daily relations with the Senate by assuming the leadership on a matter which some of certainty will seek to ignite into an issue of prerogatives. But the President and the Secretary of State could readily and effectively respond to the initiative of bipartisan Senate statesmanship.

Today's preoccupation in our foreign affairs is with the difficulties of negotiation and the reconciliation of major differences with other nations. These difficulties cannot be resolved by legerdemain, or merely by changes in our internal procedures. But we are committed by conviction and necessity to solving these difficulties, and then to seeking our larger opportunities, through the processes of international agreement. Today by any man's honest judgment our procedures for the democratic review and execution of international engagements are — whatever the reason and legal arguments — in an unholy mess. The true conflict is not between the Executive and the Senate, nor is the primary issue the undemocratic nature of the two-thirds rule. The real conflict is between our procedures and our policies; the issue is whether procedure should determine or serve our policies.

¹⁴ *Congressional Record*, October 27, 1943, p. A4873.

MIDDLE ENGLAND

By E. L. Woodward

AN ENGLISHMAN who has had the good fortune to spend five to six months in the United States would be foolish if he did not learn a great deal and even more foolish if he assumed that he had learned enough to make large and dogmatic generalizations about American opinion. Indeed, he will find that his impressions are too vivid and in many respects too contradictory to allow hard and fast conclusions. Above all, he will hesitate to commit himself to any political judgments. Nevertheless even here one fact stands out clearly. In spite of the widespread interest in British affairs and in spite also of the high ability and keen eyes of American correspondents in London, the interpretation of Great Britain in most American books and papers is slightly out of focus. This is inevitably the case. The distortion would be greater if the journalists were less good at their job; but journalists have to report news, and on the old theory that "man bites dog" is news, whereas the reverse is not, most of what happens in England fails at least to reach American headlines.

Past history, from the point of view of the press, belongs mainly to the "dog bites man" category, and yet this lack of focus, which is even more noticeable in the British view of America, is due in part to an underestimate of the significance of historical forces. The influence of the past upon the present is more difficult to analyze in the United States than in Great Britain, but it is not less potent. Without a considerable knowledge of American history, an Englishman must fail to understand why the extraordinary coalition of opposites known as the Democratic Party and the other extraordinary coalition of opposites known as the Republican Party can maintain themselves as units. If they were stars, and not parties, they would certainly explode and out of their fragments new political worlds would be formed. In other words, logic would suggest an entirely new "setup." But tradition is stronger than logic.

It may be that tradition in the United States has this peculiar clamping power because it is so recent. At all events, Americans cannot easily realize why a country like Great Britain, which has carried into the present so much history, can jettison a great deal of the past without fear of a revolutionary break in national hab-

its. The English have known and survived so many changes that they are not afraid of change. They are less nervous about "un-English" activities by their fellow-countrymen than Americans tend to be nervous about "un-American" activities. A nation possessing a house of hereditary peers, to which a Labor Government continues to make additions, need not trouble overmuch about the disturbing effect of getting rid of lesser anachronisms.

Similarly, there is more submission to the laws but less respect for written documents in Great Britain than in America. The railway station at the state capital of Wisconsin displays a facsimile of the Declaration of Independence. For many years — until after 1939 — the Great Western Railway terminus in London had a royal waiting room; although it was practically never used, no one thought of taking the much-needed space for other purposes. Americans would hardly tolerate an anachronism of this kind at the Pennsylvania Station; a loyal English citizen would be astonished to see a facsimile of Magna Carta in a railway station. More fuss is made about early copies of this Charter in the United States than in Great Britain, yet again only one American in a million realizes that the document belongs to an epoch in which "free enterprise" and the "capitalist system" hardly existed, agricultural serfdom was taken for granted, and justice was largely a matter of personal status. It is true that few Englishmen know that the "free men" of King John's reign were a privileged minority, but there is in England a vague realization of the meaning of continuous historical change because there is everywhere present some visible evidence of a remote and "different" past; for example, the King's consent to the bill nationalizing the coal mines was given in Norman French. The English habit of preserving nonessentials is, in a way, an acknowledgment that essentials change. English conservatism is less timid than American conservatism, since the English are more able to envisage how small are the effects of any one political measure against the total background of a "historical" people. The changes brought about by legislation are in any case smaller than those which take place unawares. The invention of the bicycle has had social consequences more extensive than anything likely to come out of the present program of the Labor Government except the Education Act, and this was more or less agreed upon by all parties.

These considerations, however, are not intended to belittle the

importance of deliberately planned social or political change or to suggest that the last general election in Great Britain was not an event of historical importance. They merely show that the British people have not suddenly become enamored of what Queen Elizabeth called "newfangledness." Even on a basis of figures, there was nothing startling about the general election; the number of seats won by a very small margin of votes was enough to warn sober party managers that, even if they had a wish to do so, ministers had not obtained a mandate to upset everything in the country. There has been, of course, a certain amount of trumpet-blowing and, one might add, of coat-trailing by the victors; on the other side, a number of Conservatives have begun to fear that chaos and ruin are approaching. It will be remembered that a stout-hearted man like the first Duke of Wellington held this view for years on end during the most remarkable era of English progress in the nineteenth century.

Some echoes of the trumpet-blowing have been heard in the United States; their reverberation has led at times to false impressions. In fact, politicians never have the freedom of action to which they pretend in election addresses; English politicians at this moment have very little freedom. Circumstances dictate a particular line of policy aiming at the restoration and maintenance of economic well-being. It is unlikely that any body of sensible men would differ very much about the essentials of this day-to-day policy, although they might describe it in different ways. Thus few people in England really believe that "controls" could be abolished here and now without economic disaster or that the coal industry could be reorganized without drastic state interference. In the sphere of foreign policy there is room for differences of opinion about methods, but again there is not a very large freedom of choice. On the specific question of Anglo-American relations, no one desires to weaken the forces making for coöperation between the two countries, though there is a certain bewilderment and also a certain nervousness about American policy. The average Englishman feels bewildered at the present contrast between American abundance and British scarcity. He cannot understand why after a war effort supposed to be "100 percent" on each side of the Atlantic, the British people should emerge with the loss of a considerable part of their national wealth while the American people at least appear to be richer than before. An English housewife finds it odd that English china to match a tea-

set shattered in the Blitz can be bought in New York but is not on sale in London. The nervousness, which is increasing, is due to fears that America, having willed the restoration of multi-lateral international trade, will now refuse to will the means necessary to secure this end. In other words, the British standard of life may fall still further, at all events for a time, as a result of a *volte-face* in American economic policy. But there is no alternative to a policy of "wait and see" as far as America is concerned. Everyone, for obvious reasons, would welcome a lasting improvement in Anglo-Soviet relations; no one would purchase this friendship at the cost of Anglo-American coöperation.

All this goes to reinforce the view of the French statesman Thiers nearly a hundred years ago that British governments tend to be left-center. It is historically true that governments which have deviated noticeably from the left-center line have suffered heavily on an appeal to the electors. The general election of 1945 was in this respect a deferred day of reckoning for the mistakes of the Baldwin-Chamberlain era. From this point of view the war made little difference to the result. Indeed, it is probable that, if there had been no war, and if the election had taken place in the autumn of 1939, the Labor majority would have been greater. A sense of obligation to Mr. Churchill for his immense services kept and still keeps a good many possible wanderers within the Conservative fold.

Nonetheless, left-center is left-center and not right-center. Even after discounting a good deal of post-election shouting and after allowing for the narrowness of the immediate choices allowed to any British Government today, there remain many aspects of the 1945 victory which ought not to be explained as accidental. The Labor victory represented a real change, although it should not be called a revolutionary change, in the temper of the English people. The victory was not won by chance accretions to the Labor vote. It was not merely the result of the soldiers' impatience of discipline or exasperation of women voters over shopping queues. It was not due only to the solid core of trade unionists conscious of the work which the unions have done in the past for the working class. The Conservatives might well have come back with a small majority if a large section of the middle class had not voted against them. A section of this vote belongs to the "floating" electorate and cannot be relied upon for continued support. What might be called the highly educated Labor

vote is unlikely to be lost. A generation ago it would have been given mainly to the Liberals. Political forecasts are dangerous things, but a revival of a Liberal Party seems a little improbable. In a sense the Liberal Party in politics today resembles the Church of England in religion. Except for those born into the faith, each stands for a complicated intellectual position; neither is likely to produce mass conversions.

What did the supporters of Labor mean by their vote? What did they expect a Labor Government to do? It is difficult in any country to define the "working class" except in an arbitrary way, and still more difficult to know what this class thinks about politics. On the whole, Dickens' picture of the English workingman is true — minus a good deal of sentimentality. There is considerable class feeling, a certain amount of jealousy, but surprisingly little class hatred. One would rather notice a quick resentment at injustice, a distrust of rhetoric (including rhetorical appeals to revolution), a rough common sense, and a very shrewd judgment of the possible. There is also, as events have shown time after time, a remarkable power of "holding on;" an analogy with the habits of bulldogs is not merely a caricaturist's fancy.

The English working class has long known that the franchise was an instrument conferring political power. This power is now in their hands. They propose to use it. They also propose to "hold on" to it. They will "hold on" to the Labor Party in politics even if their leaders make mistakes, just as they have held on often enough in battles where their commanders have committed blunders. They do not want revolutionary action; they have no need of it. They do not want to turn their power against other classes; a class with political power in England has rarely used it in this way. Finally, they are patriotic Englishmen (or Scots or Welshmen); their habits are not those of a downtrodden peasantry or an outcast proletariat suddenly in the possession of authority. It must not be forgotten that Mr. Churchill is still the most popular subject of the Crown. There is — as he well knows — no inconsistency in cheering him and voting against him.

Working class interests begin with the acquisition of material things. Why not? Workingmen know that their standard of living has risen in the last hundred years. Industrialism has made life longer, given more varied choices, provided better food, better clothing, better houses. The rate of improvement has been slow, but it can be speeded up and a more even distribution of purchas-

ing power can secure for the working class a larger share of wealth here and now. No Englishman, whatever his party, can feel in his heart that these demands are unreasonable. Moreover, they are not demands for material things only. The desire for more leisure is a desire for liberty. There are things in England, as elsewhere, which money cannot buy, but the poor are less likely to get them than the rich, since cultural values depend ultimately upon the possession of leisure. Similarly, working class demands put great emphasis upon security. "Social security" is a misleading term if it is taken to imply a decline in the vigor of the English people. It merely means insurance against risks which threaten a man's standard of life; these risks are not comparable with those taken in the reasonable employment of capital. It is not a sign of timidity or slackening of energy to take out a life insurance policy.

Finally, there is a sense of democratic equality, a belief in the high value of the individual, behind this insistence upon a more even distribution of purchasing power. Such a belief in equality is not new in English history. It was given explicit statement in a time of social unrest six centuries ago. It does not necessarily carry with it the abolition of distinctions of rank. It means only that no one shall fall, as it were, below a certain margin of independence and level of human dignity.

No one, and certainly no American, is likely to quarrel with these demands or to regard them as evidence of national decline or social disintegration. The field of possible disagreement lies in the methods used to bring about the desired changes. Obviously they cannot be brought about merely by "soaking the rich" and otherwise leaving the existing social and economic order unaltered. The average of political intelligence in Great Britain is too high to allow any party to get away with this kind of naïveté. The main theme of the Socialist program for which a majority of the British electorate voted in 1945 was the removal of the "profit motive" from the provision of the essential needs and services of the country. There was and is much exaggeration in the attacks upon "private profit." All political slogans, not excluding those of so-called individualism and "free enterprise," tend to exaggeration. In fact, no political group with any appreciable following in Great Britain wants to confiscate or destroy all sources of private profit or to remove all opportunities of private enterprise. The government which now has the support of the working class is acting only on the belief 1, that certain industries and services are

essential to a modern community; 2, that these main requirements of the community have been supplied hitherto by private interests whose primary motive has been profit-making; and 3, that such methods of getting essential work done may have been necessary in the past but are unnecessary, wasteful and socially undesirable in the present stage of industrial technique which allows and even demands for efficiency a much greater degree of planning and control by the whole community.

This view may be right or wrong. It is not just the view of a class out for loot. It cannot be set aside merely by calling it the road to serfdom or to the police state. Moreover, as far as Great Britain is concerned, the desire for better planning and social control is not felt by the working class alone. Herein lies the importance of the second and smaller class of voter which gave Labor its majority. It is a mistake to suppose that all the professional men or women who voted Labor belong to the type known, a little unfairly, as "intellectuals." (Incidentally, some of these are tiresome exhibitionists or social misfits, but most are hard-headed people who have to earn a living in a real world.) The Labor program has an appeal to many Englishmen with practical experience of running a business because to their minds the program takes account of the essential facts that the technique of modern industry is *social* and that it implies a division of function, a multiplication of effort, a dovetailing of countless individual acts which will run to waste if there is not planning and control.

There is, of course, a certain tautology in describing any act of society as social. Even Diogenes did not make his own tub or, for that matter, cut and transport the wood for it, but it can be said that in certain types of society, for example, in a simple agricultural community working with locally-made appliances for home consumption or a nearby market, or in a community where industry is a matter of handicraft, there is no need for anything more than local coördination. Individuals or small communities are obviously not the effective units of modern agriculture or modern industry. The argument can be pushed too far, but it is not unconvincing in a general sense. Moreover, in Great Britain the logic of modern industrial technique has already been accepted to a very considerable extent. The phrase "we are all Socialists now" is more than fifty years old and was coined by a Gladstonian Liberal. Experiments in municipal enterprise and social services have been carried a long way, and on the whole

with successful results. The faults of "bureaucracy" are not more noticeable in these enterprises than in most large-scale concerns. The advantages are that the consumer has shaken off a good many of the servitudes to which he has to submit in an order where "free enterprise" really means not the freedom of the individual but that of large private corporations.

Thus when full allowance has been made for the attraction of catchwords and slogans, the present program of the Labor Party represents not a weary surrender of effort and still less a vengeful but negative plan of spoliation. This program generates enthusiasm and attracts young and active minds because it represents an adjustment of society to the economic environment and because it means liberation and not enslavement for the individual. There are dangers in any experiment. The opponents of the present government have laid enough stress upon the dangers of "planning" and of all forms of collectivism for the public to be aware of their existence. There are also safeguards. The habits of the English, their love of political freedom, their incessant watchfulness against undue interference, their sensitiveness to any tampering with their rights, and, one might add, their hearty dislike of the restrictions put upon them by present circumstances, provide strong barriers against the spread of totalitarianism. A free parliament, a free press, a legal system and courts of law which have always upheld the rights of private citizens against arbitrary power supply an institutional framework which will not easily admit the despotism of the state. Finally, there are the limits set to experiment by present-day facts. The life of Great Britain depends upon the export trade and, paradoxically, the "survival test" of the Labor experiment must be whether it can give the foreign buyer what he wants at the price he is willing to pay.

Here I reach one of the most-discussed points of the position today. Many people argue that, whatever may be the merits of removing large sections of British economic activities from the region of private profit, the present moment is not suited for undertaking such experiments. We need short-term and not long-term programs. There is a good deal of truth in this argument. It was, I think, rather stronger 12 months ago than it is today. In the excitement of their victory, ministers and their supporters tended to forget that they had to provide the next meal rather than plan the menus of a distant future. The recent White Paper, and the appeals to workers to increase production, show that the

gravity of the situation is not unrealized. The Labor ministers may be mistaken in their policy, but they are not daydreaming. Moreover, it is at least open to discussion that, so far from interfering with the short-term program, the far-reaching schemes of the Government are as essential to immediate recovery as to a more remote well-being. Once again it is necessary to remember the nervousness felt by all parties, and not only by the Labor Party, about the trend of opinion in the United States. If America turns towards economic isolationism, that is to say, if she not only fails to absorb her own increased productive power but fails also to buy from those to whom she wishes to sell, then Great Britain will find herself requiring as much planning and direction of effort as was essential to her political and economic existence at the height of the war. The present long-term plans are from this point of view a form of insurance which the English would be unwise to neglect. Furthermore, there is a strong psychological or at all events practical argument in favor of getting on with the long-term program. There is no doubt that the attempt to put it into effect is satisfying the electors and is making a response on their side more probable.

It would be idle to deny that there is a real problem in getting this response. The British consumer — and the majority of consumers belong to the working class — has had to put up with a great deal in the last seven years. Year after year hope of relaxation has been deferred. After a war which the Germans provoked, the consumer now has to “go without” to the tune of some \$300,000,000 a year to keep the Germans alive. “Fill the ships and we will fill the shops” is a good phrase from the Government to the workers in the export trades; the shops are not yet any fuller, but the workers are more likely to listen to the advice when it comes from a Labor Government and from Ministers who are trying to carry out their promises. The wonder is not that there have been strikes and a falling-off in production in Great Britain after the strain of the war, but that the unrest and slackening have not been greater. No government could maintain or improve the position if it had not the confidence of the working class; for good reasons or bad, the Conservatives had forfeited this confidence as far as concerned the management of peacetime affairs. If they are to regain the popular support which they have lost, they will have to readjust their ideas on a scale comparable with the change from Toryism to Conservatism in Sir Robert

Peel's time. I do not think that they are incapable of such an adjustment. There is as much life and ability in the Conservative Party as in the Labor Party, and not less goodwill. Within the general picture which I have tried to draw it will be seen that there is ample room for criticism of the methods of the "new course" in British politics, but this criticism will be barren if it does not take account of the fact that the course is at all events as new as anything can be in the long years of English history, and that the novelty is a sign of life and energy.

Thus if I might return to the question of the lack of focus in the American view of England, I should say that American opinion has misinterpreted these signs of growth and adaptation and has taken them to be evidence of a certain lack of backbone or of the collapse of the "little man" into the arms of an all-too-paternal state. As a corrective of this view it is perhaps worth while for Americans to notice that in English eyes *they* are the people who cannot read the significance of the times and who allow themselves to be ensnared by outworn catchwords and imprisoned in economic policies out of relation to the present-day world. English nervousness about American action is due simply to this fact that the English see the United States heading for another economic disaster through sheer failure of intellectual analysis. It is probable, or at all events it is to be hoped, that this view of the immediate future of American policy is as wrong as the American view of the decline of English enterprise and initiative. Nonetheless, the English do believe that they have made the more correct diagnosis of the troubles of the world and that they have found a way out.

The way out, as so often in English history, is a middle course between anarchy and constraint. Ideologically as well as geographically, England is set between the United States and the Soviet Union. There are dangers in this position, but there are also great advantages; and, on balance, although they know that they must do a good deal of rather drab and monotonous "holding-on," the English people are not without a strong sense of optimism about their own future. At any rate, if these English have remained as self-satisfied as ever they were of their own thrice-blessed intellectual superiority, they cannot be said to have thrown away in a mood of revolutionary excitement all the qualities which their critics have observed in them over past and more prosperous years.

UNESCO FACES TWO WORLDS

By Byron Dexter

THE new international body which is known for convenience as UNESCO is a product of the widespread belief that only to the degree that there is a world community will world law be practicable and a world political organization be effective. It is the instrument devised to help build that community by working directly to mold men's ideas. But in addressing itself to that apparently beneficent task, it finds — perhaps a little to its surprise — that it is dealing with some of the most explosive political issues now confronting statesmen and people.

The first General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (to give it its full name) was held in Paris in November and December of last year and was attended by delegates of the 44 member states. It selected four major, immediate objectives: 1, rehabilitation of shattered cultural and educational centers; 2, reduction of illiteracy; 3, revision of textbooks; and 4, removal of barriers to world communications and extension of the use of the "mass media." It also adopted a budget of \$6,000,000 for the first year, elected a Director-General to serve a two-year term (an English scholar, Julian Huxley), located its permanent headquarters in Paris and chose Mexico City as the site of the 1947 General Conference. By agreement with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, it is officially a specialized agency of the United Nations, under Articles 57 and 63 of the Charter. And in the United States, a National Commission to supply a propulsive force in its work in this country has been formed by act of Congress. The new agency is a going concern.

Very little of the evidence which would permit a realistic judgment of its program and possibilities is yet in, however. The Paris program is, in general, put in terms only of recommendations for study and report by the Director-General and his staff, and by various committees. But the importance of its problems and the part that will be played by public opinion in crystallizing its program, demand an effort to identify the elements of its structure and objectives which may help or hamper the realization of its promise.

There are two threads to follow in exploring the terrain which

is its special province. The first is that there are two kinds of world agency tied together in it. UNESCO is designed to carry out the ideas of two dissimilar groups within each nation: professional educators, and specialists in mass communications. Though words can readily be found to obliterate the difference between them — both “in the last analysis” can be said to be concerned with education — the fact is that men whose work is done in a classroom, and men whose work is done in, say, a newspaper office, engage in operations of so different a nature as, for practical purposes, to give each a different objective. UNESCO includes both, and thus has two functions and two kinds of practical objectives, to be attained by dissimilar methods. They are by no means rigidly divided and they frequently overlap, but it is useful to make a distinction between them.

The first rôle of the new organization is the relatively non-controversial one of acting as a clearing-house, particularly in regard to the projects of educators. As outlined in UNESCO's constitution, it may be described more or less as an extension of the rôle of the old International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation of the League of Nations. A project for an exchange of student fellowships, which might be expressed in bilateral agreements between states, is an example of activities of this sort.

The second rôle is new, undefined, challenging and dangerous. The door is opened for it in UNESCO because it leads to the heart of the complex forces which represent the hope of these postwar years, as well as their dangers. It is the rôle which has been well suggested by Messrs. White and Leigh in the title of a book — “Peoples Speaking to Peoples.”¹ It is the one-world idea, particularly vivid in the imaginations of Americans and heralded by the new technical devices which can be described soberly enough as introducing changes in communication comparable in importance to those effected five centuries ago by the invention of movable type. As part of this second function, the new agency has the task of promoting the use of the mass media in order to induce the greatest possible degree of understanding among the men and women of the world.

Though numerous activities in this category would be implemented by agreements between states for which UNESCO would

¹ Llewelyn White and Robert D. Leigh, “Peoples Speaking to Peoples. A Report on International Mass Communication from the Commission on Freedom of the Press.” Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946.

act as clearing house, they obviously also imply a different type of international action, distinguished by its tendency to disregard the formal divisions of states and to cut across national boundaries. The proposal for a global network to be operated by the new agency is an example. The degree to which activities of this second kind shall be pursued, the content of the ideas to be disseminated and the terms of union which can make fruitful the interaction of the two groups of specialists, roughly define the first question in regard to the new organization.

UNESCO's second major problem, and great paradox, can be put in a few sentences. The U.S.S.R. absented itself from the General Conference at Paris. But it was generally accepted that the U.S.S.R. made its views known through a Yugoslav observer at the conference; and that spokesman turned inside out the premise upon which UNESCO is founded, namely, that the free flow of ideas among men is a primary ideal. The depth of the gulf that separates Communist and "western" views of free speech, already very plain, was suddenly accentuated. The question is, can the gulf be bridged? In attempting to bridge it, may not UNESCO cut the world more sharply into two communities?

II

In the interwar years, the International Institute of Intellectual Coöperation did useful work as a clearing house for projects designed to establish closer relationships among professional people. Up to 1938, 36 bilateral "intellectual agreements" were signed under its auspices, some of them covering such political questions as elimination of "offensive" passages from textbooks, though the majority were restricted to arrangements for exchanges of educational personnel and facilities, and so on. The leading spirits of the Institute were devoted internationalists; but the Institute's program for international coöperation tended to exhort the saved. The impact of the organization upon the world outside did not widen as the years passed. Of course, in the last half of that grim decade, the League of Nations itself was simply playing out its hand; and as its strength ebbed, so did the vigor of its subsidiary activities.

But if it was Hitler who gave the League its death blow, it was Hitler who, in left-handed fashion, made certain that the task of intellectual coöperation would be resumed with new strength and conviction at the end of the Second World War. Hitler paid the

intellectuals of Europe a fine compliment: he recognized them as his primary enemies. He and Goebbels saw clearly that teachers, scientists, men of letters — “intellectuals” or “professional men,” whichever label one prefers — first had to be exterminated in the conquered nations before the New Order could become a political possibility. The intellectuals of Europe went underground; and when those who lived finally emerged, it turned out, often enough, that they were the political leaders of their countries. That new morale among professional men, and the clearer understanding of the political power inherent in cultural affairs, account for no little of the drive and confidence that have brought UNESCO into being.

The constitution of this specialized agency is an interesting document. It reflects the great political trend of the postwar years, and reflects it in just about the proportions that it seems to assume in the thoughts of men and in the events of the day. The constitution is explicitly an arrangement among sovereign states. And it is something more. Vaguely, ambiguously, yet with unmistakable intent and with the stirrings of power, it reaches for an ordering of individuals to individuals within a world organization in which national governments are secondary. This, perhaps, is why Henri Bonnet has called UNESCO “the spearhead of the United Nations.” How the arrangements foreshadowed in this agency may develop — which ones will develop, and which will atrophy and be discarded — no one can say. But there is a significant beginning. The opening and closing phrases of the Preamble are typical:

The Governments of the States parties to the constitution declare . . . that a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, and that the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.

“Governments of States” is writ large; and so is “mankind.” Between stretches a vast area to be given meaning.

A few places in which the interplay of the two approaches to world organization is especially visible may be noted. The General Conference is composed of the “representatives of the States Members of the Organisation” (Article IV, Section 1); but it may invite representatives of international organizations — that is to say, individuals — to attend specified sessions of the

Conference as observers (Article IV, Section 13). The General Conference of sovereign-state delegates (with "individuals" sometimes there and sometimes not) is the formal seat of power in the agency; it determines policies, takes decisions on programs drawn up by the Executive Board, and appoints the Director-General. This is orthodox procedure. But from this body to the Executive Board and the Secretariat — the next instruments of power — is a good-sized jump. The Executive Board of 18 is wholly a board of individuals — "persons competent in the arts, the humanities, the sciences, education and the diffusion of ideas and qualified by their experience and capacity to fulfill the administrative and executive duties of the Board." (Article V, Section 2). It is to be formed with regard to diversity of cultures and "a balanced geographical distribution;" but hierarchies of Powers and the familiar devices to maintain them are conspicuously unprovided for. Vote is by majority, save when international conventions, *e.g.*, a copyright convention, are to be submitted to states, when a two-thirds majority is required. Article V, Section 11 spells out the idea: "The members of the Executive Board shall exercise the powers delegated to them by the General Conference on behalf of the Conference as a whole and not as representatives of their respective Governments."

The Secretariat is wholly non-governmental. This follows United Nations precedent; but the Director-General of this agency is perhaps more explicitly endowed with power than is his prototype, the Secretary-General: he is succinctly instructed to "formulate proposals for appropriate action by the Conference and the Board" (Article VI, Section 3). Whether he or the Executive Board will be the power behind the throne remains to be seen. The real leverage of UNESCO in whatever it does must be the power of public opinion; and the two requirements for the effective application of that force are expertness and unremitting attention to the business in hand — virtues which the Director-General and his staff are designed to embody. At Paris, however, the term of the first Director-General was, by informal agreement, limited to two years instead of the six prescribed by the Constitution, and it was specified that all appointments by the Director-General must be approved by the Executive Board.

In any event, much of what UNESCO does, and no matter whether it be done through individual states, or through individual men and women, will be done by an appeal to the mind of

the community. The agency is enjoined by its member states from "intervening in matters which are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction." But the General Conference can summon international conferences on education, on the sciences and humanities and (a broad phrase) on "the dissemination of knowledge" (Article IV, Section 3). It can submit recommendations and international conventions to governments. Every member state is obligated to submit to it reports "relating to educational, scientific and cultural life and institutions" (Article VIII). It is instructed to "advise the United Nations Organisation on the educational, scientific and cultural aspects of matters of concern to the latter in accordance with the terms and procedure agreed upon between the appropriate authorities of the two Organisations" (Article IV, Section 5). All this is the apparatus for molding public opinion. To aid in summoning that twentieth-century genie, UNESCO has also the instrument of the National Commissions, the formation of which is recommended to the member states by the constitution but not made compulsory. (In the United States, the Commission is composed of representatives of 60 organizations, and 40 individuals appointed by the Secretary of State.) Given strong leadership, wise selection of issues and skilled presentation, these Commissions could conceivably exert much influence.

And then, there are the portentous "mass media," which UNESCO is so emphatically instructed to cultivate. The purpose of the organization, Article I, Section 2 declares, is to "collaborate in the work of advancing the mutual knowledge and understanding of peoples, through all means of mass communication and to that end recommend such international agreements as may be necessary to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image."

For some of the concrete possibilities inherent in all this machinery we must turn to the program recommended at Paris. Of the four main projects which may be taken to represent UNESCO's purpose and functions as now conceived, those relating to reconstruction, a literacy campaign and textbook revision seem almost exclusively "clearing house" activities. In regard to the first, the conference was careful to make plain that UNESCO is not a relief agency. It may purchase some scientific apparatus with its own funds, for institutions especially in need of it, but its efforts will be directed primarily to surveying

the needs of rehabilitation of schools, museums and libraries, coördinating the work of other agencies, publicizing the campaign and raising funds. (The sum of \$100,000,000 is named as the goal.) It is interesting to note that there is a door opening into uncharted fields, in this sphere of UNESCO's work as in most others. Article IX, Section 3 of the constitution authorizes the Director-General (with the approval of the Executive Board) to accept money directly from private institutions and persons — a provision which might lead to unorthodox developments, though hardly in connection with rebuilding libraries and museums.

The campaign to make available a minimum degree of education to all the people of the world — about half of whom can now neither read nor write — is a long-term project, to be initiated by a survey by the staff of the agency in collaboration with experts from all countries. It is based not only on the obligation of more prosperous nations toward less favored peoples, but on the obvious advantages to all nations of establishing the educational prerequisites for economic and social health everywhere in the modern world. The program envisages education for adults in such fields as agriculture and public health, as well as instruction for young and old in the rudiments of reading and writing. This should be one of UNESCO's great projects.

The project for the world-wide revision of textbooks is more controversial. It calls for a clearing house for the collection of information on the subject, including copies of school books most commonly used, the formulation of a code of ethics for writers of textbooks, and a world-wide conference which would focus attention on the subject. The effort would presumably be implemented by bilateral agreements between states. UNESCO will, moreover, "call to the attention of the member nations any misuse of the facilities of teaching which it considers dangerous to the peace."

Under the Casares Resolution, adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1925 and later revised, the International Committee on Intellectual Coöperation made revision of school books (meaning principally history books) one of its major efforts. The Resolution called upon governments to assure themselves "that the textbooks in use in their countries contained no passages prejudicial to mutual understanding between nations." Though a number of agreements were signed, the Institute itself admitted in 1933 that little had been accomplished:

It is surprising to note how much activity this question has called forth, but a closer examination of the material leads unfortunately to the conclusion that in many cases the resolutions taken have remained merely platonic and that the programs of action set up have not often been carried into practice.²

Indeed, the gap between ideal and reality in this field was wide. It is symptomatic that the Free State of Brunswick decreed after the war that "Readers inciting to hatred between nations . . . are not to be used in the classroom," and that this decree was cancelled by the Minister of Education of Brunswick in 1930, who instructed that "a knowledge of history must develop the will to national self-assertion."³ It was only in France, where teachers enjoyed a particular freedom in the choice of school books, that the effort to discontinue the use of books which glorified war and offended other nations made appreciable headway.

One cannot help remembering the sorrowful, and nearly universal, feeling of 1940 that France was suffering, not from an excess of nationalism, but from a lack of patriotism. To what degree the revision of textbooks was responsible for the lethargy in France is hard to tell, but the chances are that in France as elsewhere, the practical effect was very small. The thesis that wars begin in the minds of men and that hence ideas implanted in childhood and youth set wars afoot is met with frequently in the literature of the interwar movement to revise school books, and it seems to have been carried over into UNESCO somewhat uncritically. No doubt history can furnish examples which substantiate it, though instances drawn from the two World Wars would seem to suggest that the school books determined less than is often supposed. (One notes that in 1917 and again in 1941 Americans fought *beside* their history-book enemy.)

And however that may be, the nature of the words and themes that give offense to other nations has changed so greatly in recent years that the effort to avoid offensive textbook passages seems quite impracticable now. The question is not merely how the story of the Second World War could be told without wounding national esteem, in Germany for example. The very nature of a slight to national esteem has changed. As Isaiah Bowman says: "The twentieth century attaches fighting importance to social ideas." Belittle a foreign nation's military grandeur and you may

² "School Text-Book Revision and International Understanding." Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, 1933, p. 1.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 51.

elicit pleased agreement; disparage its system of coöperative consumer credit agencies and you draw blood. Are history books to refrain from discussions, in concrete terms, of capitalism, Socialism, Communism, individualism, the relation of trade unions to governments, state planning, free enterprise, civil liberties, the characteristics of a secret police and so on and so on? It is on these subjects that offensive things are said these days. That there can be textbooks full of raucous nationalism that were better not used is surely true, but the practical problem of improving the writing of history would hardly seem to yield to frontal attack. The laws of good writing are hard to codify; and the extreme examples of bad writing in this field — anything comparable to the Japanese version of the divinity of the Emperor, for example — would, if raised, be a political issue of the most serious kind — a Security Council matter for the United Nations, of which the textbook aspect would quite certainly be but one minor part. UNESCO's effort to bring the scholars of the world into closer relationships, and to facilitate the opportunity for mutual criticism and mutual approval which has so much to do with first-rate work, will surely be encouraged by all men of good will. But it may be questioned whether an effort to revise the textbooks of the world will increase the prestige of the agency.

The fourth major project in its program — the elimination of barriers to world communications and the extension of the use of the mass media — lies in the new, broad category of "peoples speaking to peoples." The distinction between this and the "clearing house" rôle is only a rough one, but it is serviceable. Inherent in every action to be taken by UNESCO is the possibility of appealing to world opinion to achieve the desired ends. But though that explosive element is present to some degree in all the plans of the new agency, it is concentrated in the proposals for action in the field of communications. The question of a global network, by which the people of all the world would be addressed at one signal from a world center, is merely one of the controversial issues which focus upon this part of the program. Even were it removed, there would remain the insistent problems of the commercial and cultural use of the new devices of telecommunication (a word which takes its full significance if it is remembered that the first two syllables mean "far away"); the troublesome question of interpenetration of cultures; and above

all the issue of freedom of information, which so separates the western lands from Russia.

Lest UNESCO be too easily charged with temerity in tackling problems of this size, it should perhaps be pointed out that it was the prominence of these factors of international relations which created this specialized agency, not the agency which originated the problems. The range and power of the new inventions which have made the problems so real are little appreciated; indeed some of the new devices may as yet be merely in the stage of Hargreaves' spinning-jenny of 1770. Voice broadcasting by radio, which can penetrate every corner of the world, is only one of them. To this familiar development must be added such devices as wireless transmission of facsimile pages, in color if desired, and "multiple address" newscasting, which permits wireless transmission of words by dot and dash at the rate of 800 a minute (as compared with 40 to 60 by cable). The implications of such a technique are staggering. In due course, perhaps under some system of charges according to ability to pay as now governs the rates of American press associations, newspapers anywhere in the world should be able to obtain hundreds of thousands of words of foreign news daily⁴ — a flow of information indeed! The reader of any newspaper in the world, or the editor (if he could not print it all) would have at his disposal the equivalent, say, of the foreign news service of *The New York Times*; or perhaps of *Pravda*; or perhaps of the *Chicago Tribune*. And then there are the developments of the process of offset printing (through the aid of photography) by which the type pages of a magazine — perhaps thousands of pounds of metal — are in effect transformed to a thin packet of papers, to be carried in a plane and put on presses halfway around the globe. A periodical can now be printed simultaneously in all the cities of the world. What will such developments do to national boundaries? Are the sovereign states the Luddites which will attempt to break the machines?

How deeply American commercial and political interests are involved need not be underscored. It was at the behest of Americans that the London Conference of 1945 adopted the resolution instructing the Preparatory Commission to give special attention to UNESCO's work in the field of mass communications. But it is equally apparent that this technological revolution already touches the interests of every nation in the world.

⁴ Cf. "Peoples Speaking to Peoples," *op. cit.*

The report of the Program Committee, adopted at Paris, proposes: 1, the eventual establishment of a world-wide network for radio broadcasting and reception, and an immediate study of the question with a view to submitting a practicable plan to the next General Conference; 2, a survey of the press, the film and the whole range of telecommunications and postal services, to eliminate inadequacies and encourage needed expansion; 3, the establishment of an international radio forum and a world university of the air, by which (within the framework of existing facilities) subjects of international interest can be discussed; and 4, "what might be called negative or curative proposals for the removal of barriers obstructing the flow of communication." The report of the Sub-Committee had recommended, in regard to this "curative" aspect of the program, that the agency deal with copyright restrictions, with the cost of cable and wireless communication, and "with all restrictions on the flow of information and ideas across international boundaries, and with the suppression and distortion of information and ideas by any influence."

In a final comment on the program, the Chairman of the Program Committee emphasized the two strands of thought which, as we have seen, interweave everywhere in the constitution and the program of the agency. Without the collaboration of the member nations, UNESCO can do nothing, he concluded; yet at the same time, he pointed out, these are "proposals advanced for action by the peoples of the world."

III

The Russian comment came quickly. Vladislav Ribnikar, a Yugoslav observer, addressed the General Conference at the first session to explain why his government had not ratified the constitution of UNESCO; and it was unmistakable that his remarks were to be taken as the view of the U.S.S.R. on the program and possibilities of the new agency. The speech was not printed verbatim in the United States, and there was some tendency here to dismiss it merely as a Soviet effort, fortunately repelled, to inject discord into the Conference proceedings.

There was much more to it than that. Mr. Ribnikar, using as his text an address and a pamphlet by Dr. Huxley discussing the nature of a "world philosophy" — evolutionary humanism — that would serve to draw "east" and "west" together, began by urging that the organization base its work on "the general rules

of the Constitution”⁵ — rather than on the “more or less abstract principles” of the Preamble. He took exception, in particular, to the concepts of the Preamble that “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed;” and to the clause of the Preamble which reads: “That ignorance of each other’s ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of the suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have too often broken into war.” Mr. Ribnikar felt that this was an inaccurate picture of the causes of war between nations.

He then quoted Article 1, Section 3, of the constitution — “With a view to preserving the independence, integrity and fruitful diversity of the cultures and educational systems of the States Members of this Organisation, the Organisation is prohibited from intervening in matters which are essentially within their domestic jurisdiction” — and declared that “numerous proposals concerning the UNESCO programme submitted by the Preparatory Commission” show a “persistent tendency which is absolutely contrary to the view of the Constitution.” According to the program, he declared, UNESCO’s “own philosophy labelled ‘World Scientific Humanism’ . . . will be forcibly disseminated and imposed upon the peoples of the world.” He particularly protested against the rejection of materialist thought in this “official philosophy,” pointing out that dialectical materialism “is recognized and its general outlook adopted by a great country, the Soviet Union,” and that to deny materialism its place among the philosophies of the world would be to deny much of the scientific tradition of which such countries as England and France are proud. “Let us not forget,” he said, “that the campaign against dialectical materialism was one of the main features of the Fascist régimes; they called upon the peoples to fight the Soviet Union in the name of European civilization. It is impossible for UNESCO to take a similar attitude, while declaring itself in favor of international coöperation and the ‘free flow of ideas.’”

Obviously, there were major and minor themes here. (There had never been a pretence by Dr. Huxley that “evolutionary humanism” had been adopted as an official philosophy of UNESCO; and there was no chance that it was going to be. Dr.

⁵ UNESCO, General Conference, First Session, Verbatim Record. Paris, November 21, 1946.

Huxley, himself a biologist, must have been astonished to find himself charged with denying the importance of the scientific tradition in western thought, and of undertaking a campaign against dialectical materialism. He subsequently assured Mr. Ribnikar that he had had no such intention — and the Yugoslav spokesman was happy to know what, of course, he knew already.) In his speech, Mr. Ribnikar then elaborated what, one must suppose, was his major theme — UNESCO's efforts in the field of mass communication. He first defined the agency's proper function. He did not imply, he said, that philosophic materialism should be imposed on all members of its organization. "International, cultural coöperation means fruitful competition on the creative plane, a competition between cultures, from which should emerge the stabilization of values corresponding to the interests of the United Nations and of mankind." This is cryptic terminology; in view of his own comment on the abstract character of UNESCO's Preamble, the Conference might have hoped for something more concrete. But one assumes that, at any rate, Mr. Ribnikar was saying that Russia would approve of *some* international cultural activities through an international agency. They must, however, be activities that would not "alter or correct" the "educational systems and the general conditions necessary to a speedy development of national cultures" — in nations which, as Yugoslavia, for example, have achieved a cultural rebirth: "This is why we are against any attempt to create any kind of cultural centralization."

UNESCO must, therefore, Mr. Ribnikar continued, not only "recommend peace and coöperation with the means available," but must "oppose any attempt to provoke suspicion and hatred between the peoples and to prepare public opinion in certain countries for such provocation. . . . It should not only reprove them, but take active measures to suppress them." The telling passage of the statement followed. The proposals of the Preparatory Commission were not merely failing to oppose Fascist and pro-Fascist elements which still exist in many countries, he said:

On the contrary, a whole series of proposals by the Preparatory Commission, mis-using the principle of "free flow of ideas," provides for the penetration of the masses by a new propaganda devised by the adversaries of peace and the instigators of new wars. [The italicization is added.]

There was a final stroke to drive the message home: "The absence of a Soviet delegation to the General Conference shows

that such work cannot succeed. It seems unnecessary to point out that no cultural coöperation between the United Nations is conceivable without the collaboration of the Soviet Union, just as it would be difficult to imagine the United Nations without the Soviet Union." In short, he served notice that the U.S.S.R. is implacably opposed to the mass-communications activities of UNESCO.

This clarifies the situation. There is no reason to suppose that Soviet Russia does not mean what she says. Nor has she raised an issue which will disappear merely if it is not discussed. The initial response to such a difference of opinion can only be an effort of reëxamination by member nations of UNESCO and their peoples — above all by Americans, who are the prime movers in the proposals to which Russia objects — of the course of action which has been taken. There are no limits to the field of such an inquiry. But are there, perhaps, several fixed points which may help orient the thinking which must be done?

First it seems relevant to underscore the fact that the success of UNESCO, or its failure in any project which raises important issues, can greatly — perhaps even decisively — affect the whole United Nations organization. UNESCO is tied to the Economic and Social Council by the same type of loose agreement which binds the other specialized agencies. Subsidiary agreements will make special arrangements in regard to the budget and the mass media. Though neither has been announced, it is expected that the Secretary-General will be given the right to advise UNESCO about its budget, but that the agency will itself determine its budget. UNESCO will probably be free to follow its own line in regard to mass communications also, though it is clearly realized that these activities interlock with those of other agencies — with the Committee on Human Rights for example, in regard to questions of civil liberties. A Radio Committee has been set up on which each of these specialized agencies is represented. Though there are manifest advantages in a loose arrangement, the desirable long-term trend would seem to be toward a tightening of the relationships of all the specialized agencies with the parent organization.

A second point of reference is that Russia seems willing to participate in certain activities — those presumably of the "clearing house" kind — and that it is to the advantage of everyone that she should do so. The necessity of making such projects

efficient and practical is obvious — as is the possibility of over-extension of efforts. As George N. Shuster has remarked: "The number of internationalists with aces up their sleeves is legion." But at the same time, there is no mistake which the leaders of the agency seem so determined to avoid as this possibility of over-extension. The extreme modesty of UNESCO's first budget was a manifestation of the awareness of the danger.

The Yugoslav spokesman's comments on the sweeping propositions in the Preamble seem relevant and useful; though, in fact, as Mr. Ribnikar sagaciously observed, it is unlikely that these abstract propositions will be decisive in determining UNESCO's future; the only important exception, perhaps, would be if "moral solidarity" were interpreted as "religious solidarity," or as a call for a grouping of Christian peoples — though the possibilities of strife inherent in this also seem generally perceived.⁴ That there can be wide variety within a community can be taken as self-evident by anyone who is not anxious to find a pretext for a dispute. We have a great instance: there was a world community with moral solidarity at Nuremberg.

The third fixed point is that, in Soviet eyes, the future of UNESCO depends on what is done in the field of mass communications. It is helpful to be told this so plainly. Should the "western" answer, then, be to drop those activities, to put them in an organization by themselves, or to go ahead with them — and if the latter, then on what terms?

To drop the mass communications activities would be for UNESCO, and for the United Nations, to turn their backs on one of the greatest, potentially most useful and most dangerous centers of force in the modern world. It would mean the renunciation of a world mission for the agency and its parent body. Since the forces of the mass media are so unmistakably both international and supernational in character, an attempt to harness and use them is an unavoidable function of a world agency which pretends to concern itself with the forces which make for war and peace.

There has, however, been some evidence of a temptation among different groups of specialists to play with the thought of putting these mass-media activities in a separate organization. The Committee of Consultants to the Department of State, in its report of September 1946, insisted that if the mass-media work

⁴ Cf. "Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Seventy-Ninth Congress, Second Session, on H. J. Res. 305," p. 15 ff.

were relegated to an inferior position, it should be withdrawn from UNESCO and a new body which was exclusively concerned with it should be set up.⁷ The committee could hardly have considered the implications of its suggestion. Nothing could so easily put this whole question of the breaking down of barriers to the use of the mass media into terms of the United States versus the world, as would such a course. It is the United States which is asking new arrangements, new privileges, new fields of activity for its mass communication industries all around the globe. A world agency mainly representing the objectives of one nation would be unfortunate indeed.

As an example of the contrary tendency, we may note a protest by Kenneth Lindsay, in the London *Spectator* ⁸ that "matters of technique such as the film, the radio and the Press have been elevated into positions of undue importance at the expense of education and teaching," and that this has spoiled the purity of the original concept. But fortunately, a division of UNESCO into two separate agencies is not seriously being considered. The amalgamation of the work of the two groups of specialists is essential if the work of either is to be effective, as the experience of the International Institute makes plain. Here, indeed, Americans can make a valuable contribution, for what comes to the surface in all of this is the old question of highbrow and lowbrow, perennially familiar to Americans. One of the great pieces of news in the world is that for the first time in history there exists a large nation with a mass culture — the United States of America. That mass culture is the reverse of the medal of mass production. It is our special achievement — source of our greatest pride, and some of our worst headaches. Is it not the theme around which all the major questions of education and of culture have revolved in the United States in this century? Precisely what it means for the United States, and for the world, will doubtless be disclosed in another hundred years. But one thing the American experience to date makes quite clear: the mass producers of culture and their critics need one another.

And here lies one more fixed point of reference. It is the interaction between the mass culture of the United States, and the cultures of other member states, which will at once begin to give

⁷ "The Mass Media and UNESCO." Report of the Committee of Consultants to the Department of State, September 24, 1946.

⁸ Kenneth Lindsay, M.P., "The Future of UNESCO." *The Spectator*, London, December 13, 1946.

UNESCO its shape and size. Will there be an unplanned and uncritical outpouring of American entertainment, American ideas, American news, the distinguishing characteristic of which is simply the size of the stream? This is what more than one country (quite apart from the group of Slav nations) genuinely fears. "Why, then, should the smaller nations and the so-called 'backward peoples' feel uneasy when America offered to share the enlightenment which its own people enjoy?" remarked the *New Statesman and Nation*, of London, in a discussion of UNESCO: ⁹

In the background [it continued] were the teeming factories of Hollywood dishing out canned-culture by the million-feet, the radio voices speaking with the Voice of America, the fecund presses ready to pour out acres of print about the American Way of Life. Countries saw their own cultures being swamped. In a "free" world, they would not be able to discriminate against Hollywood even on grounds of taste nor erect defensive barriers against the vast surplus of culture which America, with her enormous technical resources, is in a position to export.

That would seem to be the point at which the much harder question of relations with Russia can best be attacked. For the European nations, as for Latin America and the Orient, the question of quality is an inseparable part of the question of the "free flow of words and images." To equate a concern for quality with censorship (as did the specialists of the American Committee of Consultants) ¹⁰ and thus to brush it aside as inadmissible on principle is not merely disingenuous, but dangerously naïve as to the effects of a "free flow" of information on world peace. To assume that the faster and more powerfully the contacts between peoples are established and enlarged, the better the likelihood of understanding between them, is to ignore large sectors of history. As Sir Alfred Zimmern has said, travel, and reading newspapers, are the two great mediums for understanding a foreign land, but, as he also emphasized, both travel and reading are skills that need cultivation if they are to yield harmony rather than discord. The first reaction of natural man toward the stranger is hostility — and toward the advent of the stranger en masse, war. The point need not be labored, though we might note the concrete instance which bears so directly on the present question — that the appearance of mass-circulation newspapers both in England and

⁹ "America and Europe." *The New Statesman and Nation*, London, December 28, 1946, p. 475-476.

¹⁰ But not the National Committee, nor the Department of State.

the United States toward the end of the last century, in response to the growth in literacy, brought a mood of jingoism in both countries and was to a considerable degree responsible for wars.

A scheme of self-regulation by newspaper reporters and perhaps broadcasters, greater awareness of responsibility for quality by editors, publishers and all producers of "words and images," and absence of self-righteousness in arguing the question of the reduction of barriers to films, periodicals and newspapers, would seem to be prerequisites on the American side for amicable arrangements in this field with the nations which see the larger political issues pretty much as we do.¹¹

These are the arrangements that will anchor one end of the bridge and set the angle of its projection. To help construct them is UNESCO's immediate task. But that does not mean that thought about the relationship of Russia and the new agency may be postponed to a later day. To phrase the question of the U.S.S.R. and UNESCO merely in terms of whether and when Russia will join is to miss what would seem to be the most important point of all. The fact is that a world platform has been set up, and the corollary fact is that Russia is on this platform now, addressing the world. Whether or not she is formally a member state of the agency, she will certainly continue to do so. And with great shrewdness in perceiving openings, she will deliver her own message. She will say many intelligent things, as Mr. Ribnikar's speech at Paris shows. The message will likewise be ruthlessly propagandist. Mr. Ribnikar's demand, for example, that UNESCO take active measures to suppress "any attempt to provoke suspicion and hatred between the peoples," coming as it did after a demand for strict observance of the rules of the constitution, and after an attack on the centralization of UNESCO's activities which alone might give the agency power, made little sense. But it was skilful propaganda, enabling the speaker to take the offensive, and to attach the epithet Fascist to "the free flow of ideas" — a nimble feat indeed. How effectively so negative a propaganda will appeal to men's imaginations in the longer run is another matter.

¹¹ An anonymous columnist in the January 11, 1947, *New Statesman and Nation* — that distinguished weekly which is stepping gaily on an increased ration of ideological oats — offered a hint as to the way the wind blows over much of the Continent in this matter when he expressed the wish that the *New York Herald Tribune* would establish a London edition: he would take the risk of the "conservative" editorial page, he suggested, to get the benefit for English journalism of the *Herald Tribune's* great tradition of objective reporting.

Russia does not doubt that a world community is desirable and necessary, but she has her own blueprint of the nature of that community. That, and not the shade of meaning of such words as "impose," or of "matters essentially within a nation's jurisdiction" and so forth, is the substance of the issue between Russia and the non-Communist world, here as elsewhere. Nothing is gained by pretending that this is not the case. We may remind ourselves again that there are many "clearing house" activities in which the U.S.S.R. can participate to her own and UNESCO's advantage; but it may properly be emphasized also that the agency's larger aim of bringing peoples more closely in touch with peoples is repugnant to the Soviet Union, and that she will oppose it, outside UNESCO or inside, as she thinks best. UNESCO can make it easier for the U.S.S.R. to look with favor upon many of its projects just by making them realistic, efficient and effective. But there is no use spinning a bridge of words.

Will the gap between the two worlds be widened, then, if the new agency, after careful examination of the mass-communication projects, goes ahead with them?

First let us note again that this may not be quite the question. If the United States pursues its own special interests, enthusiasms and objectives uncritically, a gap can open in a different place, that is to say, between the United States and other nations of the non-Communist world. The drive behind such prodigious organizations as the United States press and moving picture industries can never produce a tidy product; were they to aim merely at that, half their best virtues would disappear. But there is little virtue in the automatic application of any principle, least of all of such a mighty one as the principle of free speech.

If, however, there is give and take between the mass culture of the United States, and the cultures of other lands, a great community may slowly appear. All the mechanisms of UNESCO — conferences, committees, administrative boards — which throw Americans, Europeans, Middle and Far Easterners and Africans, mass-media specialists and educators, together in planning and executing the various projects of the agency will speed the growth of the community. And the projects themselves will bring peoples closer to peoples. Of course it is possible that the very process will widen the present gap between the Soviet and western worlds. The only guarantee that the gap will not widen is for all the world to become Communist.

Thus, UNESCO will work amid danger. But it may also work in confidence that it is on the road that leads to the coming political shape of things. It is not chance that brings so plain a challenge to this agency of the United Nations.

The Republic, the Utopia and the City of the Sun [wrote Lord Acton] were protests against a state of things which the experience of their authors taught them to condemn, and from the faults of which they took refuge in the opposite extremes. They remained without influence, and have never passed from literary into political history, because something more than discontent and speculative ingenuity is needed in order to invest a political idea with power over the masses of mankind. The scheme of a philosopher can command the practical allegiance of fanatics only, not of nations; and though oppression may give rise to violent and repeated outbreaks, like the convulsions of a man in pain, it cannot mature a settled purpose and plan of regeneration, unless a new notion of happiness is joined to the sense of present evil.

Is not the idea of the world community precisely that "new notion of happiness," which alone can make possible a settled plan of regeneration for the men and women of the world, as the idea of the sovereign, independent state was the new notion that made possible a political arrangement after Gutenberg had invented his type? We begin with two world communities in embryo. They now have one great common feature. In the plans which each has drawn up for its world community, both the Communist and non-Communist worlds recognize that the peoples of their community must enjoy at least one freedom — the third on Franklin D. Roosevelt's list of four: Freedom from Want. The non-Communist world recognizes as essential for a sound structure the three others, which the mechanism of a secret police — a distinguishing characteristic of the Soviet Russian state — partly or wholly excludes: Freedom of Speech and Expression, Freedom of Religion and Freedom from Fear. Those who believe that freedom of information is an inseparable part of the first of the Four — the architectonic one — can in the present danger only set to work by the blueprint which their own experience has traced. They will work in hope that all the Russian people, in and outside the Government of the U.S.S.R., and all the Slav people, will in time come to think that the house built on the four great pillars is more secure, more spacious and more pleasant than a structure built around one, and themselves will wish to use the freedom which that house affords.

EUROPE: SPLIT OR UNITED?

By Alexander Galin

ARTICLES and comments advancing the idea of a reorganized and united Europe began to appear in the press of certain countries during World War II. Some writers conceived the unification of Europe in the shape of a west-European bloc, or west-European federation. Subsequently, Mr. Churchill proposed the establishment of a United States of Europe, and Mr. Léon Blum, desiring to find an innocent-sounding name for this formation, proposed to call it a west-European family. Lastly, on Mr. Churchill's initiative, a United Europe Committee, composed of Conservatives, Liberals and even some Laborites, has very recently been formed in London. In view of the fact that the proponents of a United States of Europe are becoming increasingly insistent — some of them, indeed, like Lord Vansittart, posing the dilemma degeneration or unity — we should make an earnest effort to analyze what precisely these “uniters” propose, whose support they expect to secure and what political and economic objectives the initiators of this hue and cry really have in view.

II

The slogan of a United States of Europe is not new. Much has been written about a United Europe and eternal peace in the past two or three centuries. Let us leave aside remoter times and consider only the period between the two world wars.

In 1922 the idea of a Pan-Europe was suggested by an Austrian, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, who succeeded in winning over the leaders of some of the European countries. But this was a private initiative, and the majority of outstanding European statesmen paid little attention to his congresses and manifestoes. These did strike a responsive chord in some hearts, however, for an underlying note of his writings and speeches was the need of uniting Europe against the Soviet Union.

Pan-Europe assumed a semi-official character in September 1929, during the Tenth Assembly of the League of Nations. At a meeting of heads of delegations which Aristide Briand called on September 9 he proposed a European Federal Union; and he was requested to circulate a memorandum on the question to all

the governments, including the Soviet Union. Accordingly, Briand drafted a lengthy memorandum, proposing officially the creation of a European Federal Union, and in May 1930 he sent it to 27 European states. It urged "the desirability of an understanding between the Governments concerned with a view to the institution, among European peoples, of a kind of federal bond establishing among them a régime of constant solidarity, and permitting them, in all cases when it might be necessary, to enter into immediate contact for the study, the discussion, and the solution of the problems susceptible of concerning them in common."

The French Government stated that its proposal "found its justification in the very definite sentiment of a collective responsibility in face of the danger which threatens European peace, from the political as well as from the economic and social point of view, because of the lack of coördination which still prevails in the general economy of Europe." It called attention to the divided state of the Continent, to the fact that Europe had 20,000 kilometers of customs barriers. It developed at length the following four theses: 1. The necessity for a general pact, however elementary, affirming the principle of European moral unity and the solidarity of the European states. 2. The necessity for proper organs, including a European Conference and a Permanent European Political Committee, to enable the European Union to perform its functions. 3. The necessity for laying down fundamental directives to guide the European Committee in drawing up its program. 4. The advisability of leaving all questions of application either to the future European Conference or the future European Committee.

Briand's recommendations embraced not only political problems, but also extended to fundamental economic questions: general economics, lowering of customs tariffs, economic equipment, means of communication and transit, finance, labor, public health, intellectual coöperation, inter-parliamentary relations, administration, etc. The memorandum concluded with the following words: "Union in order to live and flourish — such is the impelling necessity that henceforth faces the nations of Europe."

Briand's original plan envisaged the creation of a European Federal Union with broad powers, outside the framework of the League of Nations. Its purpose was threefold: 1, it was to establish France's political and economic hegemony on the Conti-

nent; 2, its edge was to be directed against the Soviet Union; and 3, it was to protect Europe from the political and economic influence of the United States of America. More or less favorable replies were received from Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia — in a word, from those states which, with France at their head, constituted the *cordon sanitaire* against the Soviet Union.

The British Labor Government adopted a very cautious attitude towards the French proposal. Its official note of July 16, 1930, after several complimentary remarks to the French Government, went on to say that: "His Majesty's Government think it possible that an exclusive and independent European Union of the kind proposed might emphasize or create tendencies to inter-continental rivalries and hostilities which it is important in the general interest to diminish and avoid."

This implied that the British Labor Government had no intention of bringing grist to the French mill. If to this it be added that Germany's attitude toward Briand's project was one of polite but cold semi-approval, that Italy was frankly hostile and suspicious, that a number of countries feared to fall into the grip of French finance capital, and that, what was most important, the general public in the European countries were alarmed at the proposal for a Pan-Europe directed against the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A., looking upon it as a harbinger of war, it will be clear why the plan was a failure.

Another circumstance should be borne in mind. The European Federal Union was to consist only of members of the League of Nations. When, therefore, the acting Secretary-General of the League, M. Avenol, sent an invitation to the Soviet Government on behalf of the commission for the study of a European Union to take part in an inquiry into the world economic crisis, the Soviet Government replied that it had its own views as to the reasons for the permanent economic antagonisms among states and for the economic depressions and crises that periodically beset capitalist countries, and also as to the methods whereby genuine solidarity among nations could be achieved.

The Soviet Government's note further said: "It is absolutely strange and incomprehensible that a group of European states should appropriate to themselves the right to decide whether another group of European states should or should not be admitted to a union which claims to be Pan-European. Nor is it, of

course, any the less strange when a country like Switzerland, which occupies only .4 percent of the territory of Europe, or even Norway, which occupies 3.1 percent of the territory of Europe, opposes the admission of a state like the U. S. S. R., whose European part alone occupies 45 percent of the territory of all Europe, an area more than double that of France, Belgium, Rumania, Jugoslavia, Switzerland, Spain, Holland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway together." While not refusing to take part in discussions of certain questions jointly with other countries, the Soviet Government drew attention to the dangerous tendencies manifested by the sponsors of a European Federal Union which was to embrace only a part of Europe.

Lord Cecil, the British representative at the League, frankly voiced his opposition to the proposal. He said among other things: "A Europe opposed to the whole world would be as terrible a menace to the cause of peace as international rivalry."

After 1932, the European Commission of Inquiry for the European Union, formed in 1930, ceased to function. The plan of the French Government and the numerous memoranda of European governments were committed to the archives, where they rest undisturbed to this day. Thus the much-boosted plan for a union of Europe ended, as the French say, *en queue de poisson*. But when Hitler came to power in Germany, the question of uniting Europe arose on a new basis. Hitler's "New Order" followed the line traced by Briand, but this time it was to be in the interests of German imperialism. Just as Briand had revived the plan of Napoleon I,¹ so Hitler drew out of the archives the plan for the union of Europe which had been framed in such detail during World War I by the ideologists of German imperialism, the plan which Wilhelm II, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff had tried to put into effect by fire and sword. Hitler's Germany also laid claim to leadership in Europe, but in the first stage her aim was to unite Europe against Britain and America on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other. In the second stage, Hitler's Germany tried to smash the Soviet Union, with a view to utilizing its resources against Britain and America and to creating an agrarian hinterland for the "New Order" — in other words, for the union of Europe under German imperialism.

¹ Napoleon I wrote in his political testament on April 17, 1821: "I was obliged to tame Europe with arms; this should now be done by conviction. Europe must be united by the unbreakable bonds of a federation."

How this attempt ended is universal knowledge. Hitler's Germany had set herself an impossible task. She collapsed in the effort to realize it. Again Europe was saved from the "united."

III

The sponsor of the idea of a union of western Europe was General Franco, who toward the end of 1944, foreseeing the defeat of his allies and patrons, Hitler and Mussolini, wrote a letter to Churchill in which he stressed the necessity of uniting Europe against the Soviet Union. As long as Churchill was in power, he refrained from giving direct support to this cry, although it was no secret that the British Government looked with favor on the idea of the west-European federation. So did the Laborites. Harold Laski, then Chairman of the Labor Party, interviewed by a correspondent of the French weekly, *Tribune Economique*, in August 1945, declared: "The attitude of our party toward the project for an economic union of Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Norway and Denmark is quite definite. We favor the closest coöperation in all spheres." Several other Laborites spoke approvingly, but the Labor Party did not advocate the idea officially.

The task was taken up by Churchill when, by the will of the British people, he found himself released from government affairs. He now thought it fitting to boost publicly the idea suggested by General Franco. At Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 1946, he furiously attacked the Soviet Union and the new democracies. Then, having received a telling rebuff from Stalin, he tried to tone down the impression and declared that he had been misunderstood.

But on September 19, 1946, Churchill delivered his address at Zurich University, replete with such highly colored phrases as the "tragedy of Europe" and "the babel of voices among the victors and the silence of despair among the vanquished." He recalled Gladstone's "blessed act of oblivion." He recommended as the way of salvation from darkness, chaos and crisis the building of a kind of United States of Europe. Churchill warned his hearers that "time may be short" and that it was necessary to create "a European family" at once, because "we dwell strangely and precariously under the shield and, I will even say, under the protection, of the atomic bomb." This hysterical and panicky speech evoked both ardent approval and ardent protest. The political differentiation would affect all countries, including the United States, for, instead of uniting, Churchill's plan would split the

freedom-loving nations for the sake of reconciliation with the sponsors of Fascist régimes.

But who is to unite Europe, and for what purpose? Churchill considers that the initiative and leadership should be assumed by France and Germany. Which Germany? Evidently, that part of Germany which is under control of the British, American and French forces of occupation. But it is known that Germany is still very far from having been denazified, that the British, American and French zones are still a long way from having been democratized, that the German problem still largely remains to be discussed by the Allies. Mr. Churchill is in a hurry just because Germany has not yet been democratized; that is why he proposes a bloc of France and Germany to take over the leadership of a United Europe. No wonder, then, that Heinrich Leuchtgens, the leader of the new German National Democratic Party, which he publicly calls the "sole Right party in Europe," declared that his party is out for a "west-European alliance of states under the leadership of Great Britain," and voiced his "respect and admiration" for Mr. Churchill. Birds of a feather flock together.

Mr. Churchill omits to say what rôle is to be played by Britain. He decks her in the toga of disinterested patron, and would have us believe that she is pursuing no aims of her own, either political or economic, but is motivated solely by a spirit of altruism and human charity. There is probably no politician in the world that believes in the disinterestedness of British foreign policy. Let us recall what England's distinguished Foreign Secretary, George Canning, said: "That noble and lofty disinterestedness which lends immortality to the names of heroes cannot and must not be regarded as a suitable motive of political actions among nations." Sir Arthur Willert, from whose book "The Frontiers of England" this quotation is borrowed, says: "These words are as true today as they were then."

Which countries, then, are to be admitted to the United States of Europe? So far, Mr. Churchill has avoided expressing himself specifically on this point. But from what his ardent followers have written, it appears that the idea is to unite France, Italy, Austria, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries. Aristide Briand's Pan-Europe stopped at the Soviet frontiers of 1931; today the United States of Europe is to exclude not only the Soviet Union, but also Finland, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, the Soviet zone of Germany,

Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Bearing in mind that in European Russia there are eight Soviet Republics with a total population of 130,000,000, that the countries bordering on the Soviet Union — which are also to be left out of the United States of Europe — have a population of not less than 90,000,000, it will be seen that Mr. Churchill is proposing to unite half the population of Europe and to set it against the other half.

Although Mr. Churchill would magnanimously entrust the leadership of half of Europe to France and Germany, this is only a symbolic gesture. What he actually has in mind, of course, is that the master of the fate of Europe will be Great Britain.

What is the political and economic program of the United States of Europe? Is it intended as a political, an economic, or a military-strategical union? All three. Churchill wants to abolish customs barriers and thus open a number of countries to the free penetration of British goods. He wants half of Europe to be headed by conservatives, so that the necessary quantity of cannon fodder may be found for eventual military enterprises. Since Europe is not yet a British colony, Churchill says nothing about this. His idea is first to form the bloc, and then to talk about its aims and objects. But can the nations of Europe be expected to follow this political impressionist?

If the intention really were to rehabilitate the war-devastated areas and to promote the economic development of the European countries, if the object really were the maintenance of peace, why then exclude from the United States of Europe the Soviet Union, which has done more than Great Britain to defeat Hitler's Germany? Why are countries like Poland and Yugoslavia, which have suffered more than others from Nazi aggression, excluded from the bloc? Obviously, these are not the guiding considerations, and the real idea is to weld together an anti-Soviet bloc, a bloc directed against the nations which suffered most from the war.

But is it to be only an anti-Soviet bloc? Of course not. Mr. Churchill juggles with words and pays courteous compliments to the United States of America, promising her the patronage over the United States of Europe. But these are nothing but diplomatic flourishes, for the bloc would be also directed against America. One of its purposes is to fence off a part of Europe from the political influence and economic competition of the United States and to create the most favorable conditions for British economic and political leadership in this part of Europe.

If Mr. Churchill had said what he thought, his Zurich speech would have been couched roughly as follows: "Britain has been weakened economically and politically. Our allies, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, are now stronger than we are. Our colonies, and especially India — the foundation of Britain's might — are in a state of dangerous ferment. We must unite as large a number of European countries as possible so as to fend off the Soviet Union and prevent the United States from penetrating into our European Continent. It would be folly to declare openly that we want to form a bloc against the Soviet Union and the United States. Let us then form a bloc against Communism, against eastern totalitarianism. That will make it easier to put through a series of anti-American measures and to establish the hegemony of British imperialism in Europe."

That is what Churchill *should* have said. Instead, he followed in the footsteps of Hitler, who began with an "anti-Comintern pact" and ended with war and disaster. Beneath these anti-Communist sprigs of lilac Mr. Churchill is concealing deep-laid and far-reaching schemes, and he seems to believe that no one will divine them behind his oratorical tinsel and bombast. It was not for nothing that the late President Roosevelt, as we are told by Elliott Roosevelt in his "As He Saw It," remarked to his son after a stormy altercation with Churchill: "Winston is an old Tory, a real old Tory of the old school."

Churchill's plan would split not only Europe, but other countries as well, and first of all America. The idea of a union of Europe on Churchill's lines evoked a sympathetic response from Mr. John Foster Dulles, who never loses an opportunity to support a reactionary idea. Mr. Dulles, of course, is opposed to the "Potsdam dictate," and favors an "economic union of Europe"; and while he predicts that such a union would promote the prosperity of 200,000,000 Europeans (which is precisely half the population of Europe), he is delighted with Mr. Attlee's phrase: "Europe must federate or perish." He declares that "We have, more than any other people, experience in using the federal formula and developing its manifold possibilities." As though it were a matter of formulas! The important thing is what political and economic content is to be given to the federal formulas — who is to be united, and why.

Mr. Henry Wallace, who is not so easily taken in by fine talk about the celestial virtues of a United States of Europe, looks

upon Churchill's plan quite differently. Wallace says that Churchill's fundamental purpose is to "encircle the Soviet Union," and that he "turns to the United States for support of his reactionary anti-Soviet program." "Stripped of its fine words," Wallace writes, "the Tory position is essentially that France and Germany must combine to be the buffer against Russia. . . . Germany and France will provide the foot soldiers if trouble arises."

Mr. Churchill says that the United States of Europe should be formed within the framework of the international organization of the United Nations. But if its aims are to be the same as those of the United Nations Charter, why is a United States of Europe needed at all? Mr. Churchill would scarcely have undertaken to push the scheme if it were only a question of duplicating the international organization. Consequently, the new organization, as he plans it, is to occupy itself with questions that do not come within the functions and jurisdiction of the United Nations. Why, then, does Mr. Churchill not say so? From whatever side we approach it, the reactionary nature of the United States of Europe, or the west-European bloc, or the west-European family, stands plainly out.

What was the attitude of the British Labor Government to Mr. Churchill's scheme? The *Daily Herald* of September 21, 1946, contained a note that: "The Foreign Office stated last night that the Government was in no way consulted or informed about the speech made in Zurich by Mr. Winston Churchill." That was all. But does the fact that Churchill acted on his own initiative absolve the Labor Government from having its own opinion?

IV

In the middle of January, the United Europe Committee was formed in London, with Churchill at its head. Its members include prominent Conservatives like Lord Amery and Lord Vansittart; representatives of the clergy like the Right Rev. Edward Ellis, Bishop of Nottingham and the Very Rev. Walter Matthews, Dean of St. Paul's; some Liberals like Lord Layton, and a few Laborites. The formation of the committee was acclaimed in the big newspapers, by the B. B. C. and by prominent Conservatives who have long been toying with the idea of uniting Europe after their own fashion — in other words, bringing part of Europe under the sway of the British Empire.

The committee stated in its first declaration: "This problem is so urgent that if the governments find it impossible to undertake its realization at present, the people of good will in all countries should unite before it is too late. Europe must unite if she wants to preserve her civilization." Here again we have the warning sounded by Churchill in Zurich — unite before it is too late.

Viscount Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare) said: "The present position on the Continent is indefensible — separate zones, impassable frontiers, exchange control, no freedom of movement, pernicious ideas of autarchy and many more obstacles stifling European civilization . . ." (Note here the suggestion for the elimination of customs barriers.) "There was a risk that it would be regarded either as a means of reinsuring the British Empire or as a Western bloc against Russia," he continued, deeming it necessary to deny any such assumption in advance. But the more one reads his speeches and the speeches of the other "unifiers," the more one is strengthened in the conviction as to their real purpose. If there were any lingering doubt it would be dispelled by a perusal of the explanations given by Lord Layton, and by Duncan Sandys, Churchill's son-in-law, at a press conference in London on January 16. They said that "a United Europe will naturally strive for a close friendship and coöperation with the Soviet Union and U. S. A." But if it is intended to establish close coöperation with the U. S. S. R., why are the U. S. S. R. and its neighbors excluded from the bloc from the very outset? These would-be splitters of Europe obviously cannot get their story straight. Asked whether the Soviet Union would be invited to join the movement for a united Europe, Lord Amery replied: "The United Europe would be an association of countries of common culture and spiritual outlook." Comment is superfluous.

One might cite scores of enthusiastic articles in praise of Churchill's new offspring (nine-tenths of the British press is in the hands of the Conservatives), but, as Bismarck said, what the newspapers say is not necessarily public opinion.

It becomes the more important to know the attitude of the British Labor Government to the Churchill scheme because several fairly prominent members of the Labor Party have joined the committee. The Government's opinion is unknown. But we have the opinion of Mr. Percy Cudlipp, editor of the *Daily Herald*, the Government's semi-official organ: "Indeed, this Committee excludes Soviet Russia from its conception of a

United Europe. It also excludes those countries which border on Russia and are under her influence. . . . I am convinced that in so far as Churchill is concerned, this plan represents primarily an attempt to play up power politics against Russia."

The Executive Committee of the Labor Party advised six Laborites not to support the United Europe Committee. Morgan Phillips, the Party's secretary, declared: "The future peace and progress of Europe depend on the success of the United Nations and therefore on the strengthening of friendly collaboration between Russia, America and Britain. Churchill, however, explicitly excludes Russia from 'United Europe,' which he envisaged. This fact, coupled with Churchill's record and known opinions regarding Russia, means that the Committee's policy will be interpreted, rightly or wrongly, as aiming at the elimination of Russian influence from Europe."

Soviet public opinion objects to a United States of Europe of this kind, not only because the scheme is being pushed by "an old Tory of the old school," but because the program is anti-democratic and fraught with calamity for Europe and mankind generally. And no matter who the head of a committee with a program of this kind might be — whether it were headed by a Conservative, a Liberal, a British Laborite or a French Socialist — the organization must meet with stern opposition from all progressively minded people who want to see Germany and her former satellites really denazified and democratized, who want to see all nations, including the European, not divided, but coöperating in the work of eradicating Fascism, the cause of wars, and of ensuring stable and enduring peace.

A group of Labor M.P.'s (Lang, Crossman, King, Foot, Dodds and others) moved a resolution in the House of Commons calling upon the Government to intimate "Britain's readiness to federate with any other nations willing to do so on a basis of a federal constitution to be agreed by a representative Constituent Assembly." This resolution also favors federation, but not on Churchill lines. However, it does not seem to be very clear on the subject. One might say that there are different opinions and big divergences in the Labor Party on this issue. Some follow Churchill, others want what Churchill wants but without Churchill, some advocate a west-European bloc, but of a special kind, others a world government, and so forth. But behind all this divergency there is one leading idea — to rally around Britain as many

countries as possible, having a common culture and spiritual outlook, in order, with their help and at their expense, to deliver Britain from its present political and economic difficulties.

This is borne out by the reaction to Léon Blum's visit to England and the negotiations for a treaty of mutual assistance between Britain and France. Since M. Blum favors a west-European bloc, around this table met fellow-thinkers of the past (members of the Second Socialist International) and the present. The British Conservative press gleefully announced that Churchill approved of the proposed treaty and that agreement between Britain and France would serve as the prelude to, and foundation of, a United States of Europe. How times have changed! In 1930, a British Labor Government turned down Briand's Pan-Europe because it implied French hegemony in continental Europe; today Léon Blum supports British plans for the creation of a west-European bloc, which owes its popularity in England to the fact that both Conservatives and Laborites hope Britain will play the dominating rôle in it.

France is deeply divided on this issue. Grave suspicion is aroused by the anti-Soviet implications of a scheme to unite half of Europe. If Léon Blum is prepared to act as junior partner to his friend Attlee, that is his affair — but Léon Blum is not France by a long way! One scarcely thinks that the French National Assembly and Council of the Republic, to say nothing of the French people, will consent to the conversion of the Fourth French Republic into an instrument for strengthening Great Britain at the expense of half the Continent — in short, will turn France into a tool of intrigue against the U. S. S. R.

Why has Churchill taken up the idea of a United States of Europe? What would be his attitude to a proposal for a United States of Africa, with Great Britain outside and opposed to it? Why does he think that Europe needs the leadership of the British Conservatives and of himself? The freedom-loving nations have disposed of one would-be Führer of Europe; why should they now need a Führer of the British brand? The British people sacked the Conservatives and cast off the Conservative shirt; what reason have Churchill and his friends to think that the peoples of Europe are willing to don the old threadbare political linen?

Some protagonists of the projected United States of Europe (Lord Vansittart, for example) have made attempts to prove that the Churchill plan dovetails with the idea of regional arrange-

ments provided for in the United Nations Charter. This is not true. The Charter of the United Nations (Article 52) does not preclude the existence of regional arrangements or agencies to deal with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and which are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

From what has been said already, it is obvious that a federation of one-half of Europe against the other half is in no way consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. If we adhere to the United Nations Charter — and this is the sacred duty of all freedom-loving nations — a constructive solution of this problem must be along the following lines:

1. Alliances of groups of countries must not be directed against any other group of countries. They must not be anti-Soviet or anti-American or anti-European.

2. Regional arrangements should not pursue aims that contradict the United Nations Charter in letter or in spirit.

4. Former Axis countries and their satellites can be included in these regional arrangements only after they have been denazified and democratized and after they have been accepted as members of the United Nations. Only a country as a whole, and not parts of it, may be a member of a regional alliance.

5. Those countries that played such a big part in the defeat of the Axis countries and their satellites must not be excluded from these regional arrangements, which, according to the United Nations, are to serve the purpose of maintaining peace and security.

This is a constructive solution to the problem which Mr. Churchill and his followers are deliberately making more involved and confused. If the supporters of the idea of a United States of Europe have these aims in mind, why do they need to establish this special organization?

Churchill is a fervid imperialist and reactionary romanticist. He looks to the past; he would like to turn back the wheel of history. But the peoples of Europe want to go forward, not backward. The whole world has changed, all peoples have developed in political mentality in this war. British imperialism will not succeed in filling the vacuum formed after the defeat of Hitler Germany by creating a “new order” in Europe on the Churchill pattern. *The peoples of Europe do not want a split under the label of union.* For that reason the plan is doomed to failure.

ALTERNATIVES FOR GERMANY

By Allen W. Dulles

THERE will not be economic or political health in Europe until we have faced and dealt with the German problem. Neither Britain nor France, war-weary, in financial straits and preoccupied with domestic and empire problems, can shoulder the major part of the burden of making a settlement in Germany. The United States is the only western Power which has the capacity, if it has the will, to take the lead and to see the task through. The performance of this task demands American initiative, ingenuity and money in large amounts. The money is not charity; it is part of the cost of World War II. It is also an investment in our own future welfare and security.

Germany must be dealt with in the framework of Europe. If the settlement is to bring economic health to Europe, it must advance the economic stabilization of all of Germany's neighbors and help them to face their common economic problems together. If it is to bring political health to Europe, it must contribute to a reduction of the political tension on the Continent and between the Powers outside the Continent which are hardly less concerned with the future of Germany than are that country's immediate neighbors.

In laying plans to deal with Germany we face these problems and contradictions:

1. If Germany is to be solvent and self-sustaining, and hence is to cease being an object of outside charity, she will, by implication, be industrially prosperous. But the prospect of a prosperous Germany arouses fears of a Germany that may again be militarily powerful and dangerous.

2. Germany's industry is necessary for Europe, and must be fitted into the European economy. But the natural pattern to follow, *i.e.*, integrating the industry of western Germany chiefly into western Europe, will arouse Russia's suspicions that preparations are being made to use Germany against her. Similarly, the absorption of the industrial capacity of prewar eastern Germany (Silesia, etc.) into the Soviet sphere of influence will raise

Author's Note: This article is based on discussions in a group of members of the Council on Foreign Relations who have been studying the German problem. It is not to be taken as representing the views of the Council, which does not itself take a position on public questions, or of all the individual members of the group, some of whom were in disagreement on specific points.

apprehensions in the west of a substantial strengthening of the military potential of Soviet Russia.

3. Democracy cannot be inculcated in a society which is starving and hopeless. But we have historical grounds for fearing that as soon as Germans begin to hope, they will hope for a new Greater Reich.

4. Everyone wants Germany to be "democratic." But the very definition of the word democracy is in dispute between Soviet Russia and her western allies.

Any settlement has its risks. No hazards are greater, however, than a continuance of the present process of disintegration in Germany — political, material, social and spiritual — and of the rivalry among the occupying Powers which has accelerated that process. The following objectives and measures are suggested as elements in a constructive German policy.

I. SECURITY

Germany should be disarmed and both forbidden and prevented from manufacturing any arms or instruments of war. She should be allowed no military force or military organization except necessary police. She should be prohibited from manufacturing aircraft of any sort, and restricted as to the amount of aviation equipment she may import for domestic transport use. The manufacture of any synthetic product should be limited to types and amounts which would not tend to create a war potential (admittedly not easy to define concretely in the case of oil, rubber, etc.). The great industrial area of the Ruhr should be subject to special control, as indicated below.

Mass armies cannot continue in occupation of Germany indefinitely without the deterioration of their morale, and without reinforcing the feeling of the German people that the occupying forces have lifted from their shoulders the responsibility of doing anything to help themselves. The occupation as now practised should be terminated by all the occupying Powers, perhaps even before a treaty is ratified. This emphatically is not to say that military controls, policed by an adequate constabulary, should not be continued, in addition to political and economic controls.

These controls should be supplemented by an enforcement agreement among the Allies along the lines suggested by former Secretary of State Byrnes, covering a period of 25 or 40 years. We must frankly recognize, however, that controls enumerated

in treaties have only the virtue of defining the intentions of the contracting Powers and formulating their agreements. They will be effective only if the Powers have the determination to live up to their agreements and continue to be willing to enforce the controls. Adequate safeguards against German rearmament were written into the treaty after World War I. Germany was able to arm for new aggression because the Allies were divided among themselves and were unwilling to assume the burden of enforcing the treaty by timely action.

The restriction of Germany's industry to a point where she would not be self-supporting would not by itself answer the security problem. Industries can quickly be rebuilt for war purposes, as experience has proved in the past. What will constitute armament in the atomic age cannot be foreseen.

II. GERMANY'S ECONOMY

A program of complete deindustrialization, even if practicable, is inconsistent with other Allied aims. If Germany's industry were destroyed, it could make no contribution to the restoration of European or world economy; and Germany herself would remain a burden. Germany must have a viable economy, which means she should have a decent standard of living, regain the hope of improvement through her own efforts and produce enough exports to pay for necessary imports. German industry should be subject to the controls cited above, but not to arbitrary limits in permitted fields of production. The German economy should be so organized as to enable the German people to earn their own way in the world and to contribute to the restoration of European economy.

Reparations. Germany has a duty to help repair the damage she has wrought. But two factors conditioning this duty are her capacity to pay reparations and the effect such payment would have on the European economy. Any final settlement should readjust the Potsdam Agreement and put a substantial end to reparations in the form of plant and equipment. (An exception, of course, would be the equipment of arms plants, which are to be banned in Germany entirely. Also there may be excess scrap, machine tools and the like which might still be taken. The restitution of all looted property should, in addition, be completed.)

Reparations from current production might well be considered as an alternative to reparations from capital assets, but with due

consideration for the fact that Germany's exports should meet her requirements for financing essential imports. To some extent, also, German labor might be employed in the production of reparations goods within Germany, especially in fabricating finished products from raw materials furnished by reparations creditors. Reparations from current production of heavy industry might tend to stimulate German heavy industry artificially to an undesirable point. But the same danger would not exist in the case of reparations in the form of consumer goods.

The possibility that Germany might furnish manpower to help in restoring the regions she devastated should also be considered. But this would have to be worked out on a basis which would avoid the forms of economic slavery for which the Nazis justly incurred world obloquy. The labor of prisoners held after V-E day might well be credited on reparation account.

A limit should be set to reparations, both as to time and amount. Payments should not continue after the period of European reconstruction; and if they were limited as to amount, this would hold out hope to Germany of an earlier termination as a reward for effective performance. At the end of a definite period, say 10 to 15 years, any reparation settlement now reached should be reviewed.

The Ruhr and Upper Silesia. The Ruhr should be given a special status and its industries should be operated, under an appropriate allocating authority, for the benefit of Europe, including Germany. The chief countries to consider, with Germany, should be those most naturally integrated economically with the Ruhr: France, Belgium and Holland in first line, and secondarily Italy, the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland and others.

The political separation of the Ruhr from Germany would have unwelcome political consequences. It would lead to irredentism in Germany, and would increase the tensions among the Powers administering the area. It would also leave Germany in an impossible economic situation. But some form of international control is desirable, in the interests of security and of European economic reconstruction. What form should this international control take? The question raises difficult practical problems. The operation of the Ruhr iron, steel and coal industries by nationals of foreign countries which produce and sell the same products would create conflicts of interest. Obviously, the Ruhr should not be allowed to become the stepchild of the heavy

industry of France or Britain. A formula must be devised to provide a measure of security control, insure the proper development of the Ruhr's resources, and effect a fair distribution of its products. The task obviously is difficult; but the fact that no wholly acceptable plan has yet been found is not proof that none can be produced.

German finances. The restoration of German economy and the revival of foreign trade will not be fully effective without a drastic currency reform and the establishment of a foreign exchange rate. The oversupply of currency is a major cause of economic stagnation. The excess of money over goods, and the lack of confidence in the currency, reduce the incentive to work; wages will buy too little. Drastic financial reforms which go to the heart of the structure of property ownership cannot be carried out, even on restricted scale, without affecting all property relationships. An attempt to introduce such reforms in only one or two zones, the British and American for example, not only would encounter great practical difficulties, but might prejudice eventual unification with other zones.

The solution of these problems, however, cannot safely wait till the laborious process of negotiating and ratifying a treaty has been completed. A drastic modification of present occupation policies is required. Any reconciliation between Soviet and western ideas in the fields of banking, currency and ownership of property is so difficult to attain that it may be necessary to try to find a *modus vivendi* by setting up a German financial authority with power, within certain limits, to determine fiscal policy. This suggests that the German settlement may prove to be, of necessity, a series of agreements, the first of which might deal with urgent practical problems, such as the financial one, even before the whole treaty structure has been put together.

III. GERMANY'S FRONTIERS

The narrowing of Germany's borders during the period of occupation has aggravated the German economic problem. The loss of the food-producing areas in the east, and the transfer of Germans from the Polish-occupied areas and Czechoslovakia, have accentuated the food shortage. The amputation of the important coal and industrial areas of Silesia and the Saar has weakened Germany's ability to produce exportable goods to balance her essential imports. Upper Silesia and the Saar accounted for some

15 percent of Germany's prewar industry, and some 20 percent of her coal.

While no legally binding decisions have yet been taken as to any of Germany's prewar boundaries, certain commitments have been made which, in conjunction with a new situation existing in the east, do not, as a practical matter, leave the United States with free hands. 1. The northern half of East Prussia, including Königsberg, has, in effect, been promised to the Soviet Union. 2. The Poles occupy the area eastward of the Oder-Neisse line and have evacuated a substantial part of the Germans in Pomerania, eastern Brandenburg, Upper and Lower Silesia, and East Prussia. The United States has agreed to support a revision of Poland's frontiers with Germany. The extent of the revisions is to be determined at the peace settlement. 3. The special claims of the French on the Saar have been recognized by ex-Secretary Byrnes at Stuttgart.

The following comments may be made on the principal territorial issues. The Saar should be dealt with in a manner to take account primarily of the economic interests and needs of France. The French might well hesitate, however, to assume political responsibility for some 900,000 Germans in the area; these may today lean toward France to escape the German chaos, but tomorrow they could prove a most troublesome element in the French body politic. The border adjustments desired by the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium and Czechoslovakia should be examined to ascertain the true basis of each claim, *i.e.* whether it involves a rectification of frontier justified on economic grounds, or a disguised annexation of a substantial area for strategic or other less justifiable reasons.

The crux of the territorial problem lies in the east. History will probably decide that the Soviet Union has been pressing Poland farther to the west into Germany than is in Poland's own interest. Recollection of the historic partitions of Poland makes us fearful that there may be another. If she annexes all of the German areas east of the Oder-Neisse, Poland will place herself in a difficult position vis-à-vis the future Germany. Furthermore, Soviet Russia would then have a rich prize to offer Germany to lure her into the Russian camp — the restoration to Germany of her ancient frontiers in the east. Similarly, Russia could hold this as an ever-present threat over any Polish government. The possibility of the coercion of Poland, crushed between Germany and

the Soviet Union, is so great that emphasis should be laid on the fact that, once a treaty has been signed, any further modification of the frontiers must have the consent of all the signatories, not merely those whose frontiers are involved.

The desirability of retaining within Germany part of the agricultural areas of Lower Silesia, Pomerania and eastern Brandenburg has already been suggested by ex-Secretary Byrnes. East Prussia and Danzig (except, of course, for the Russian Koenigsberg area), would be added to the prewar Polish territories. There are strong arguments in favor of assigning Upper Silesia to Polish sovereignty, but consideration should be given to working out a special status for its industrial area.

It would be a mistake to assume that we have no right to an influential voice in determining the eastern frontier of Germany. The United States has stated that it would stand by its agreement regarding the cession to Russia of the Koenigsberg area, and the revision of Germany's eastern frontier in Poland's favor; but the extent of these revisions and the status of Silesia remain to be determined.

The industrial area of Upper Silesia is of importance not only to Poland and Russia, but also to the Danube Basin and other parts of Europe. In the interest of the unification and restoration of European economy there should be an examination of the question whether the Upper Silesian industries and coal, like those of the Ruhr, can serve a broader purpose than could be achieved under the exclusive management and control of a single Power.

IV. GERMANY'S POLITICAL STRUCTURE

If a new constitution is to endure, its terms cannot be forced upon the German people from outside. There are two things, however, that can be done.

During the period of occupation we can guide and direct the trends. In the American zone this has been done by developing *Laender* Governments, and the system now is being followed in the British and French zones. This leads in the direction of a decentralized Germany. (Under any federal setup, of course, the dissolution of Prussia should be confirmed, and stress should be laid on a maximum of cultural autonomy in the states.) In the second place, we can and should set forth in the treaty certain minimum requirements, possibly in the form of a bill of rights,

to which any future constitution must conform. In this way we can stipulate that the essentials of a democratic government must be maintained, with freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of elections, the immunities of the individual, and the like. Failure to maintain these principles would then constitute a violation of Germany's international obligations. The German constitution ought to make any repetition of what happened in Germany in the early days of the Hitler régime a matter of international concern and a German breach of an international obligation.

With the help of old traditions and the patterns set by the occupying Powers, it should not be impossible to guide the course of events in Germany so that the Germans themselves would adopt a federal form of government which reserved to the people of the states of Germany all powers not specifically confided to a central government. The powers of the central government would include: limited powers of taxation; control of commerce and transportation; the regulation of exports and imports; post and communications; banking and currency; foreign policy; and a limited police force to carry out these responsibilities. Also, it would presumably be necessary to have a central legislative body, which might include representatives elected by the people of the states according to regulations prescribed by the states, as well, possibly, as a senate composed of representatives chosen by the legislative bodies in the states. Political and cultural life, however, should develop around the separate states.

The degree of decentralization which is wise and practicable is a matter on which many Americans familiar with conditions in Germany are in disagreement. Some feel that the economic unity essential to Germany necessitates a more centralized government than the one just described, and that a federal political structure would help to perpetuate Communist influence in the federal states of eastern Germany and might encourage reaction in a state like Bavaria. Finally, those who oppose decentralization feel that it would be a delusion to believe that a federal Germany would be any more peace-loving or in practical fact any weaker militarily than a unitary Germany.

To the writer, however, the arguments in favor of a thoroughgoing political decentralization of Germany seem compelling. We can have more hope of developing a program of reëducation if we work with the German people in several smaller political units

than in a great unitary state. The power complex of the Germans tends to run riot if given a vehicle through which to express itself. Historically the German people made their best contribution to western civilization in a decentralized confederation. This was a time for them of relative contentment, of peace and cultural progress. When Germany was a unitary Prussianized state, she repeatedly brought war and catastrophe to herself and Europe. Finally, if we are to build up a European union or any form of closer economic community among the states of western Europe, there would be great danger in taking Germany into it unless she were decentralized and federalized, and unless there were a resolute determination that she must remain so; for a strong, centralized Germany would overshadow any other single member of the union in population and potential power and hence would be viewed with apprehension as almost certain to control the union.

These differing views regarding Germany's political future, however, have certain points of common agreement, as mentioned above. Those who minimize the importance of decentralization agree nevertheless that it is wise to build up the cultural autonomy of the German states and give them a certain degree of political self-government. The advocates of decentralization recognize that there must be no trade barriers as between the states of a federation or confederation, and that there must be some form of central administration to ensure this.

There has been disagreement as to where the capital of the new Germany should be. The obvious disadvantages of locating the central government of a federal German state in the old Prussian capital of Berlin have led to the suggestion that this devastated city on the eastern fringe of the new Germany should remain a monument to the frustrated ambitions of the Kaiser and Hitler, and that the capital should be moved westward. Frankfurt might be a suitable site; but if Russian agreement to this could not be secured, then a city of western Saxony or Thuringia might be chosen.

What are we to do if our negotiations fail and Russia remains on the Elbe? We would then seem to have no alternative but to build up the economic life of western Germany as best we can, and integrate it into western Europe. There is no reason why we should not make this clear. Soviet willingness to negotiate an overall German settlement would probably be expedited by

the realization that an alternative course of action is open to us, that we would not react to Russian delaying tactics by passively allowing western Germany to disintegrate.

V. GERMANY'S SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The defeat of Nazism has removed one of the obstacles to the democratization of Germany; but it has not created a democratic Germany. Nor is there much basis for the belief that democracy will develop in Germany under present conditions of defeat, hunger, idleness and despair. One way to help create the conditions in which democracy could take root is to give a hope of decent livelihood to the mass of Germans. This, of course, will not be enough alone, as the aggressiveness of a comparatively prosperous Germany under William II and Hitler proved. But it nevertheless is one essential step.

The effort of denazification should be directed from now on primarily against those who exercised authority in the fields of government, business or the professions — the leaders of the masses rather than the masses themselves. The program to help the Germans reëducate themselves — and they will have to do it themselves if it is to take hold — should be vitalized. A first step is to open Germany more widely to the liberalizing influences of the west, for example, by removal of the restrictions on the entry of newspapers, periodicals and books in English, French and other languages, and in German translations.

From the outset of occupation, the United States has sought to introduce democracy at the "grass roots" — that is, to train the German people in political responsibility at the local and state level. This policy should be pressed with every means at our disposal. Probably the best achievement of our occupation has been the development of local self-government, and the help given to Germans in the setting up of their own *Laender* Governments. Encouragement has properly been given to the free play of party organizations of all political complexions, and to the formation of labor unions. We must look to the churches, to organized labor and to the few remaining political leaders of proved anti-Nazi antecedents for leadership in the process of establishing a basis for self government. The universities still suffer severely from the dearth of younger professors. It would seem wise to send professors from the United States, England and the western European democracies to help bolster education

in the German universities; but the extent to which this can be done is probably limited. Selected German students and younger professors should also be given the facilities to study abroad; and, to encourage the emergence of democratic leaders in various fields, selected young trade union leaders, clergymen, writers and editors should be given the opportunity to make contacts in the United States and western Europe. Such matters are not part of a treaty, but attention to them is essential if there is to be even a slender chance that Germany will follow the path of democracy.

None of the occupying Powers should attempt to impose its particular social system, whether it be capitalism or Socialism. The Germans should be free to determine the measure of state or private ownership of industry which they consider appropriate to their economic position and social structure, so long as it is essentially democratic in its guarantee of human rights.

VI. PROCEDURE OF RATIFICATION

The German treaty will be formulated by the victors, and if the usual procedure were followed it would be submitted for signature and ratification to a new German Government, composed of the most reputable anti-Nazis we could find. But such a course seems most undesirable. The peace will not be a negotiated one; it will probably be much more of a *diktat* than the Versailles Treaty. Though the German individuals who signed the Treaty of Versailles were permitted to submit comments, which resulted in modifications, and were, indeed, permitted to denounce it before signing, they were nevertheless discredited in German eyes, and vastly weakened thereby in their later fight against Nazism. So were the political parties which accepted the treaty. Today an even less substantial basis for democracy exists in Germany than did in 1918, and what little there is should not be handicapped in this way.

Theoretically, then, the forthcoming drastic German treaty should bear the signatures of the heirs and successors of Hitler, men such as Doenitz and Papen. Since that is not in fact practicable, the treaty should simply be imposed by unilateral act of the victors. No German signatures would, in any event, give the agreement the characteristics of a binding contract, though any government which takes office in Germany must, of course, agree to be bound by the treaty as a condition of Allied recognition.

VII. CONCLUSION

We should not look on the German problem merely as a factor in our relations with Soviet Russia. Nor will any settlement which may satisfy Russia and ourselves and lessen tension between us necessarily be a good one. We should view Germany first of all in its European setting. No solution which fails to take account of the needs of Europe will last. Secondly, whatever settlement is agreed on will be illusory if during the long months of negotiation we have been unable to prevent the German economy from disintegration. This will require the expenditure of money in large amounts — the money of American taxpayers — as well as a high degree of intelligent planning.

If the American people are to be asked to contribute additional funds to European and German restoration in order to see their war aims accomplished and in order to secure a chance of consolidating the peace, they are entitled to three assurances: first, that Germany will not be stripped of economically useful assets while we are donating supplies to her; second, that repayment for such advances will not be subordinated to the payment of reparations; and third, that the funds appropriated will be expended under a program of sufficient scope to justify the belief that it will accomplish its purpose.

Our stake in the restoration of European economy is so great that we, as a people, and our elected representatives, must ask for the same boldness of conception and power of execution in facing the German problem today that brought us victory in the fighting war.

THE NEW FRENCH CONSTITUTION

By *André Géraud*
("Pertinax")

ALL the main parts of the new French constitutional machine have now been assembled, and the finished product has been approved by the French people. In the referendum of October 13, it received 9,126,370 "yeas," against 8,043,336 "nays," out of a total of 25,448,125 registered voters, male and female. Has the Fourth Republic a chance to survive under this Constitution? Or are we likely now to witness a rapid change of scene, a cascade of innovations like that which filled the decade from 1789 to 1799?

The French people lived under the Constitution of 1875 for 65 years — that is, till July 11, 1940, the date of the first "Constitutional Act" promulgated by Pétain by virtue of the powers conferred on him the day before by the last Chamber of Deputies and last Senate of the Third Republic. To that Constitution the French people had been indebted for the first stable régime they had known since the Revolution. Coups d'état, brusque changes, sudden breaks of continuity, these for 65 years they had been spared. The longest period of stability before the adoption of the Constitution of 1875 had been 18 years, once during the July Monarchy and again during the Second Empire.

The fragmentary and incomplete laws of February and July 1875 laid out the framework of a constitutional monarchy *à l'Anglaise*, but with a president in the place of the monarch. It was a compromise; and Legitimists, Orléanists, Bonapartists and Republicans, mutually opposed in both feelings and doctrines, resigned themselves to it as a last resource. As a matter of fact, the discord among the organizers was responsible for the strength of their work. The articles they agreed on, disconnected as they were, proved in practice more stable than the ambitious systems which had been attempted in 1791, 1795, 1799, 1804, 1815, 1848 and 1852. That the little skiff put together out of odds and ends proved more seaworthy than the supposedly perfected hulls constructed by proud engineers is not so surprising as it might seem. In popular government, empiricism, patience, a modest adaptation to circumstances, are preferable to abstractions. Gilded phrases are not sound currency.

The Constitution of 1875, gradually making its way decade by decade, gave France a kind of government which, at the lowest estimate, was competent in periods of calm. More, by 1914-1918 the Third Republic had developed a personnel which was able to weather victoriously a crisis of war and invasion. But it was incapable of adapting itself to the social and economic upheavals of the second quarter of the twentieth century. Its hands were too feeble to keep the French people from drifting to disaster.

Human responsibilities cannot be sorted out easily from those of institutions. A Poincaré, a Clemenceau, perhaps even a Barthou, might have been equal to saving the country in the perilous period from 1930 to 1940. Let us record merely that the existing institutions did not assist the men who were in fact in power, and that the men themselves were very inferior to the predecessors who had held their high positions.

In its final period, in its last 30 years, let us say, the régime was characterized more and more by a fatal confusion between executive and legislative functions, or, to use more exact terminology, between government action and parliamentary control. The French people believed they were living in a parliamentary régime; properly speaking, however, no such régime did actually exist. In England, the country which invented this form of government, it has specific characteristics which France had not copied. At Westminster, the Cabinet which governs and the Parliament which controls it hold equal status. The Cabinet is not subordinated to the Parliament. The Cabinet's responsibility to the House of Commons is balanced by its right to appeal to the electorate if the Commons refuses to give it its confidence — in short, by the right of the Cabinet to dissolve Parliament. In France, however, the right of dissolving the Assembly was used just once, on June 19, 1877, and never after.

The right of dissolution is thought of in France as an instrument of the coup d'état because nearly 70 years ago Marshal MacMahon, President of the Republic, attempted to use it to keep in office the Duc de Broglie's "reactionary" cabinet in face of an adverse vote in the Chamber of Deputies. Marshal MacMahon lost out at the general elections which followed, and thereupon, accepting the popular will, appointed Jules Dufaure as President of the Council. The escapade was a short one, but the memory of it remained very vivid in French minds. Gaston Doumergue, President of the Council of Ministers in 1934, tried

vainly to regain the balance which had swung against the Executive, and to reinstate dissolution of the Chamber as a normal government procedure. In a reform of that sort political leaders like Edouard Herriot could see only a step toward dictatorship. I can still hear his words: "At Barthou's funeral, when I saw Doumergue take the head of the procession, ten paces ahead of us, I understood that he aspired to supreme power."

Gaston Doumergue, a mediocre person, probably was not made of the stuff of dictators. Let us not forget, however, that he had men like Laval and Flandin among his following. No regrets need perhaps be wasted, then, that he was denied the right of dissolving the Chamber. Perhaps actually he would have used that right against the Republic. What is regrettable is that, long before Doumergue, not one of the great leaders of the Third Republic had thought of taking an initiative in that direction. They probably would not have aroused the same distrust; and the anarchical state of affairs created by the multiplicity of parties and clans might have been lessened. Thus might we have been spared the departmental satraps — the Chautemps, the Malvys, the Monzies, and the rest — who became especially powerful in the Senate because the urban populations, less easily a prey to their methods of patronage, were not adequately represented there. One recalls in this connection the courts of justice of the eighteenth century, and their appeals to ancient liberties, or simply to liberty itself, as a basis for their objections to the reforms eventually brought about by the Revolution. What a valuable weapon the right of dissolution, the right of appeal to the people, might have been for smashing and dispersing the old inert oligarchies that cumbered the political arena between the two world wars! We should examine into this important matter a little more thoroughly as a preliminary to studying the new French Constitution.

II

Was the Third Republic in fact a régime of assembly? By that phrase I mean a constitutional organization in which the government originates directly from a chamber elected by universal suffrage and retaining the first and last word upon every occasion.

France has had a single-chamber government three times: in 1792-95, in 1848-52 and in 1871-76. Let us leave aside the third of these, the period from 1871 to 1876, when the National As-

sembly, elected in reaction against the Second Empire, the military defeat and the Commune, and made up largely of Legitimists and Orléanists, agreed to set up a conservative Republic as a middle course acceptable to the two opposing factions. The other two single-chamber assemblies, however, called on to cope with foreign war or internal disorder, sought salvation in recourse to energetic, violent men like Danton and Robespierre, who found support in a nation-wide network of clubs, or in the enthronement of the pretender Bonaparte.

Nothing of this sort occurred in the France of 1875-1940. The French people had gone through bitter experiences, from which they were barely recovering. Adventure did not tempt them. Moreover, the popular assembly no longer held a sole position of domination. Now it was flanked by a Senate elected by restricted suffrage, and thus was held back from irresponsible leanings toward one idea or one man. Thus neutralized against bad actions, however, it was also rendered incapable of taking good actions rapidly and decisively except when very unusual leaders succeeded in shaking it out of its torpor.

In the end, the country came into the management of a clique of parliamentarians — “the republic of comrades.” The denizens of this little parliamentary world were less concerned with exercising control over the government, the true function of Parliament, than with mixing in governmental work and usurping ministerial functions. The picture of the Third Republic in this period of its decline is fresh in all our memories. The presidents of the important committees of the Chamber and the Senate were often yesterday’s ministers, and they invariably thought of themselves as the ministers of tomorrow. They had their dependents among the officials in the ministries; and frequently it was these who were in command. The ambition of a successful senator and deputy is to become minister, or even, without waiting for that, to direct the ministerial offices from the outside. When parliamentary control invades the field of government action it either upsets or paralyzes it; the Government no longer governs, and Parliament itself ceases to exercise control.¹

In sum, it can be said that the Republic of 1875 did not evolve into a régime by assembly any more than it did into a real parlia-

¹ Beginning in 1934, an attempt was made to find a way out of this chaos by means of decree-laws. Customarily this procedure is adopted when the statutory or legislative powers of the government are increasing. The shocking feature of the decree-laws of 1934-40 was the attendant Parliamentary inertia.

mentary government. It was a cross between the two systems.

Protection of a country's broad, long-term interests requires strong government action, by which I mean action by an executive which, while refraining from persecuting Parliament, knows how to energize its activities. Left to themselves, popular representatives are too often subject to the pressure of short-term interests. The Third Republic did not supply the required strong government action because the executive had surrendered the right of dissolution.

But, it will be asked, did England do much better? There the government possesses the right of dissolution, and because it possesses that right it can usually discipline the majority without invoking its prerogative. Now there is not much doubt that English cabinets since 1905 have not been particularly wise in the field of foreign policy; indeed, their shortsightedness was responsible for many of the misfortunes which have overwhelmed the world. But that is not the essence of the question we are considering here. To possess the necessary power for the proper conduct of affairs is one thing; to employ it sensibly is another. In France, the power of the government was on the average exercised fairly well in the international field; but in internal affairs it did not assert itself with sufficient force, and it is in this respect that it loses in comparison with the English model.

III

After the liberation, France was divided as to how the government should be reconstituted. Was it best to take the Constitution of 1875 as a point of departure, to elect a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate according to the old rules, and to count on them to introduce the necessary improvements? Or should the whole 1875 structure be abolished and should none of its scattered remnants be salvaged to build up the new state edifice? The immense majority preferred the second alternative.

Some people — General de Gaulle at their head — were opposed to the laws of 1875 because they felt that in order to resurrect France and safeguard her in a world threatened by new vicissitudes it was wise and necessary to establish a presidential type of government. Presidential government: this is the first time the expression appears in my account. Parliamentary government, government by assembly and the peculiar compound that formed the Third Republic have all been defined. The presi-

dential formula must now be explained; for though it does not have much chance of acceptance in France except by accident, the spectre of it expresses a strong influence on French affairs.

The principal features of the presidential régime as commonly understood in Europe are the following: 1, a President chosen by an electoral body larger than Parliament, that is, a President independent of Parliament; 2, ministers chosen by the President and responsible to him; 3, a recognized right of the President to dissolve Parliament and appeal to the people against the body which the people have elected.

In France such a system of government can only evolve into despotism, pure and simple. The history of 1848–1851 is there to warn us. In the United States, a form of presidential government has been in existence for a century and a half without encroaching on public liberties; but that form differs fundamentally from the European model just described. The American President can do nothing against Congress and he does not possess the right to dismiss it. The basis of the American Constitution was and still is separation of powers, in the eighteenth century sense.² Now separation of powers can, when the executive and the legislative branches are in disagreement, divide the authority of the state. The happy lot of the United States has permitted this infringement of state authority without creating too great disturbance or causing too much uneasiness. In our redoubtable Europe, on the contrary, no such stoppage in the operation of public authority has ever been tolerated. When the organ of action and the organ of control come to grips, and when the Constitution provides no means of settling the dispute between them without undue delay, there is every chance that it will be settled without regard to law. Either government action will stifle the control or the control will absorb (and perhaps transform) the government action. In the first event we have presidential government according to its European meaning; in the second, government by assembly.

Professors of constitutional law have long since recognized this chain of cause and effect, and in their teachings no longer speak of separation of powers but of separation of functions. They have dropped the teaching of Montesquieu. Separation of powers is like the separation of two trees; separation of functions is like the separation of two branches of a tree. And the best way of coördi-

² In the United States, moreover, the presidential régime is superimposed upon a federal structure, which serves as a guarantee against presidential abuses of authority.

nating the two branches is to distinguish, as the English do, the government function from the control function, while protecting it from becoming too subordinate. Any arrangement which grants government action more than is granted under the English system weakens the control function unduly.

The exponents of a presidential régime (General de Gaulle is not among them; he has never taken the pains to set forth his conception fully) were not the only opponents, or even the principal opponents, of the Constitution of 1875. The masses which voted against it on October 21, 1945, had no thought that a presidential government should be built upon its ruins. They merely felt instinctively that after such an overwhelming disaster great changes were indispensable. And most men of the Liberation, all question of the future régime aside, felt that a rupture with the past would have a salutary effect upon French psychology. They thought the people needed a shock in order to recover. They also had a feeling that if the prewar institutions were condemned France would be less likely to believe that the shame of Vichy had a logical place in her history. The old bed was swarming with lice and bedbugs. Why not burn it up? Further, there was a justifiable patriotic prejudice against the Senate of 1940, which had been a hotbed of treason. "Scarcely 30 enlightened patriots are to be found there," said its President, M. Jeanneney. Moreover, leftist extremists have always been impatient to destroy it.

In the October 21 referendum, then, only 670,292 out of more than 24 million registered voters declared themselves in favor of a return to the Republic of 1875.

IV

The Constitution of 1875 having been rejected, the French were faced with a complete blank. For the twelfth time in a century and a half their institutions had to be reconstructed. The Constituent Assembly worked at the task from November 1945 to April 1946 under the eyes of an indifferent people.

What a contrast to the enthusiasm and confidence of their ancestors of 1789 and even of 1794! Then⁴ political architects like Sieyès did not doubt that a régime could be put together all at once, like a ship. They even disdained historical experience, as these lines by Sieyès indicate: "Plenty of others are busy slavishly arranging ideas, fitting them to events. When one who desires only to serve the public interest meditates on them, he must at

every page say that a healthy policy is not the science of that which is, but of that which should be." And now note the impression this doctrinaire made on Gouverneur Morris (January 25, 1791): "At three o'clock go to dine with Madame de Staël. . . . The Abbé Sieyès is here, and descants with much self-sufficiency on government, despising all that has been said or sung on that subject before him, and Madame says that his writings and opinions will form in politics a new era, as that of Newton in physics." Such was the fine ardor, the grand illusion, of the early days. It quickly vanished. A few years later Sieyès denounced "our nation of monkeys with the larynxes of parrots," and buried himself in a "philosophical silence." His pessimism found expression in extracts from Sallust and Lucan: *Ruit irrevocabile vulgus*.

In the middle of the century the lassitude and sorrow of revolutionaries grown old, relics of a more heroic age, overcame the most liberal of the French élite. Prévost Paradol, writing in 1868 on "the new France," could find no better way of expressing the discouragement of his contemporaries over the recurring problem of the state than to quote Lucretius on the never-ending labor of Sisyphus: *Et semper victus tristisque recedit*. The spectacle of the first nation on the Continent that had learned to stand upright being forced to improvise its system of government every 15 years was indeed a sad one. If France had drawn on her fund of age-long experience she could have found a way to meet almost any need. Relatively simple changes and modifications of legal texts would have been sufficient. That is the way of the English. But our history has evolved differently; and we were not able to follow their example. We would have been far better off if our aristocracy, like theirs, had become the school of public liberties, instead of settling down at Versailles around the *Roi Soleil*. We might then have been spared many disastrous schisms and a long series of fresh starts.

Feeble as was the country's physical condition after the Second World War, it produced two draft constitutions in less than one year. This could not have happened, however, in spite of the great zeal displayed by various ideologists and politicians, if beforehand there had not occurred a really extraordinary "militarization" of public life. Here we reach a capital point.

The parliamentary vote of July 10, 1940, which created the Pétain dictatorship, covered with public disgrace the 17 parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. The number

of votes in favor of the dictatorship was 569, with only 80 opposed and some 200 absent or abstaining. Of the 155 Socialist deputies, less than a hundred have survived the post-liberation purge (and the Socialists, remember, were less subject to the baleful influences at work in the days of defeat than the right, the center and left center). In a word, in politics just as in military, economic and financial fields, the country's post-liberation break with the entrenched élite was drastic. And not only were the old politicians replaced after 1944 by newcomers who had been tempered in the Resistance; in addition, a fundamental reform of parties took place — in structure, membership and leadership.

All this had important consequences. The electoral laws of August 17, 1945, and of October 5 and 27, 1946, established a method of proportional representation which, in fact, permits the party leaders, the caucus, the "machine," to designate whomever they wish as deputies and as councillors of the Republic. The voter votes for the party, and the party designates those elected. The voter must take the global list drawn up by the party. Since October he has been able to modify the order in which the names appear; but any alteration of this sort is valid only if ten percent of the electors suggest the identical change — which would be a truly miraculous coincidence!

In a word, the three main parties holding four-fifths of the seats in the National Assembly — Communist, Socialist and Popular Republican (M.R.P.) — are mostly composed of inferior men, without personality or clear opinions, picked for their docility. It is hard to understand how a transformation as radical as this could have occurred in French political life. Proportional representation seems to have been adopted to halt the crumbling of parties and to force them to concentrate into a few large units. In addition, the determination of the Popular Republicans to yield nothing to the Communists in discipline or precision of action has led to the adoption, as almost a general habit, of methods which formerly were practised only by contingents of the Third International. Communist discipline has been taken over by the others.

This explains how two long and complicated constitutional drafts could be elaborated in a relatively short time. It was because the members of the big parties enjoyed very restricted freedom of expression. Gone is the time when eight out of 17 groups in the Chamber put the adjective "independent" on

their tickets to show plainly that they expected to move as they pleased on the political chessboard. Certainly there is no cause to regret the minute divisions and subdivisions of parliamentary life, which so often enabled a few individuals to make the law; that state of affairs enabled Laval to commit his crimes. But the rigorous party discipline which we have to put up with today is more than a proper penalty for those past sins.

In both the plenary sessions of the Constituent Assembly and in its committee meetings there were two fairly equal blocs. The 64 deputies from overseas (32 whites, 32 natives) weighted the balance in favor of the Socialist and Communist proposals, that is, of government by assembly. Secondly — and here we touch on the factor which governs the whole present juncture of affairs — the rule of proportional representation, operating in conjunction with the rigid party framework and the strict party discipline, made it impossible to find any governmental majority that might be even slightly stable, ruled out the chance that a homogeneous majority might result from the victory of one over the others, and destroyed all possibility that a coalition majority might result from individual or party suppleness and compromise.

V

The first of the two draft Constitutions, that of April 19, was rejected in the referendum of May 5 by 10,450,883 votes against 9,280,386, with a relatively small number of abstentions. It nevertheless served as the basis for the second draft (that of September 29) which became the present Constitution. Several of its features therefore deserve to be explained, if only to show the shift that took place between spring and autumn.

The Preamble, entitled, if you please, "Declaration of the Rights of Man," was composed of 39 articles; and 95 articles comprised the body of the work. The declaration of the rights of man, 1946 style, contained several statements, particularly certain ones concerning property rights, which had a great influence on the outcome of the May 5 referendum. Property was guaranteed by law; but in the language of these legislators it is social utility which justifies property and hence must regulate its use. Article 26 declared that economic monopolies would be transformed into collective properties, that is, would be nationalized. Article 35 stated that "every man must be able to acquire property by work and saving." Thus it was at least suggested that, in conformity

with the principle of social utility, property rights should have a certain beginning and a certain end. This explains the perplexity and disquiet shown by many property holders when they came to vote on May 5, the more so since the decree of October 17, 1945, affirmed the right of farmers and farm tenants, the direct exploiters, to own agricultural property, and Article 31 of the declaration provided for the participation of workers "in the management of enterprises." This seemed to attack the social structure in several vital points.

As for the mechanical features of the Constitution, the drafters (or rather a slight majority of them) wished clearly to bring France back to a government by assembly.

Let me repeat that the régime of 1875 was not a parliamentary régime in the English sense of the term, since the political responsibility of the ministers to a Chamber chosen by universal suffrage was not balanced by the Cabinet's right of dissolution. The Chamber's supremacy over the Cabinet made the executive very unstable. The existence of a Senate selected by a more restricted suffrage reduced the bad effects of the system, but at the cost of creating terrible confusion between the two main functions of the state, government action and control.

The draft Constitution of April 1946 would have aggravated this state of affairs. The right to dissolve the Chamber was indeed granted to the Council of Ministers, but on crippling conditions. It could be exercised only in case a second ministerial crisis occurred in the course of an annual session; and even then only during the last 30 months of the five-year legislature. Finally, if the President of the Council and his colleagues wished to use it, they would have to consult with the President of the Chamber. The fact is, the procedure was drawn up to assist the Chamber in coercing the government rather than to assist the government in overcoming the opposition of the Chamber. For on the day the Chamber would pass out of existence, its President and the Presidents of the Commissions (which any serious reformer should try to keep from encroaching further on the executive function) would take over the authority of the Cabinet. The executive would thus be defeated by the very innovation which was supposed to enable it to assert itself against Parliament.

The draft provided for no second Chamber. Though the old Senate admittedly had faults, it nonetheless fulfilled a beneficial function as a counterweight to an assembly chosen by universal

suffrage. The problem, then, was to get rid of the Senate and to procure another counterweight. The April text provided none. Two consultative bodies, an Economic Council (method of selection not specified) and a "Conseil de l'Union Française," elected by the Conseils Généraux of the metropolitan departments and by the assemblies of the overseas territories, were falsely represented as the equivalent of a second Chamber. They did not together form even the shadow of one. But the most disturbing feature of the government by assembly which was outlined was that it left no room for what is termed "direct democracy." The system attains its full capabilities in Switzerland. But the monopoly which Swiss members of parliament enjoy is tempered by the possibility of recourse to the referendum: referendum of initiative, referendum of consultation, referendum of decision. In France in 1946 our legislators were willing to permit this sort of appeal to the people only as part of the procedure for putting new articles of the Constitution in force. In other words, they were as alert to safeguard the parliamentary monopoly against the electorate as against the executive.

And the President of the Republic? It is hardly worth while to mention what he was to become under the plan. He lost all his prerogatives of 1875, both those which he still exercised and those which had fallen into disuse. He no longer would appoint the President of the Council, but merely submit the names of various candidates to the Assembly. The power of pardon was assigned to a committee of the judiciary. He was still to promulgate laws, but within a fixed time limit. He would keep the records of the Council of Ministers. And that was about all.

The clauses relating to the French overseas empire were perhaps the most absurd of all. The members of the Assembly were themselves shocked to learn what they had done when M. Edouard Herriot, at the session of August 28, denounced the more or less hidden meaning of these provisions. Suffice to say that the colonial territories were to acquire the right to separate from France proper at will, or to remain attached by only the tenuous thread of an international treaty (Articles 14 and 66). Moreover, the trained governors of the important colonies were to be removed and replaced by members of the Cabinet who would take up residence abroad; that is, they were to be run by politicians.

Such was the first draft of the Constitution in its major lines. It reveals a singular lack of political maturity on the part of those

who conceived it. Plans so manifestly contrary to the national interest could not have been produced by Socialist ideology and Communist manoeuvring alone. They are only to be explained by the double fear which animated the members of the Constituent Assembly — fear of the resurgence of the Senate of the Third Republic, and fear of General de Gaulle and his predilection for a presidential régime as revealed in his speech at Bayeux on June 16. The Constitution of April 19 was drafted to exclude the old political cliques which had become encrusted in the defunct Senate, and to bar the road to “personal power.” At best this was a negative merit.

The country had no recourse but to reject the April draft, and did so on May 5. If it had not, the single Assembly provided for would have foundered in the ensuing chaos; or it would have degenerated into a sort of revolutionary convention, in the style of 1792–1794, with a committee of public safety in the key position. Or, more simply and more likely, General de Gaulle would have been recalled by an upsurge of public opinion and, despite hell and high water, as the American expression goes, would have set about constructing a presidential régime of the American kind.

General de Gaulle’s own actions and those of his friends were largely responsible for this result. At their instigation, the leaders of the M.R.P. had broken several days previously with the Socialists and the Communists over the articles defining the powers of the President of the Republic. Then the harmony between the General and the heads of the M.R.P. — Georges Bidault, Robert Schuman and others — was broken. He hinted at a kind of presidential government, at which they rebelled. Thereupon they began negotiating with the left in an attempt to refloat the wreckage of the Constitution.

This quarrel between General de Gaulle and his recent supporters had serious repercussions. On the one hand, the General gradually committed himself more and more deeply to a constitutional doctrine which had no chance of victory unless in the event of some great national misfortune. He assumed the rôle of prophet of the day of judgment. Conceivably his apocalyptic utterances will be useful to him later; but for the moment they rather militate against him.

At the elections for the National Assembly on November 10 a number of Gaullists transferred their vote to the “Rassemblement des Gauches,” composed of former Radical Socialists, in order to

avenge themselves on the M.R.P. This meant that many anti-Communist votes were not used to best advantage, and that the Communists won seats which the M.R.P. should have had. Since the Communists thus became the strongest party in the Assembly, they made a greater claim than ever before for posts in the new government. No Cabinet can be formed without them, for the Socialists refuse to participate unless they are included also. On the other hand, the National Assembly never has found it easy to operate when the Communists are included in the government. In view of all this, and because the Constitution as finally adopted on October 13 received only a relative majority of votes, many people feel that it is ephemeral.

An objective examination of the articles of the Constitution in the light of internal events does not contradict this impression. It cannot be said that they reveal the corrections in the laws of 1875 which were demanded by experience and political prudence. Article 51, the article defining the dissolution procedure, supplies the key answer. The substance of this article, not altered greatly since April, reads as follows: "If, in the course of a single period of eighteen months, two ministerial crises occur, dissolution of the National Assembly may be decided upon in the Council of Ministers upon the advice of the President of the Assembly. The dissolution in conformity with this decision shall be pronounced by decree of the President of the Republic. The provisions of the preceding paragraph are not applicable until after the expiration of the first 18 months of the Legislature." And Article 52 adds: "In the event of dissolution, the Cabinet, with the exception of the President of the Council and the Minister of the Interior, remains in office to handle current affairs. The President of the Republic designates the President of the National Assembly as President of the Council. The latter designates the new Minister of the Interior in agreement with the steering committee of the Assembly. He designates as Ministers of State members of groups not represented in the government."

Nothing in this leads me to change the comments made earlier on the corresponding provisions of the first draft. It is not the Government, it is the Assembly, which will bring about the Assembly's dissolution. And as soon as dissolution occurs the chief of the Government passes over his duties to the President of the Assembly, who automatically is transformed into an administrator-trustee. Those who drafted the September amend-

ments plainly were still haunted by memories of the period from May to October in 1877, and wished to prevent some future President of the Council, one with a taste for authority, from repeating what Marshal MacMahon's ministers did in their effort to win their electoral battle — namely, remove a great number of officials, including 1,743 mayors, and dissolve 613 municipal councils. That was indeed a terrible "massacre." But weakness as well as strength can be responsible for massacres, bloody ones. If I must choose between the "catastrophe" of 1877 and the catastrophe of 1940, I choose 1877.

Having read Articles 51 and 52 we know where we stand. The Constitution of September 29 does not provide for a parliamentary régime worthy of the name, but something very much like a régime by assembly. Those of an opposite opinion point out that a true second Chamber has been created. We have, in fact, been given a "Council of the Republic," and this does constitute a change from the draft of April 19. The change, however, is great only in appearance.

This Council of the Republic has two grave defects. In the first place, it has only one prerogative — if it disapproves a bill adopted by the National Assembly it can send it back there for reconsideration. That is all. Moreover, it is allowed only from ten to sixty days in which to do this, after which the National Assembly is free to ignore its comments and suggested amendments. From that point on the Council of the Republic has no further say in the matter. The question arises whether the Council of the Republic is at all likely in any event to oppose the National Assembly. It comes into existence through a two-part election under the rules of proportional representation. The "big electors" who choose the Councillors of the Republic, like the Councillors of the Republic themselves, are designated by the parties already entrenched in the Assembly. Identical orders circulate in the two chambers. The Council of the Republic can be but the other's mirror. The elections of November-December have already proved that. One need only recall the authority exercised by the Senate of the Third Republic, particularly in financial matters, in order to judge what an abyss separates the new system from the old. To call the new Council a "Chamber for reflection" is probably to say the best thing possible about its function. The old Senate used sometimes to impart strength to the Cabinet to resist the Chamber. The more than equivocal right of dissolution given

the Cabinet under the new system in no way compensates for this loss.

Some improvements were made in other sections of the Constitution, such as that providing for the establishment of a Constitutional Committee which can stop the passage of laws infringing the Constitution and decide upon the procedure for revising them if the Government or the Assembly does not do so. There is also Article 17, which, by a conjuring trick, prevents deputies from proposing increases in expenditures. But none of these compensates for the deadly infringement on the prerogatives and power of the Government.

The rôle of the President of the Republic in protecting the permanent interests of the state and in supervising the regular functioning of the Constitutional mechanism is better defined in the September than in the April draft. According to the April plan, the President of the Republic was to be elected by a public vote, involving him in the battle of parties. The secret vote is now practised, *au-dessus de la mêlée*. In addition, the President becomes something more than a mere custodian of the archives, a simple clerk. He again becomes more or less the kind of chief of state which France had from 1875 to 1940. Within the period fixed for the promulgation of laws (10 days, or, in cases of urgency, five) he may request that they be reconsidered, and this cannot be refused. Nothing is left to his initiative, however, in the dissolution procedure. He is a totally passive agent. This is wrong. It would have been better not to define too closely the cases in which the President of the Council can have recourse to dissolution, and to have given the President of the Republic the right to refuse it, to grant it, or even to require it, under the simple guiding principle that the operation of the constitutional process must not be blocked.

It is on the subject of the French Union that the September Constitution shows the most improvement. The April draft, as we saw, recognized the right of the colonies to separate from the metropolitan area. Nothing of this proposal remains in the present Constitution, and the career governors will remain in place. Article 67 creates a "federal citizenship," to be enjoyed by both the people of France and by natives. Up to now, except in the old colonies, the natives legally were only "subjects." Of course, the necessary distinctions will be made by adding to "federal citizenship" citizenship in metropolitan France and diverse local citizen-

ships corresponding to varying levels of civilization. The Assembly of the French Union is no longer the fake second chamber foreseen in April. One half of it will be elected by the National Assembly and the Council of the Republic; the other half by the local overseas assemblies. It will be a consultative body on problems of empire, at the disposition of the Cabinet and Parliament. The Assembly of the French Union and the High Council which will assist it will work out the particular statute of each area (departments assimilated to those of the metropolitan area; overseas territories; associated territories; and states).

A second consultative body is also created, the Economic Council. Its function will be to draw up the "national economic plan," which thereupon becomes obligatory.

A few rather bad innovations may also be noted. Thus prefects are replaced by government delegates in supervising municipal and departmental offices. Either this is only a specious change or it implies a slackening of central authority; if the latter, in this era of controls it is something which cannot last. The declaration of the rights of man has disappeared. We nevertheless have not been spared a preamble, much of it resembling electoral claptrap.

Such is the new Constitution given the Fourth Republic. We can conclude our survey only on a note of doubt. The new instrument is not much better than the one it replaces. On what seems to me the primary point, freeing governmental action from undue parliamentary control, I do not believe the slightest gain can be recorded. Quite the contrary.

Will the new Constitution long survive? This depends in great part on whether a true government operates it, a government that is something more than a juxtaposition of mutually inimical parties or a minority Cabinet merely charged with expediting current affairs. Perhaps to make the wheels turn it will be found necessary to modify the electoral law, relinquishing proportional representation in favor of some other system promising to produce a homogeneous majority. But if recourse ever were had to this, it probably would be only after weeks and months of effort had been spent in trying to avoid it and after the supply of available statesmen — they are rare, alas! — had been used up in getting the machine under way. Moreover, the operation could hardly be brought off unless dissolution of the National Assembly occurred well before the date indicated in the Constitution and outside the procedure there provided. This would open a first leak

in the vessel. The revisionist movement, widespread in conservative circles, would profit by the opportunity. General de Gaulle would not fail to raise his voice if it seemed to him that the disintegration of the Socialist Party and of M.R.P. was well under way. Then would sound, probably, the hour of the great reawakening of which he has sometimes spoken. But in spite of all these drawbacks, and the certain fact that the party machines and their leaders, big and small, will not easily give up the privileges they have secured under the new electoral law, public opinion will in time rebel if the Fourth Republic gets off to a bad start.

It cannot be written, then, that the Fourth Republic has found its definitive form. This is most regrettable. Last summer General de Gaulle's name was put in nomination for the Presidency of the Republic by a sort of private plebiscite. To escape from this situation he spoke at Bar-le-Duc on September 29 and damned the Constitution. This deliberate action demonstrated that he is by no means the ambitious politician, avid for power, once denounced by so many people. An egotistical politician would not have turned his back on such a tempting opportunity. One cannot help recalling, however, how much better it would have been if the leader of the French Resistance had never condescended to play the political game. It lay in his power to stabilize the country better than anyone else. He would only have had to keep away from the fallacious presidential theory, know how to repulse reactionary embraces, and surround himself, this time, with competent assistants. For let us not forget that in the autumn of 1944 the authority of Charles de Gaulle was almost unlimited. No constitutional barrier obstructed him. A few unfortunate appointments doomed his enterprise to failure. A second defeat would be full of peril.

THE FRENCH FINANCIAL DILEMMA

By Charles Rist

AT THE moment when hostilities ended and France was completely liberated, the new French Government headed by General de Gaulle faced a singularly grave financial situation. This can be pictured by a few statistics. The daily indemnity paid to the Germans during the occupation, first amounting to 300 million and finally to 500 million francs, had increased the bank note circulation from 142 to 572 billions. The level of official prices, taking 1938 as the basis for comparison, had risen from 102 to 276; but the real level, reflected by black-market prices, had approximately quadrupled. Expenditures in the 1945 budget reached 512 billions (not including 88 billions outside the budget), while receipts amounted to 207 billions — whence could be foreseen a deficit of about 300 billions.

These figures evoked a double problem, at once monetary and financial. Was it feasible then and there to fix on an acceptable rate of exchange for the franc with the pound and the dollar, from which it had been cut off for five years? Secondly, could budgetary expenditures and receipts be balanced while the foundations of the French economy were shattered? — while the railways, bridges and roads remained partly destroyed and the system of electrical production and distribution was in chaos; when coal output was reduced by half; when automobile production and repair had not functioned for five years; when there was a dearth of gasoline; and when foreign trade was practically suspended, which meant that the only way to pay for imports was to draw on the reserves of the Bank of France?

Budgetary problems, monetary problems and problems of reconstruction thus loomed up at the same time and inextricably intermingled. It is hardly surprising that at the outset proposed solutions were hesitant and uncertain. However, one fact seemed obvious and dominated all the others: the systematic inflation organized by the Germans had to be stopped as soon as possible. The military and administrative expenses of the state must be reduced and efforts concentrated on reconstruction. Thrift must be encouraged and bounds set to the rise of prices.

Such were the opinions of Frenchmen who, after having suffered four years of the occupation, still kept in mind the monetary

and financial mistakes made after the First World War. They thought that the Government's primary task was to put its financial house in order as the *sine qua non* of getting production under way.

But these views were bound to come into immediate collision with entirely different political concepts, the outgrowth partly of passions roused by the occupation itself, partly of divergences of opinion between the French who had been outside France, in exile in London and Algiers, and those who had remained in the country throughout the war. Equally courageous in their resistance to the enemy, these two groups were nevertheless profoundly divided by the dissimilarity of their experiences. From the start, in consequence, financial good sense had to yield to political considerations.

To begin with, concern over military needs took precedence over all others in the mind of the new Chief of State. General de Gaulle considered restoration of the combat power of the French Army to be of first importance. He thought a large number of soldiers supplied with the most up-to-date weapons must be kept under arms. In a country ruined by five years of German occupation he planned to create the active army which it should have possessed at the beginning of the war. His aim seemed not so much to reestablish the prestige of France in the eyes of the beaten enemy as in those of her allies, east and west.

This conception resulted in maintaining and even increasing French military expenses to a degree no one could have expected at the moment of liberation. Over a long period our foreign purchases were mainly in the field of war matériel — airplanes, tanks and motor trucks. At the same time, nearly 2,000,000 men were kept under arms, a figure quite disproportionate to the country's actual needs. In a recent speech, Minister of Finance Schuman stated that at the beginning of 1946 the army still numbered 1,800,000 men. It has since been reduced to about 500,000. But during the first six months of 1945 the military expenses represented about 40 percent of the budget of ordinary expenses. Today they have been reduced to 29 percent, a proportion almost the same as that in Great Britain and the United States, where army expenses form 30 and 31 percent of the budget.

A second and very different concern dominated the minds of the political leaders during the first and second years after the liberation. They wished to increase the purchasing power of the

working class, whose wages had been systematically kept at an abnormally low level by the occupying Power and the Vichy Government. To raise the wage scale was indispensable; but this redress of wages, as well as of salaries of state employees, would inevitably be reflected in the price of goods *so long as the quantity of these remained the same*. The considerable difference in price between commodities sold at the legal rate and those sold on the black market forecast an inevitable price increase. At the outset, at least, there could be no question of increasing production of goods. The maritime transport at our disposal was practically nil. The absurd division of France into as many separate economic units as there are departments kept the least favored departments in penury. As for increasing agricultural production in a country deprived of artificial fertilizers for four years and working with reduced manpower, this could not be reasonably expected before at least a year after the return of the prisoners from Germany. The increase of wages and salaries thus was inevitably reflected in a considerable rise of prices which, in turn, quickly reacted on state expenditures.

This preoccupation with giving help to workers and government employees (as was, I repeat, perfectly legitimate after four years of want) was associated with another completely contradictory concern, namely, to stabilize the price level and avoid the deadly cycle of a complementary rise of wages and prices.

The political and economic general staffs that arrived in France from London and Algiers after about four years of exile had been impressed by the efficacy of the economic controls exercised in Great Britain and the United States. The system of rationing applied in those two countries (under much more favorable conditions than in France), as well as the system of subsidies aiming to prevent price rises in certain products, seemed to them particularly effective. Back in France, their first care was to strengthen such measures or apply them where they had not existed before. This is not the place to speak of rationing, except to say that, after five years of rigorous constraint, means of alleviating rather than reinforcing it should have been sought. Subsidies to prevent rises in the price of bread, meat and coal could only increase the sum total of expenses at a time when budgetary receipts were lowest and when every effort should have been made to avoid useless expenditures. These subsidies in the 1945 budget amounted to nearly 50 billions, or 9 percent of the total.

Thus from all sides, under the pressure of military men, government employees and workers, and finally of politicians who feared the consequences of too quick a price rise of essential commodities, budget charges soared rapidly — but without the means of obtaining sufficient income making an appearance.

Later on I shall point out what the budgetary situation is today. First, however, let us briefly consider the monetary situation as it existed at liberation, and how it has since developed.

Metropolitan France at the time of the liberation had no foreign exchange rate. The only currency with which exchange was made was the mark; the rate was 20 francs for one mark. This rate was extremely unfavorable to the franc and, on the other hand, very advantageous to the occupation troops. Systematic pillage of a conquered country by stabilizing its rate of exchange is a financial invention which was unknown in epochs when monetary circulation was primarily metallic; but it is easily operated in paper-money régimes. During the First World War the Germans had already made considerable use of it in the occupied territories of France, Belgium and Poland.

On the other hand, a rate of exchange of 200 francs to the pound sterling and 50 francs to the dollar had been put into effect soon after the debarkation of the Anglo-American troops in North Africa. These rates hardly differed from those in force in 1938. When they arrived in France from Algiers, the financial general staff wished to maintain them, even though they gave the franc much too high a value in relation to the two other currencies. As a matter of fact, if one compares the rise in prices in France, England and the United States during the war, one sees that the wholesale price level in France corresponded to the coefficient 4 or 5, while in England and the United States it needed to be multiplied by only about 1.5 compared to 1939. This exchange rate made French merchandise seem excessively dear to holders of pounds or dollars. Allied soldiers complained from the outset. However, since French imports from abroad were managed in 1944 exclusively by the state, and since, furthermore, the Allied leaders wisely wished to make it difficult for their troops to buy in a country already swept clean of merchandise, the maintenance of this rate seemed acceptable at first.

But as soon as hostilities ended the problem of importing civilian commodities had to be faced, a problem closely bound to that of French exports. It then became obvious that the official

rate of exchange was prohibitive for most of the export commodities. On the other hand, the French had an obvious advantage in procuring foreign currencies at this very favorable rate for purchases from Switzerland, England and the United States. The fact was quickly appreciated by the few Frenchmen who at that time managed to travel in England or Switzerland.

In December 1945, the French Government, seeing its reserves of gold abroad rapidly diminishing and realizing that without exports France would be unable to procure indispensable commodities and tools of production, decided to devalue the French franc. It stabilized it at a rate of exchange of 480 francs to the pound, 119 to the dollar, and 27.63 to the Swiss franc. These are still the rates today.

But during the interval the level of French prices continued to rise. Could this rise have been prevented? On that point there has been the sharpest disagreement between the economists who came from Algiers and those who had remained in France. The former were influenced by the ideas bruited about in London during the war and by their conversations with Belgian, Dutch and even certain English economists. In their opinion, a further rise of prices and fall of exchange could be stopped only by an abrupt reduction of monetary instruments (bank bills and creditor accounts current in the private banks). Starting from the premise that a good part of the purchasing power created during the occupation was hoarded by individuals and had not yet been put into circulation, they thought they could prevent a further rise by destroying this purchasing power. This idea of a deflation caused by reduction in value of the instruments of payment harks back to the beginning of the nineteenth century. It is a highly debatable theory, with hardly any experience to support it. The Belgian Government nevertheless applied it at once with great energy. It blocked private accounts in the banks and proceeded to an exchange of bank notes which was to end in the destruction of a part of the notes given up by the holders.

The French situation was very different, however, from the Belgian. In the first place, the French Government did not physically possess the new notes that would be necessary to effect an immediate exchange. Secondly, Belgium was a creditor of the Anglo-Saxon countries for considerable sums as a result of its deliveries of merchandise to them, especially from the Belgian Congo. The balance of Belgian accounts was therefore

at least momentarily favorable vis-à-vis the Anglo-Saxon countries. Belgium could import considerable merchandise from them in the assurance of being able to make payment, thanks to her credits in London and New York. Lastly, and above all, Belgium had decided on an energetic financial policy which was intended to achieve relative budgetary equilibrium beginning in 1946. The continued inflation from which she suffered during 1944 and a part of 1945 resulted from the expenditures of the Allied armies on her territory much more than from her own expenditures.

Those Frenchmen who opposed a sudden amputation of monetary circulation first emphasized the technical difficulties of a blocking operation applied to 40,000,000 inhabitants, compared to the mere 6,000,000 in Belgium. France, moreover, had not a single favorable element in her balance of accounts. Besides, skepticism was permissible about a simple cut in purchasing power as a means of reducing prices. Previous experiments of the kind had proved ineffective if not accompanied by a rapid increase of the quantity of merchandise. And it was impossible to count on any considerable production of foodstuffs or manufactures. Above all, the Government showed no disposition whatever to move toward balancing the budget, which alone would have calmed public fears of a coming inflation.

The Minister of Finance then in office had no other choice than to follow a middle course. He decided first to contract a substantial loan which, he believed, would enable him to cover at least a part of the budgetary deficit; and secondly he proceeded to exchange bank notes without synchronously blocking accounts. The loan issued at three percent proved very successful and brought in 125 billions. The exchange of notes, in June 1945, principally resulted in influencing a great number of note holders to open bank accounts. The amount of bank notes in circulation was in consequence reduced from 550 billions to 445. At the same time the total of deposit accounts in the four great banks rose from 314 billions to 371. This increase resulted in an immediate augmentation of subscriptions to short-term Treasury bonds, since the sole employment offered to banks of deposit for their receipts was investment in bonds. Lastly, about 30 billions of notes were not presented to the Bank of France, which allowed it to deduct that amount from its liabilities.

The result of the operation was therefore to put the Treasury in possession of considerable sums at a moment when its expenses

were huge and its tax receipts very meagre. But this relative affluence of the Treasury, while it relieved the Minister's immediate worries, risked causing him to forget that the resources he had used to cover current expenses were exceptional and would not occur again. Furthermore, these resources reassured the public, which was badly informed on the situation, delaying considerably the moment when the issuance of new bank bills would become necessary.

The operation could have no effect on prices, since all the sums deposited in the Treasury necessarily had to be put back into circulation. The total purchasing power of the country had suffered no curtailment. The rate of circulation of the currency was greatly accelerated, since funds which till then had been hoarded were being spent by the state.

Most important of all, nothing was done to reassure the discerning part of the public which looked not just at the present situation but at what lay ahead. Price rises in fact result not only from a consideration of the present currency total but from fears regarding its increase. They are the result not only of consumer demand, but also of hoarding by owners tempted to build up stock piles in fear of future inflation. This double action — increased demand of consumers fearing imminent price rises, and curtailed offers by producers fearing currency depreciation — has a powerful effect in stimulating price rises. The French Government should therefore have taken every method of dissipating these fears, especially by demonstrating that all means were being employed to establish budgetary equilibrium.

Alas, the Government took the exactly opposite course. On December 31, 1945, M. Plevén estimated the budgetary expenditures at 438 billions and the receipts at 289. This meant a deficit of 149 billions. Nine months later, on September 3, 1946, M. Schuman estimated budget expenses at 581 billions and receipts at 372, which would give a deficit of 209 billions. Thus, in nine months expenses had grown by 33 percent, the anticipated receipts by 30 percent, and the deficit by 40 percent.

These figures give a quite inadequate idea of the situation. In fact, to the strictly budgetary expenditures should be added the deficit of the railways, the cost of reconstructing transport and the cost of nationalized enterprises, altogether 73 billions. To this sum, again, should be added 114 billions, the cost of reconstructing private enterprises. Consequently, the total expenses

falling on the state for the year 1946 reached 768 billions, as compared with normal receipts of 372 billions. The difference between these two figures, 396 billions, will have to be covered by loans, by the liquidation of requisitioned foreign holdings, and finally by advances of the Bank of France, that is, by the inflation which M. Schuman estimated at 100 billions of notes. Such was the situation at the beginning of September 1946.

What instantly strikes one in this picture is how expenditures shot up. How did it happen that in a year and a half they had reached 581 billions? Of this total, civil expenses accounted for 411 billions and military expenses for 170. The military expenses consequently represented 40 percent of civil expenses and 29 percent of the entire budget. Obviously, they were out of all proportion. It is absurd for the French military budget to represent the same proportion of our expenditures as the American and British do of American and British expenditures. On this point the French public has made up its mind. The contrast of military opulence with national poverty, and the continuing manufacture of armaments which will be completely outmoded in a few years, has scandalized everyone familiar with the situation. Yet so far the stubborn resistance of the military hierarchy has succeeded — as it did in 1918 after the last war — in slowing down the deflation of the armed services which successive ministers of finance so much desired.

Civilian expenditures are also out of all proportion. One evil-omened expense consists of the subsidies by which the state hopes to maintain certain products at prices more accessible to consumers. During the war this policy might have had some usefulness in helping to keep down living costs, especially for the working classes. But after peace was restored it had no further *raison d'être*. It works only when the prices of the products subventioned are kept at their normal levels. When an inflationary policy raises the general level of prices, the sole effect of subsidies is to retard, without preventing, the price rise of particular products. That happened in France. Since the general index of prices had risen in two years from 276 to 812 (October 1946), the relief afforded consumers has been imperceptible. On the other hand, the disadvantage of the contribution to the budgetary deficit is only too real.

Politicians are loath to admit that the rise in prices originates in the budgetary deficit and the resulting inflation. They stick to

an official policy of lowering prices while refusing to admit to themselves that the mainspring of the rise is the budgetary deficit. If the public were confident that there would be no further inflation, they would be far less frightened by some increase in prices. In reality, increase is an indispensable condition for price readjustments based on the current situation resulting from sellers' offers of merchandise on the one hand and buyers' purchasing power on the other. If the creation of purchasing power were definitely stopped, preventing the periodic augmentation of private incomes, prices would soon reach a ceiling above which no purchasers would appear. At that precise moment the fall in prices would begin. The temporary rise preceding this decisive moment would therefore have proved salutary. But so far, whenever prices have risen, at the very moment income began to be insufficient to cope with them the state has intervened to raise them still higher by a new inflation. Thus it systematically prevents the effect price rises normally would have in diminishing private expenditures and initiating a price decline.

Besides ending subventions and reducing military expenses, the Government could effect substantial economies in a number of the civil ministries. The Ministry of Information, for instance, could be liquidated. The personnel of the Ministry of Food should be reduced in proportion as the produce markets are freed from restrictions. It is true that certain ministries, such as those of National Education and Hygiene, have scarcely enough personnel to fulfill their tasks. On the other hand, the multiplication of formalities and controls in all the ministries has entailed an unhealthy proliferation of bureaus and civil servants. These can be limited in many cases only by abolishing all the absurd formalities they are called on to apply. A reduction of expenses is therefore closely linked with deliverance from police, economic and administrative controls. The liquidation of these services should be undertaken as soon as possible.

Mention should be made here of another source of increased expense — the nationalization of a great number of industries. No one now denies that these nationalizations have cost the state heavily. I am not discussing the principle of the thing. Throughout Europe a powerful wave of opinion holds that the industries basic to a nation's economic life should be managed directly by the state, and should no longer remain merely under its surveillance. In time of war, when all the national forces must be con-

centrated under a single command, public opinion is worried at seeing essential defense industries in non-government hands. It fears some foreign or selfish influence may gain control. But even admitting that the nationalization principle may be morally justified, its practical value will depend primarily on the technical results. So far, the procedure has beyond doubt put burdens on the state. Its extension to other industries can result only in increasing these burdens further. This project should consequently be resolutely abandoned.

M. Schuman has estimated the probable receipts of the ordinary budget at 372 billions, which seems reasonable, since the tax receipts have continued to grow in the past year. It would indeed be extraordinary if they had not increased, considering the continuing rise of prices and incomes. As for reaching 581 billions, however, the sum required to balance expenses, that is quite another matter.

Given what we know about the present income of the French people, can we reasonably hope for any such sum? According to the most reasonable estimates, the French people during the past 30 years have paid on the average about 25 percent of their income in taxes. In order not to exceed this very high figure, their total income must reach 2,324 billion francs. The most dependable estimates of total French revenues are in the neighborhood of from 1,500 to 1,800 billions. Moreover, such high estimates as these could not have been made had not inflation (*not* increase of production, as would be the case in a normal economy) continually supplied new revenues. A figure like 2,324 billions could be attained only at the price of a new inflation, in other words, of a new depreciation of the franc, with all its attendant consequences.

The conclusion is that a substantial reduction of current expenditures is indispensable. If they are brought down to about 450 billions (which would presume an income of 1,800 billions) there is a chance of not exceeding what the taxpayers can reasonably pay.

But the extraordinary budget still remains to be covered. Its expenditures can be classified under two headings: replacement of destroyed national equipment (ports, canals, railways, bridges, public buildings, electric production centers, etc.); and reconstruction of private buildings (houses, factories, etc.). Some people suppose that all this can be financed by a new emission of paper money. Ingenious theories have been propounded to the

effect that a *productive* inflation does not have the same effect on prices as an inflation resulting from a deficit. All experience gives the lie to such ideas. Their inspiration can be traced to the much-advertised work bills, put out in Germany in 1933, which did not provoke price increases. But the German situation at that time was wholly different from France's today. Germany had from eight to nine million unemployed, and the sole fact of returning them to work was sufficient to augment revenues without provoking a price rise. Furthermore, at that time there was a world-wide depression. In France today, on the other hand, there is an acute shortage of manpower, and in the world as a whole there are rising prices. Importation of foreign manpower is a pressing need. But if paper money is created to pay for this extra manpower, the result will be a price rise in all markets, followed by new demands for wage increases. This sort of a solution is a mirage. Reconstruction can be achieved only with the help of loans floated in France and eventually abroad.

The existence of public and private credit which will enable the state and private enterprise to find the needed sums in the French market or abroad is consequently indispensable. These sums will not be obtained unless the lenders, French or foreign, are convinced of the stability of the currency. By the logic of things, then, one has to view the monetary and the budgetary problems together. There will be no monetary stability without a budgetary balance; there will be no budgetary balance without monetary stability; and, above all, there will be no public or private credit without stability.

It is often asked in the French and foreign press whether the franc can be maintained at its present level or if it must undergo a new devaluation. As I see it, the following are the basic facts on that question. First, we must remember that the present level of prices in France is not the product solely of the interaction of existing public purchasing power and the quantity of merchandise offered; it is determined even more by the public's forecast as to future prices. But up to the present no financial plan has been proposed. Balancing the budget seems to have been the least of the worries of the last two Assemblies; and the efforts at reduction attempted by the Ministers of Finance have thus far had no visible effect. The French public, therefore, remains convinced that the rise in prices is going to continue. Buyers consequently are eager to buy; on the other hand, sellers keep their

commodities in reserve. *Present* offers and demands are falsified by the perspective of *future* developments. This situation would immediately change if the public became convinced that the Government and Parliament had the will to balance the budget and stop the emission of paper money. We should then see merchandise offerings increase and prices fall. Financial reform is thus the preliminary condition for any stoppage of the price rise.

The upward trend of prices has also been stimulated by the Government's control policy, especially with regard to agricultural products. Despite the more than dubious statistics of the Food Ministry, everyone knows that production of many provisions — meat, eggs, vegetables, potatoes — is very nearly at prewar levels. No Frenchman believes that the production of wine or wheat, supplemented by colonial importations, is inadequate to supply the population. The almost complete disappearance in certain regions of milk and butter is another inexplicable paradox. Each time the control ceiling for certain products like meat was raised, supplies came into the private markets. But whenever the ceiling was lowered, the markets were empty and the black market price rose. A policy of decontrol, facilitating transfers between regions and a unification of prices over the entire territory, would soon bring about a price decline — *provided inflation were stopped*. Improvement of transportation, and especially of maritime transportation, also would obviously help.

These comments suffice to make it clear that a mere comparison of price indexes in France and abroad is not enough to determine the true parity between the franc and foreign currencies. That parity cannot fairly be estimated until after a financial program, enforced by public opinion, has been devised and applied.

When all is said, we find that the key to the problem consists in balancing the budget. Once this has been achieved, or even seriously attempted, the psychological factors which today falsify the operations of buying and selling will be replaced by influences which will tend to stabilize or lower prices. Elements favorable to stabilization will immediately appear, and the technical problem will be solved with relative ease.

This last problem is a double one. First, it consists in guaranteeing France sufficient exports to enable her to pay for her imports. A price level slightly lower than the present one would suffice to increase French exports. But the longer it takes to get the financial reform under way, the greater the risk that the price

rise will destroy our export trade. In the latter case a new fall in the franc will be inevitable, with grave consequences for the entire internal price structure.

The other aspect of the problem consists in relinking the French currency with foreign currencies and reconstituting the French stock of international money, that is, of gold. The purchase of domestic gold at a suitable price and the reconstitution of the metallic reserve of the Bank of France will become practicable when belief is restored that the stability of the franc is near. There are considerable quantities of hoarded gold in the country; indeed, according to dependable estimates they amount to three or four thousand tons. The hoarding occurred especially during and after 1936. It is a fair presumption that under similar circumstances we could repeat the experience of M. Poincaré in 1926, when a golden stream flowed into the Bank of France under the impetus of restored confidence. The tremendous variations in the price of gold on the free market show that the present rates are the result of psychological factors which will disappear when confidence is restored. As happened under M. Poincaré, a diminishing purchasing price might be announced for all gold brought to the Bank of France, the price to be stabilized at a rate at which the Bank would promise to maintain its convertibility.

If the necessary steps are taken, there is nothing in my opinion to prevent the rate from being identical with today's official rate. But the rate does not depend on France alone. It will be determined by the price levels of countries with sound currencies, and especially the United States. If these levels begin to fall, the entire French problem will have to be considered anew.

As this article was being completed a new factor intervened — the experiment begun by M. Léon Blum and continued by M. Ramadier's cabinet. The Government ordered all producers and dealers to lower prices by 5 percent, with another 5 percent decrease in view three months later. The psychological effects were considerable. All shops at once put up signs announcing the new prices. Industrialists and farmers also made efforts to comply, though this was not always easy. At the same time, the price of gold fell sharply on the illegal exchange, and there was a spectacular 20 percent drop in stock exchange values.

Quite aside from the brake which the new policy placed on rising prices, it had another advantage. It put industrialists and, above all, the Government in a position to oppose new wage and

salary demands. Since government efforts now tend toward a reestablishment of purchasing power, exaggerated increases in wages and salaries would compromise the results that the new measure was designed to produce. A fall in the cost of living, if it could be secured, is much more important for the workers than a nominal rise in wages. In a word, the new policy gives the Government a breathing spell in which to devote itself to the essential task of balancing the budget. For it goes without saying that the new policy can be effective only if the principal cause of the price rise is eliminated, namely, the budgetary deficit and its inevitable concomitant, the printing of paper money.

The Ministry of Finance has already announced certain significant measures. It is proposed, in particular, to reduce the number of employees, perhaps by as much as 50,000. That would indeed be an excellent start. But, as pointed out above, no such program can be realized without suppressing an important number of the control and enforcement agencies which have been created during the last six years. This cannot be accomplished without abandoning the controls themselves, which is the same thing as saying that administrative reform is linked closely with political economy. In the matter of food supply, it becomes more and more important to return to the free market in a number of commodities. Public opinion is convinced, and rightly, that the markets for meat, wine, wheat, sugar, etc., could be left largely to regulate themselves. Only the big cities now suffer from inexplicable scarcities; country districts are fed as well as they were before the war. It is in this field that the greatest effort should be made. The quicker the black market disappears, the quicker the resulting benefits can augment the growth of budgetary receipts.

The present experiment will succeed only on the express condition that the respite which it provides for reestablishing public finances on a sound footing is availed of to the full. If there is a balanced budget, industrialists, traders and farmers cannot refuse to make the real sacrifices demanded of them. The Government's decisiveness thus will determine the success of its new policies. In a period of controlled economy, government responsibilities increase with government powers. The Government itself therefore must set the example. Recent declarations of M. Robert Schuman, Minister of Finance, and of M. André Philip, Minister of National Economy, show that they are conscious of the extent of this responsibility.

FRENCH LABOR GOES LEFT

By Henry W. Ehrmann

“THE great popular movement that freed France from the enemy was not only a movement of national liberation, but of social liberation also.” So reads the opening statement of one of the most important pieces of social legislation received by France since she recovered her full sovereignty. Quite naturally, the foremost rôle in this “social liberation” of the country was played by French organized labor. During the period of resistance against the invader it was prominently represented in the councils of London and Algiers as well as in the organizations of the interior. The President of the National Council of Resistance, comprising all underground groups, including right-wing organizations, was Louis Saillant, President of the clandestine General Confederation of Labor (C.G.T.)

Two years after the last German was driven from French territory, the C.G.T. today is one of the most important organized forces in France, boasting a record membership of more than 6,000,000, or approximately half of all wage earners in industry, trade and administration. Only once before, during the short heyday of the Popular Front in 1936-7, did it achieve comparable (though somewhat lesser) strength; and then, as often before, its membership receded sharply from its highwater mark. In the past, the French worker has overcome his general abhorrence of joining an organization only in moments of enthusiasm and excitement; he has lost interest as soon as there was a change in political or social climate.

But since the liberation the number of dues-paying members has been remarkably steady both among industrial and agricultural workers. During the last six months of 1946 more than half a million new members were reported, though the country finds itself struggling against symptoms of moral decay and physical maladjustment. The basis of such a surprising stability is a changed attitude toward trade-union membership, entirely new in the 50 years of C.G.T. history. No longer is joining a union considered an act of faith and acceptance into a circle of like-minded confederates. The French workers of today, pretty much as their brethren in the United States, consider the union membership card a natural complement of employment.

A remarkable growth of social legislation which firmly established the union's control over jobs, as well as a radical change in composition and outlook of the C.G.T. leadership, brought about the transformation of French trade unionism. Both the social legislation and the new philosophy of its leaders are determining the rôle which organized labor is playing in the difficult early days of the Fourth Republic.

II

Shop stewards were first introduced in France — if one disregards ephemeral legislation during the First World War — by the so-called “Matignon accords” concluded by employers and unions in the presence of Léon Blum in 1936. But troubled industrial relations during the prewar period, and spotty legislation, made the activities of the shop stewards ineffective and their relations with both employers and unions uneasy. For all practical purposes, the activity of shop stewards was suspended at the outbreak of the war in 1939 just when it was most needed. Vichy did away with it altogether.

A new law, promulgated by the Constituent Assembly in April 1946 and drawing its lesson from the earlier legislation, considerably enlarged the functions of the shop stewards and excluded every possibility of a dualism between them and the unions. The candidates are chosen from lists presented by the unions. Since no system of proportional representation is adopted, the union with the largest membership will elect all its candidates. In most cases this means that the shop stewards will belong to the C.G.T. and the weaker Catholic unions will not be represented. Where previously separate shop stewards were elected for manual workers and white collar employees in the same plant, both groups have now a unified representation. Only the higher technical and supervisory personnel are in a special category, and this can be dispensed with by agreement between employers and unions. Special directives issued by the C.G.T. admonish union members always to seek an entirely unified representation of all wage earners in a given plant.

As before, the shop stewards are called upon to thresh out all individual and collective grievances. But not only is their number doubled or tripled according to the size of the plant, but where previously they had often been summarily fired by an irate employer they are now fairly effectively protected against dismis-

sal. Government factory inspectors now must seek the assistance and advice of the shop stewards; previously such coöperation was entirely voluntary. Finally, entirely new tasks are entrusted to the shop stewards: in all plants of less than 50 employees the shop stewards assume some of the functions held in larger enterprises by the Plant Committees.

The development of the legislation instituting the Plant Committees (*Comités d'Entreprises*) reflects the growing influence of the C.G.T. and its shifting ideologies. The historical antecedents of these committees are quite varied. The program of the Resistance Council contained somewhat vague proposals for the assumption of direct managerial responsibilities by the trade unions in all joint stock companies. As liberation progressed, committees mostly composed of workers' representatives and technicians sprang up spontaneously in many regions of France to administer enterprises whose collaborationist owners had fled. Other committees took over the direction of some of the hastily nationalized coal fields of northern France. Elsewhere patriotic employers coöperated with their workers after the liberation in order to speed up war production.

In order to guide and unify such developments, the de Gaulle Government promulgated a decree early in 1945 instituting plant committees composed of representatives of management and labor in all industrial and commercial establishments of more than 100 employees. With explicit reference to wartime experiences in the United States, Great Britain and Canada these committees were relied upon to increase production by improving working methods and conditions. In social matters the committees were entrusted with the management of welfare activities, such as cafeterias, nurseries, housing projects, retirement funds and the like. Only for joint stock companies and for very large enterprises were the committees entitled to information about profits; but in these they were invited to "submit suggestions" concerning the management of financial affairs — a phrase which might mean much or little.

The employers and their organizations accepted the new statute, once they had eliminated most of the provisions that would have given the committees an effective control in management. However, in some quarters it was hoped that the committees would continue to play the rôle of the Social Committees of Pétain's Labor Charter, which had been imbued by an archaic

paternalism, and that they might develop in the direction of company unions.

The C.G.T. and its affiliated organizations complained that the decree in its final form had incorporated none of the more stringent provisions proposed by the Consultative Assembly. Nevertheless, they declared their willingness to coöperate wholeheartedly in applying the new statute. Since the leadership of the C.G.T., for reasons to be discussed, was sincerely striving to "win the battle of production," the Plant Committees were given a part in that battle. Moreover, the union leaders were confident that a dynamic labor movement such as had developed since the liberation could easily defeat any attempt to play off the committees against the unions, and that the statute's curtailment of the unlimited managerial responsibility of the employer could be broadened. Wherever differences of opinion arose within the Plant Committee, the union membership was advised not only to invoke the legal possibilities provided by the statute but to conduct a campaign with the aid of leaflets, speeches and other means of mobilizing the workers of the plant. The National Union of the Metal Workers called a congress attended by a thousand members of Plant Committees to discuss the best methods of using the committees as an "instrument of class struggle."

Shortly thereafter, with a sovereign parliament reinstituted and a former secretary of the Metal Workers Union as Minister of Labor, practically all of the earlier suggestions of the C.G.T. concerning the Plant Committees were incorporated into a new statute. First of all, the institution was made compulsory in a vastly increased number of plants. It is now applicable to approximately 15,000 shops employing more than 3,000,000 wage earners. All Committees are now entitled to information about profits and can verify such information by auditors appointed by the unions. In joint stock companies, Committee members participate in a consultative capacity in meetings of the executive committee of the management. The Plant Committees are now also empowered to give advice on price increases and on related wage matters. Various provisions strengthen the ties between trade unions and Plant Committees; for example, the unions which nominate Committee members can now initiate proceedings to recall a member who has incurred their displeasure.

It is too early to predict to what extent this legislation will change economic and industrial relations in France. The tradi-

tional secretiveness of French management — heritage of a peasant race that had to seek protection from an insatiable tax collector — will be lessened. But the actual power of labor in the management of industry is not likely to amount to much as long as the Committee act only in a consultative capacity. Even in its newer and bolder version the French law does not go farther than the German statute of 1920 on Works Councils, and that attempt to give the working class a direct share in management was not successful.

French management does not seem to be particularly concerned about the legislation; and trade union leaders admit that, except in the nationalized enterprises, the Committees have not proved their worth. The workers in general lack interest in them, and the Committee members themselves are not prepared for the complicated economic task which the statute has thrust upon them. On the other hand, the C.G.T. leadership is determined not to let the Committees “degenerate” (except for efforts at increased production) into instruments of coöperation between management and labor for the betterment of industrial relations. At least for the time being, the Plant Committees are essentially just one more instrument by which the union movement exercises its grip on the working class, mainly through the administration of welfare activities.

III

This influence is all the more important to the trade unions since the normal field of general trade union activities is still very restricted. There is no collective bargaining and there are practically no strikes.

The government has invited management and labor to depart from the strict state regulation of industrial relations to which they have been accustomed since 1939. For nine months some of the most important trade-union federations have been preparing new collective bargaining contracts. However, the employers and their organizations are hesitant to conclude such agreements, declaring that they cannot take back their responsibilities for the fixing of wages as long as the government fixes prices. The reluctance of management to enter into collective bargaining also stems from the fear that this would necessarily involve the entire wage-price structure. It is admitted on all sides that in October 1946, even after the Bidault Government had granted

an 18 percent average increase of all wages and salaries, real wages of industrial workers had diminished by 54 percent since October 1938. Yet such figures do not consider black market prices. Food, the most important item in the workers' budget, is still badly distributed by regions as well as by social classes, so that the urban proletariat is at a disadvantage on two counts.

Yet the C.G.T. leadership has so far prevented any widespread strike movement. Even when the Bidault Government cut down the unions' demands for a 25 percent wage increase, which had been declared justified by a National Wage Conference, the C.G.T. confined itself to relatively mild protests. On the whole, the slogan launched by the Communists, *Produire d'abord, revendiquer ensuite*, still prevails and is tantamount to a no-strike pledge.

IV

The hold which the Communists have today on the C.G.T. is virtually complete, and almost uncontested. With the exception of the white-collar federations such as those of the civil servants, teachers and office workers, they control all of the big national unions and all the regional unions. After his return from a German prison camp, Léon Jouhaux, perennial Secretary General of the C.G.T., regained his position; and other non-Communists by agreement occupy half the positions on the governing bodies of the C.G.T. But they would find themselves powerless if they ever thought of asserting their independence. At the last national convention the non-Communist forces mustered a protest vote of not more than 23 percent of the membership. If one considers that the Communists, at the apogee of their influence in the prewar C.G.T., hardly came close to a majority and were altogether excluded from the union movement at the moment of the Hitler-Stalin pact, their present position is impressive indeed.

Once Hitler's assault on Russia had helped the French Communists to overcome their "revolutionary defeatism," they assumed the ascendancy. Their superior energy in the underground struggle won them a place of leadership, and in the general confusion at the moment of liberation they employed their influence to turn Communistically-inspired strike committees into full-fledged union directorates. Superior funds also made it possible for them to buy ample paper supplies on the black

market and to launch a vehement propaganda campaign among the rank and file of the trade unions.

The fact that some of the most violent anti-Communist leaders of the prewar C.G.T. had turned collaborationists under Vichy redounded to the advantage of the party now. And with ingenious distortions of history it worked energetically at the task of wiping out all memories of Communist tergiversation during the period of the German-Soviet pact. Once in control of a local, national or regional union the Communists did not hesitate to silence or to expel dissidents and rivals, even if they were trade-unionists with an outstanding record in the resistance movement.

However, such manœuvres alone do not explain the full extent of Communist domination of the French labor movement. Their talents as organizers, their special appeal to the youth returning from Germany, their down-to-earth approach to the problem of workers' education, and their skilful campaigns to associate every popular social or economic law with the name of a Communist trade-union leader have won them the confidence of the working masses. To give but one example: the nationalization of the coal mines has resulted in rent-free housing for miners living in quarters that were previously company-owned; and the fact was that many miners lived and worked under conditions described in a Zola novel. Indeed, many still do. Yet there has been a notable improvement, and since the Communists present themselves as the foremost promoters of nationalization, they are given the credit for it by the miners. A mentality has developed among a majority of the French workers which is very similar to the loyalty of an American miner to John L. Lewis — one utterly remote from the proud traditions of French syndicalism. The Communist union leadership encounters little difficulty in enforcing discipline, even where their course of action is not easily understood by the rank and file. A contributing factor to this is the general lassitude due to war and postwar privations.

The non-Communist elements in the C.G.T. are laboring under the same difficulties that have befallen the French Socialist Party. Evolutionary in outlook, scrupulous in methods and poor in funds, they have little appeal for the masses. It is not easy for them to oppose present Communist policy and tactics with a constructive program, and they abhor mere anti-Communism, which once before led trade-union leaders to the treacherous collaboration with Vichy and the Germans. In the summer of

1946 there were two short-lived revolts against the Communist leadership; first the postal workers and later the employees of the Treasury, both particularly underprivileged public servants, called unauthorized strikes. The Socialist Party avidly seized this opportunity to present itself, in complete reversal of earlier rôles, as the defender of strikers against what was termed the strike-breaking tactics of the Communist trade-union leaders. Léon Blum himself termed the movement a "reaction against those who have abandoned the fight for labor's demands in favor of the interest of the party." But the revolt did not spread.

Ever since the Communist Co-Secretary General of the C.G.T., Benoît Frachon, announced in 1944 that the battle of production was just as important as the battle of liberation had been, the French trade union philosophy has taken a novel aspect. The C.G.T. in the past perhaps paid less attention to the problem of productivity than did the labor movement of any other country. Even during the Popular Front period, when the social legislation might have been expected to result in an increase of individual output, the trade unions hesitated to recommend an attitude not popular among the workers. The new Communist leadership used the wave of patriotic exhilaration following the liberation to convince urban and rural workers that it was in their interest — not merely in the interest of a decaying economic system — to produce more and better. In neo-Jacobin accents they proclaimed that the cause of the nation and of its most numerous sons had merged. The slogan of a movement for a "French renaissance" was interwoven with the vocabulary of the French Revolution, when the annual convention of the metal workers' union was adorned with the proud title of "States General of the Renaissance of French Metallurgy." And occasionally the Robespierrean civic virtue of the working classes is contrasted with the spread of criminality among bourgeois black-market profiteers.

That this campaign has yielded appreciable results is undeniable. In the nationalized enterprises a regular "Stakhanovism" is being pursued. Especially in the mines, where working discipline had fallen to an all-time low after liberation and nationalization, the efforts of the Communist union organizers were spectacularly successful. Individual output today has reached 120 percent of 1938, a level not attained in any other industry. (That the per capita output, even so, does not amount to much more than one-fourth of that of the American miner is due to the obso-

leteness of machinery and methods.) The Communist trade unionists have by no means abandoned their doctrines of anti-capitalism and the class struggle, but they have rephrased them cleverly. They now denounce the trusts, not as "exploiters of human labor," but as the "enemies of democracy" and the "saboteurs of the French renaissance," on the ground that they refuse to undertake the retooling of the country's industrial plant with the necessary speed. To leftist objections that the Communist drive for more production will strengthen the class enemy, the reply is made that it would be untrue to Leninism not to take into consideration the changes of the national and international situation. "Everything depends," declared Frachon at the last National Convention of the C.G.T., "on the direction which we shall succeed in giving to the general political development of our country." Here lies the clue to present and future orientation of French labor.

The Communist trade unionists reject the principles of the Charter of Amiens which some 40 years ago tried to preserve the French labor movement from entanglements with politics and which had been religiously, though sometimes hypocritically, upheld as the basic law of French trade-unionism until the dissolution of the C.G.T. by the Vichy Government. For the present C.G.T. leadership, the interests of organized labor and of one political party, the Communist, are identical. And since the French Communist Party is looked upon with suspicion by all organizations, except by the ones it controls, the C.G.T. lashes out not only against the Right but also against Socialist ministers such as André Philip as "potential Fascists," and against the Christian trade unions as "myrmidons of the Vatican."

Before the liberation, hopes had often been expressed that a solid basis for the new republic could be created by an alliance between Catholics of liberal and Socialist leanings, and the Socialist and Communist trade-union leaders. Such hopes have vanished with the quick and complete Communist control of the C.G.T. Fusion between the C.G.T. and the French Confederation of Christian Workers (C.F.T.C.) was also expected during the period of the underground struggle. But today the relations between the two organizations are on the whole more strained than ever. The influence of the Catholic trade unions was on the increase before the war, but it did not extend beyond their traditional strongholds among white collar workers, textile workers in

the north, and some conservative districts of Brittany. Even if the Catholic unions have maintained their prewar strength (approximately 800,000 members) as they claim, they have lost greatly in relative strength. Such a development is in part due to the new social legislation, which assures the control of the "most representative" union and renders all minority movements impotent. But equally damaging to the cause of Catholic unionism are the polemics directed against it by the Communist trade unionists, who in their attacks against the C.F.T.C. air the mutual hostility between the Communist Party and Bidault's M.R.P. — and between Moscow and the Vatican.

Under its new leadership the C.G.T. continuously links its domestic and international predilections and antipathies. Its propaganda frequently points out that if the reaction at home has again become more daring, this is solely due to the support it is receiving from abroad, especially from big business in Great Britain and the United States: the influence of the French trusts would be negligible were it not for the backing they receive from across the Channel and the ocean. In the name of national independence — sometimes with outright chauvinistic accents — military preparedness is constantly advocated throughout the ranks of a traditionally pacifist movement. There can be little doubt that the present emphasis of the C.G.T. on maximum production has its roots in the continuous concern for the strengthening of the country's military potentialities.

The animosity of the labor movement to the Anglo-Saxon countries reaches particular acerbity in regard to the German question. Here the perpetual fear of the aggressive neighbor feeds itself on what are considered British and American efforts to rebuild the German war potential. The quest for the Ruhr coal sometimes takes the form of a veritable obsession. Since it is deemed impossible to achieve the rehabilitation of the country without the coal from the Ruhr and Saar, the western democracies, allegedly denying it to France, are denounced for sabotaging the French "renaissance" and by the same token helping reactionary Germany to get on her feet.

A propaganda which capitalizes at the same time on hurt national pride, on the fear of Germany, on the dislike for American plutocracy and British imperialism, and on hunger for coal and reparations has an immense appeal for the French masses. And it bolsters the strength of the present C.G.T. leadership in

yet another way: the fact that the few outstanding non-Communists in the union movement, such as Jouhaux and Saillant, are making this outlook their own and are defending it in the councils of the World Federation of Trade Unions, renders the Communist control of the C.G.T. almost unbreakable.

v

Shortly before the close of 1946 the *Commissariat Général du Plan de Modernisation et d'Équipement*, originally appointed by de Gaulle, presented its four-year plan for economic recovery. By modernization of antiquated plants and of outdated working methods, the plan proposes eventually to raise productivity, when compared with 1938, by 13 percent in mining, 46 percent in steel production, 57 percent in the automobile industry, 40 percent in building, 27 percent in agriculture. The tremendous effort which the objectives of the plan require is illustrated by the fact that almost one-fourth of the estimated national income will be needed for gross capital expenditure (as compared with 16 percent in 1938) and must hence, except for whatever sums France might be able to obtain through foreign loans, go into savings instead of consumption. To the picture of sacrifices thus imposed, it must be added that such a rise in productivity demands an increase in the labor force of 1,200,000 workers, after the return of the German prisoners of war. Such a deficit in manpower can be covered only by attracting women into productive employment, by shifting workers from the distributive trades, and by mass immigration.

Friends of France everywhere will hope that the goals of the plan can be attained. For, as has been officially stated, the alternative is not a return to prewar conditions, but a progressive material decline. In strictly economic terms the goal is difficult but not impossible. All will depend on whether the political and psychological conditions necessary for the modernization can be realized without abandoning the fundamentals of democracy.

In its elaboration the plan has been a model of democratic planning. More than 1,000 representatives of trade unions, industrial management and government departments worked on it by industry groups. From time to time Communist trade unionists commented slightly ironically on the "overambitious" schemes of the various modernization committees, thus voicing the traditional Communist distrust of whatever economic planning might originate outside of Soviet Russia. (Before the war

the Communists had violently attacked an economic plan elaborated by the then majority of the C.G.T., as well as the nationalizations proposed therein.) However, at the end the trade unions agreed to a 48-hour week (instead of the legally prescribed 40 hours), concurred in a policy of heavy immigration. That the main objective of the plan — namely the increase of individual output — is being emphatically and effectively promoted by the C.G.T. has already been stated. Since the working masses seem now to heed almost without questioning the directives given by their unions, it would seem that never have the conditions for overhauling the country's economic structure been so favorable.

If the present leadership of the powerful C.G.T. were genuinely and permanently interested in the preservation of French democratic institutions, such conclusions might be warranted. And it would then be possible for France, with Great Britain, to find that middle course between unbridled capitalism and totalitarian planning for which millions of Europeans hope. But since the French trade-union movement is firmly in the hands of the Communist Party, one fears that the atmosphere of confidence indispensable for the success of the plan will be hard to establish.

The Communist union leaders have frankly declared that their present slogans will be held only as long as their party believes that the political situation, domestic and international, warrants the call for more production and for partial collaboration. But even if no radical change in policy should occur in the near future, the mere possibility of seeing the C.G.T. leadership exercise their considerable influence in exactly the opposite direction to the one now prevailing, has already led to a stiffening of opposition to both Communism and the C.G.T. Without public reliance on the stability of currency, prices and industrial relations, the schemes of the economic planners will remain blueprints. With governmental instability and increasing antagonism between parties, groups and classes, there is but dim hope for uniting the nation to support the indispensable sacrifices.

"Besides a grave economic situation," concludes *Force Ouvrière*, one of the surviving non-Communist trade-union papers, "we witness the ferocious development of egoisms, the political split of the nation into two clans, the increasing needs for mystique. . ." And the workers are warned that if such a situation is not reversed the country will have the choice only between two forms of dictatorship.

LABOR AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA

By Serafino Romualdi

ALTHOUGH the problems of organized labor in Latin America must be considered as a whole, there are many important differences in the situation in the various countries. Despite the outsider's general impression of broad uniformity, the fact is that national conditions and characteristics differ more sharply as between one Latin American nation and another than they do, for instance, as between the United States and Argentina or Uruguay.

Latin America has had no uniform social and economic development, nor, for that matter, does it have a uniform ethnological and cultural background. Argentina, Uruguay and Chile share many Hispano-American qualities; but Brazil, with its Lusitano-American cast, has a language, a racial mixture and a political history that set it distinctly apart from its neighbors. In the Indio-American belt, stretching through the Andes plateau and Central America to Mexico, and embracing Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador, there are large sections whose populations still preserve almost intact many elements of the society that existed before the Spanish conquest. The Caribbean nations are characterized by the predominant percentage of Negro inhabitants. The basic national economies of Latin America exhibit similar diversities — agriculture and cattle-raising in the River Plata areas, mineral resources in the mountain states, petroleum in Venezuela, sugar and derivatives in the Caribbean lands and fruit plantations in the Central American countries.

Unfortunately, one thing that is true of all the Latin American nations is the inferior station accorded labor in the scale of social values. In contrast to the United States, where labor enjoys a substantial degree of respect and social equality, labor in Latin America, particularly of the manual type, is looked down upon. This tendency has been considerably reduced in Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay, and is also diminishing in Venezuela, Peru, Chile, Cuba and other countries as a result of revolutionary social developments in recent years. Despite such signs of progress, the prevailing wage in Latin America does not begin to compare with that of labor in the United States. Working and living condi-

tions are equally backward. Only in Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay have organized industrial workers become strong enough to gain important economic and social improvements, and lesser gains have been achieved in Brazil. But in the majority of the Latin American countries the industrial proletariat still lives under incredibly poor conditions, with the Bolivian tin miners as an especially vivid example of wretchedness.

The low living standards of Latin American workers, as compared with those of workers in the United States, are illustrated by the following table. These figures reveal, as of December 31, 1946, the amount of work, in terms of hours or days of labor, that is necessary to earn the retail price of each of the three basic items of apparel that every man must buy — a shirt, a pair of shoes and a suit of clothes.

WORKERS' ABILITY TO BUY ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES

<i>Country</i>	<i>Type of Worker</i>	<i>Amount of Labor Necessary to Buy:</i>		
		<i>A Shirt</i>	<i>A Pair of Shoes</i>	<i>A Suit of Clothes</i>
Colombia	Textile worker	1½ days	3 days	1 month
Brazil	Commercial worker	1 day	3 days	2 weeks
Chile	Metal worker	15 hours	20 hours	150 hours
Paraguay	Skilled worker	2 days	4 days	1 month
Peru	Unskilled industrial worker	2 days	2½ days	22 days
Mexico	Unskilled worker	3 days	7 days	1 month
Cuba	Industrial worker	1 day	2 days	1 week
Venezuela	Skilled industrial worker	6 hours	2 days	12 days
United States of America	Manufacturing worker	2 hours	5 hours	37½ hours
		12 minutes	54 minutes	
	Miner	1 hour	4 hours	27½ hours
		36 minutes	18 minutes	
	Steel worker	1 hour	5 hours	34 hours
		54 minutes	24 minutes	
	Retail trade	2 hours	7 hours	46½ hours
		42 minutes	24 minutes	

II

Perhaps the chief reason for the retarded condition of the Latin American labor movement is that none of these countries has enjoyed a sufficiently continuous period of political freedom to permit the growth of trade unions. In Mexico, Colombia and Argentina, for example, labor has achieved freedom only during the past generation. Although several countries, notably Cuba and Uruguay, accorded freedom to labor earlier, the growth of trade unions has been interrupted by governmental repression.

In some countries, including Costa Rica, Peru and Venezuela, the labor movement is less than a decade old, while in a number of others, such as Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Ecuador, governments are just beginning to allow workers to organize freely. Brazil has permitted the existence of trade unions for almost 15 years — but under absolute government control.

Latin American trade-union history has been characterized by an unusual degree of politicalization, despite the desires of the anarcho-syndicalists who established the trade unions, particularly in the cities to which the masses of Italians and Spaniards had migrated. These leaders advocated direct action, rather than the adoption of parliamentary methods; class struggle was their slogan. But the repressive measures to which the government authorities usually resorted, as well as outright anti-union legislation, compelled the labor forces to engage in political action in order to preserve their right to organize and to keep their elementary gains. They thus proceeded to cultivate the friendship of such governments as those of Irigoyen in Argentina, José Batlle y Ordóñez in Uruguay, Alfonso López in Colombia, Obregón and Calles in Mexico and others, and to support programs of a legislative nature. These circumstances placed a far greater emphasis on political activity than on straight trade-union efforts, as the latter are generally understood in the United States. This tendency became even more conspicuous with the emergence of the Communist Parties, whose trade union officials often have had no previous relationship whatsoever with the trade or craft to which they have been assigned. For example, Rubén Iscaro, whom the Argentine Communists placed at the head of the once-powerful building trades union organization, never actually worked a day in that or any other industry. Pedro Saad, president of the Ecuador Confederation of Labor until last November, is a businessman. Augusto Durán, general secretary of the Communist Party of Colombia, became a member of the executive council of the river transport workers' union without ever having been employed in that industry. As a result of these and other Communist manipulations in the trade unions of Colombia, the government issued a decree on August 6, 1946, making it mandatory for a union official, in order to be eligible for office, to have been actually employed at wages in the trade or industry in which the union exercises jurisdiction.

The development of a system of collective bargaining, of the

kind that prevails in the United States, has been seriously retarded by the preponderance of political-minded leaders in Latin American labor unions. To an extent unknown elsewhere in the western hemisphere, Latin American governments intervene not only in industrial conflicts but also in the internal affairs of trade unions. Admittedly, such intervention can have wholesome effects, as when President Betancourt last year brought to a successful conclusion the turbulent negotiations for an industry-wide collective agreement in the Venezuela oil fields, thus avoiding a costly strike. As a rule, the leaders of organized labor in Latin America reason that if a "friendly government" is in power it gains added prestige through solving labor disputes and, further, that if a "friendly government" is not kept in power, there is danger that the workers may lose their gains.

The forms of state intervention vary from country to country. In Colombia, for instance, it is quite broad. The law prohibits church-controlled trade unions, more than one union in a given plant or more than one labor federation in a given industry. Proportional representation in the election of union officers and machinery to insure fair methods of balloting are also required by law. Strikes in the public services are outlawed, and workers in private industries can strike only after the successive stages of direct negotiation, conciliation and arbitration. In Chile, the government likewise has wide powers to intervene in labor conflicts, especially through the conciliation and arbitration boards and the labor tribunals. It has the power to revoke juridical recognition of labor unions, without which they cannot function. In Brazil, the government does not participate in the negotiation of labor agreements, but it possesses the power to force compliance afterward. In Cuba, the Ministry of Labor supervises the observance of labor agreements. In Argentina, a high degree of governmental intervention in labor conflicts and in the enforcement of labor agreements has developed under the Perón régime, and there are laws raising the minimum wage and prescribing paid vacations and yearly bonuses. Perhaps the most unusual feature of the Argentine program is a system of profit-sharing which vests the workers with a substantial amount of control over the industries in which they are employed.

There are other examples of highly advanced labor and social legislation unknown to the wage-earner in the United States. In Peru and Colombia, payment for Sunday is mandatory if an

employee has worked at least four days during the week. In Brazil, a worker is vested with a life-long right to his job after a given number of years of employment. In Argentina, Brazil and several other countries, severance pay up to the amount of several months' wages is required by law. In Cuba, workers are entitled to one month's vacation with pay after each 11 months of employment. In Colombia, railroad and river transport workers are eligible for pensions of 75 percent of their wages. In Uruguay and Argentina, railroad workers have the right to retire at the age of 55 — incidentally at rates in many cases considered actuarially unsound.

However, while this seemingly enlightened attitude toward workers undoubtedly contributes to their sense of security, it has not resulted in an appreciable betterment of their standard of living. In fact, being keyed to a wage norm so low that it guarantees only the barest kind of existence, it has led to a standardization of misery. It is in sharp contrast to the program of trade unions in the United States, where workers aimed first for a high level of wages — a "saving wage" — and then sought social security and welfare legislation to supplement it. Unless the principle of the saving wage is established in Latin America, no large-scale program of industrialization can succeed. Under existing conditions, only a small percentage of the Latin American population has the means to buy home appliances, electrical accessories and other consumer goods. The principle of the saving wage points to the only road that can lead to a substantial increase in the purchasing power of the great mass of Latin American consumers.

In view of these considerations, it would seem to be somewhat illogical for the Latin American Confederation of Labor (C.T.A.L.) to condemn the United States proposals for all-around tariff reduction and advocate the establishment of heavy tariff duties "to protect young national industries." Yet that is the position this organization adopted at a meeting of its Central Committee in San José, Costa Rica, in December 1946, in accordance with the proposal of its president, Vicente Lombardo Toledano. Apparently, this has become one of Toledano's favorite themes; in a speech at the ILO Regional Conference in Mexico City in April 1946 he went so far as to urge the workers to pay higher prices for domestic products than for similar and perhaps better goods from abroad, if such action were necessary to main-

tain their home industries. Needless to say, this could become an extremely dangerous theory, for it would inevitably lead to parasitical practices seriously impeding the growth of a healthy national economy and resulting in a further decrease of mass purchasing power. It is certainly a paradox to find a labor leader who claims belief in Marxian internationalist principles advocating a policy of economic and industrial self-sufficiency, particularly by small countries conspicuously deficient in raw material, capital and skilled labor.

Any program sincerely concerned with the elevation of the living standards of the Latin American masses must rest upon a policy of economic planning and coöperation on a continental basis. It is wrong to talk of a Mexican economy, an Ecuadorian economy, a Uruguayan economy or any other national economy in this portion of the globe. These are only national segments of what foresighted observers recognize as an over-all inter-American economic and industrial relationship. Raúl V. Haya de la Torre, leader of the Aprista movement, has proposed a bold and novel approach to this question. Speaking before the National Trade Union Assembly of Peru on June 6, 1946, he pointed out that the basic problem of Latin America is not that of the distribution of wealth, as in overpopulated Europe, but rather of the production of wealth. "We do not need to take away wealth from those who have it; we must rather produce wealth for those who don't have it," he declared. And he argued that this can be achieved by "an intelligent coördination of the three factors that produce wealth: state, capital and labor. These three will have to be harmonized. State and capital against labor or state and labor against capital would not work." His plan, already approved by the Peruvian parliament, contemplates the creation of a tripartite national economic congress, subdivided into four sections: 1, basic economy; 2, agriculture and cattle raising; 3, industry and mining; and 4, banking and finance. These groups are charged with a continuing study of the economic and industrial requirements of the country and the formulation of steps for meeting them.

In Venezuela, the government of President Rómulo Betancourt is planning to set up a national economic council of a similar nature. Such steps in two countries bring into sight the encouraging possibility of the formation of national economic councils in every Latin American nation, followed by the emergence of a continental tripartite agency which would coördinate all phases

of the inter-American economy and suggest how each country could best contribute of its labor, agricultural, industrial or mineral resources to a program advancing the industrialization of Latin America. An editorial in the July 1946 issue of *Apra*, official organ of the National Educational Committee of the Aprista Party of Peru, put the program in these words:

Peru's economic plans are orientated toward a continental economic coördination, which is imperative if we are to apply in the economic field of the two Americas the political concept of "democratic inter-Americanism without imperialism." The scientific exploration of the economic realities of each country, which is the first step for the planning of their domestic economies, should, in turn, become the starting point for a joint continental effort to organize constructively our productive interdependence. In this way, from economic planning on a national basis to economic planning on a continental basis, a new system of relationships will arise which will guarantee a stabilization and harmonizing of the production and exchange of wealth between the two Americas.

Latin America's organized labor may well find that this plan is an answer to the question how to increase production, with prices which would not require protective tariffs and with labor costs which would permit the introduction of the saving wage, thus raising the purchasing power of the people.

To do its full share in this endeavor, however, organized labor in Latin America will have to develop a new concept of labor-industry relationships. Stirred up by professional politicians and often abetted by their own governments, the workers of too many Latin American countries have identified all capital as an enemy which must never be trusted and which must be harassed at every opportunity. This is considered particularly true of foreign capital, regardless of the plain fact that, as a rule, foreign capital, especially American, pays much higher wages than native employers. Of course, the behavior of early representatives of foreign capital in Latin America did much to warrant this hostility. Since that time, however, foreign capital has considerably improved not only its conduct but its viewpoint. Organized labor in Latin America could profit by a reëxamination of the record in the light of the concept that workers have a genuine stake in the success of their industries. Haya de la Torre urged a course of coöperation in the speech mentioned above. "Our policy aims to raise the workers' cultural level and technical ability," he said. "We must not only ask for our rights; we must also discharge our duties."

To bring about a more coöperative approach to the problem of industrial relationships in Latin America, both workers and employers might consider the possibilities of some such machinery as has been set up in the United States, featured by the creation of labor-relations departments by employers, staffed with competent personnel (preferably with trade union experience), and the gradual introduction of a system of voluntary impartial arbitration by direct arrangements between employers and labor unions. This machinery, financed equally by employers and workers, functions successfully in many industries in the United States. In Latin America it would seem especially desirable to exclude government agencies and so-called labor wage tribunals from these functions because of their susceptibility to political considerations.

III

Of course, there are still right extremists in Latin America, but at present the chief threat to the spread of democracy there and to the development of inter-American coöperation stems from the Communist movement. This is steadily growing stronger.

After Pearl Harbor, Communists all over Latin America became the spearhead of an effort to speed up production for the Allies. They declared a moratorium on demands for wage increases and better working conditions, and banned strikes completely. Allied officials, naturally, were grateful for the Communists' assistance.

Throughout the war period, Lombardo Toledano travelled all over Latin America. He did important work in whipping up support for the Allied war effort, and he simultaneously built up the strength of the C.T.A.L. Is Lombardo Toledano a Communist? He says that he is not a party member. But since his trip to Russia, in the early 1930's, he has followed the Communist Party line in international affairs without the slightest deviation. He was for collective security and the Popular Front policy up to the time of the Hitler-Stalin pact. Then he (and the C.T.A.L.) at once proclaimed the war between Germany and the Allies a capitalist affair in which the workers of Latin America had no interest, and he instantly changed his position when Hitler attacked Russia. That in itself is conclusive evidence. The *C.T.A.L. News*, and *El Popular* of Mexico City, which Toledano

formerly edited and still controls, are exactly the same as the official Communist press in policy, emphasis and timing, especially in relation to international affairs. Moscow does not disguise its interest in the C.T.A.L. and its monopoly over organized labor in Latin America. For example, *Trud*, the Soviet trade union organ, on December 7, 1946, assailed the American Federation of Labor for engaging in "provocative attempts to create a new association of Latin American trade unions in competition with the Confederation of Latin American Workers." Besides Lombardo Toledano, the Central Committee of the C.T.A.L. includes seven Communists — Rubén Iscaro of Argentina, Rodolfo Guzmán of Costa Rica, Lázaro Peña of Cuba, Juan Vargas Puebla of Chile, Pedro Saad of Ecuador, Enrique Rodríguez of Uruguay and Juan P. Luna of Peru; two Socialists — Juan Briones of Chile and Francisco Pérez Leirós of Argentina; one liberal — Napoleón Molina of Colombia; and one independent — Fidel Velásquez of Mexico. For years the C.T.A.L. offered violent opposition to the successive governments of Argentina, leading the fight at the ILO Conference at Philadelphia in 1944, at Paris in 1945 and at Mexico City in 1946 to exclude the Argentine workers' delegates on the ground that they were under government domination. But as soon as Russia reestablished diplomatic relations with Argentina the C.T.A.L. executed a swift about-face. In July 1946, the group of Communist-controlled labor unions in Argentina announced that they would dissolve and become incorporated into the Argentine Confederation of Labor, an organization which they had just characterized as a tool of President Perón. The Communists also joined with the Argentine Confederation of Labor in what was scheduled to be a series of public demonstrations against the high cost of living, but which they attempted to convert into a series of demonstrations against the United States. At a meeting of the C.T.A.L. Central Committee in San José, Costa Rica, on December 8, 1946, the Argentine Communist leader, Rubén Iscaro, stated that "Argentina is today the only Latin American country that flies the banner of anti-Yankee imperialism."

The attitude of Lombardo Toledano and of the C.T.A.L. toward any Latin American government is determined primarily by Communist political considerations and not by the policies of that government toward organized labor. The C.T.A.L. was friendly to the conservative President Angarita Medina of

Venezuela and hostile to his left-wing successor, Rómulo Betancourt, because the former was willing to deal with the Communists while the latter distrusts them. It was willing to deal with the autocratic President Prado of Peru but attacks the revolutionary Haya de la Torre because of his criticisms of Soviet Russia. President Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic was a champion of democracy as long as he permitted a group of Cuban Communist organizers to run the Dominican labor movement, but became a dictator again as soon as he revoked this privilege.

A rising storm of opposition all over Latin America to pro-Communist policies has recently caused Lombardo Toledano to trim his sails. In the *C.T.A.L. News* of December 1946, he declared that "the C.T.A.L. is independent of any government, church or political party. It accepts no political party instructions." Such disclaimers can hardly convince anyone who has studied the record of the C.T.A.L. and its president. To describe the growing revolt against Communist domination of the labor movement country by country would require a great deal of detailed analysis, for which there is no space here. But certain manifestations may be noted. In Argentina, the split in the General Confederation of Labor (C.G.T.) in March 1943, resulting in a right wing headed by José Domenech and a left wing led by Francisco Pérez Leirós, has since been followed by a general reshuffling in both groups, brought about by the policies of Juan Domingo Perón, first as Secretary of Labor and then as President. Since the dissolution of the Communist-controlled labor unions and their incorporation into the C.G.T., the right wing has unquestionably become the stronger and more representative labor group in the country. In the aggregate, the organized workers of Argentina number more than 750,000, with more than 500,000 in the C.G.T. As already indicated, none of the Argentine labor organizations is at present affiliated with the C.T.A.L., though the C.T.A.L. leader in Argentina paradoxically lauds President Perón.

The unity of the Uruguayan labor movement, which was brought about in 1942, ended a year later when a group of unions led by Socialists left the *Unión General de Trabajadores* (U.G.T.), which was affiliated with the C.T.A.L. These Socialists accused the C.T.A.L. of Communist domination and sectarianism. Other unions followed suit in 1944 and 1945, and only a minority of

organized labor in the country is now affiliated with the C.T.A.L.

After the new Brazilian Constitution came into effect, the government invited the various local and state labor organizations to a national convention with the purpose of setting up, for the first time in the country's history, a truly representative, nation-wide trade union federation. The meeting began on September 9, 1946, in Rio de Janeiro but was adjourned several days later by the Minister of Labor because it was obvious that the convention had already split irreconcilably between the Communists and their opponents. Those groups proceeded to form two separate Brazilian Confederations of Workers and each is now claiming official recognition.

In Chile, following the general strike of February 1946 which was promoted by the Communists but opposed by the Socialists, the Chilean Confederation of Labor split into two factions, one headed by Bernardo Ibañez, a Socialist schoolteacher, and the other by Bernardo Araya, a Communist Deputy. Both groups are affiliated with the C.T.A.L. However, following the convention of his organization in Santiago on December 13, 1946, Ibañez announced that the Socialist group would quit the C.T.A.L. within six months if it had not completely rid itself of Communist control by that time. The depth of the Chilean Socialists' feelings over this crisis is indicated in their reply, on December 25, to Lombardo Toledano's plea for unity, in which Ibañez declared: "We are not ready here to accept any understanding with the Communists . . . who are trying to dominate the working class and are using methods of coercion perhaps worse than those employed by the Nazis to dominate Europe."

The electoral victory of the Aprista Party in Peru in 1945 was followed by the virtual elimination of Communists from positions of leadership in the trade unions of this country. The Apristas are in full control of the labor movement there. The president of the Peruvian Confederation of Labor is Arturo Sabroso Montoya, a self-educated textile worker who has suffered many years of imprisonment and exile; he is a devoted follower of Haya de la Torre. Although the Peruvian Confederation of Labor is affiliated with the C.T.A.L., it constitutes one of the strongest centers of opposition to the policies of Lombardo Toledano.

The Ecuadorian Confederation of Labor was organized only a few years ago, with strength divided almost equally between Socialists and Communists, and with a Communist president,

Pedro Saad. However, at the Guayaquil convention in November 1946, the Socialists mustered sufficient strength to capture the presidency, the vice-presidency and a majority of the Central Committee. As a result of this shift of power, it is expected that the Ecuadorian Confederation of Labor will line up with the groups that have been advocating a change of C.T.A.L. policy.

The labor movement of Venezuela is largely under the control of the trade union elements of the Acción Democrática Party. Although the Communists are quite strong in the oil workers' union and in a number of smaller unions in the Federal District, including that of the clothing workers, there is little evidence of further gain in their strength. It appears almost certain that the Venezuelan trade union body will join in demanding sweeping reforms in policy and leadership in the C.T.A.L.

The powerful Confederation of Labor of Cuba, organized in 1938 through a merger of various independent unions, is today the main pillar of the C.T.A.L. structure and is under the complete domination of Communist elements. Its general secretary, Lázaro Peña, a young Negro tobacco worker, is an able leader and indefatigable organizer. The only serious challenge to Communist leadership of the Cuban labor movement could come from the trade union elements of President Grau San Martín's Auténtico Party, but such a showdown has been postponed, apparently for reasons of internal policy.

There is an interesting beginning of a Catholic trade union group in Costa Rica, which opposes the Confederation of Labor headed by the Moscow-trained Rodolfo Guzmán. It calls itself the "Rerum Novarum," since it derives its ideological inspiration from Pope Leo XIII's famous encyclical. The "Rerum Novarum" is the fruit of the progressive labor policy fostered by Monsignor Sanabria, Bishop of San José. It operates along traditional trade-union lines and on a non-confessional basis.

Though there are such signs of successful revolt against Communist domination of trade unionism in Latin America, the Communists themselves are unremittingly on the job. Intensive agitation against every aspect of the foreign policy of the United States and England — with unequivocal support of every phase of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union — characterizes the pages of *El Siglo* of Santiago, *La Hora* of Buenos Aires, *La Tribuna Popular* of Rio de Janeiro, *Hohie* of São Paulo, *Hoy* of Havana, and scores of other daily, weekly and monthly publica-

tions under Communist control. Luiz Carlos Prestes, leader of the Brazilian Communists, is reported to have said that in the event of war between the United States and Russia, he would organize bands of partisans to sabotage Brazilian attempts to aid the United States. In the same vein, *El Siglo* stated that in the event of war between the United States and Russia, not one ton of nitrate, copper or other minerals would leave Chile for shipment to the United States. Nor could this be considered an idle threat since the Chilean Communists have a tight grip on the labor organizations in the nitrate fields and in the coal and copper mines. On May Day 1946, the Communist-controlled Bolivian Confederation of Labor proclaimed: "Our international position is firmer than ever in favor of Russia, the Workers' Fatherland. Her glory is our glory. Russia is the only country that defeated Nazi-Fascism in the war." This organization has labor jurisdiction over the vital tin mines of Bolivia.

One antidote to Communist control of Latin American labor is the proposal which has been laid before the American Federation of Labor for the establishment of a permanent Inter-American Trade Union Association of democratic, independent and effective labor organizations. Such a trade-union association could promote the dissemination of sound information among Latin American trade unionists concerning the methods, techniques and structural devices of organized labor in the United States, by direct contact among both union leaders and rank-and-file groups. It could foster a regular exchange of trade-union missions free of any governmental control. The training of Latin American labor leadership would be greatly expedited by a scholarship plan under which Latin American trade unionists would come to the United States and Canada to acquire practical experience in labor schools, organized shops and trade-union offices. In addition, the plan features an exchange of trade-union publications and other literature specially prepared in Spanish and Portuguese. A clear picture of the achievements and aspirations of labor in the United States would constitute a potent contribution to the defeat of extremists of both the left and the right in Latin America. An inter-American labor movement would supply the missing link in the chain of Pan Americanism and Good Neighbor Policy, and make truly serviceable instruments of both for the task of uniting the hemisphere.

HUNGARY'S AGRARIAN REVOLUTION

By Leland Stowe

HUNGARY'S agrarian revolution began with the introduction of the Land Reform bill on the Ides of March, 1945. It involved splitting up into tiny parcels the several thousand huge or large estates owned for centuries by a small coterie of Hungarian nobles or by Church orders or organizations. Despite the magnitude and complexity of the task, the land reform was virtually completed by September 1946. Within 18 months one of Europe's chief strongholds of mediaeval feudalism had been liquidated. "Landlordism" could never be restored. Had a new day dawned for more than 4,000,000 Hungarian peasants and their families?

In any case, the physical foundations of Hungary's predominantly agricultural economy had been utterly transformed. The total of tillable land in the country is estimated at approximately 13,793,000 American acres. By the first of last September more than 4,633,000 of these acres — precisely one-third of all the arable soil — had been redistributed. In addition, another 3,300,000 acres, chiefly forest lands plus some pastures and barren country, had been either confiscated from Hungarian Nazi collaborators and German-speaking residents or expropriated. Most of these areas reverted to state, municipal or communal ownership or have been set aside for public purposes.

But the most striking feature of the land reform is the fact that allotments have been made to more than 642,000 individuals — tenant farmers, farm laborers, small farmers with inadequate soil and others. Since Hungarian peasants average four or five children to a family, this means that a revolutionary change has been effected in the lives of well over 4,000,000 persons. More than half of Hungary's entire population, then, is directly concerned with the sweeping redistribution of tillable land. These humble people, for so many generations the landless or sublanded underdogs of an anachronistic feudal system, now stand to reap certain benefits long dreamed of — or to relapse into new quagmires of thwarted hopes. Their only certainty is this: Hungary can never go back into the tight monopoly of the now-dispossessed big landowners. Where the newly "capitalized" Hungarian peasants — and their diminutive holdings of land —

will yet go is another question. And the answer may well set the agricultural pattern for Poland and Rumania, in fact for all the eastern European countries now within the Soviet Union's so-called "iron curtain."

Before approaching this long-term interrogation point that figures in any description of Hungary's land reform, we must indicate why such drastic measures became inevitable. Even a considerable number of its chief victims, Hungarian noblemen and others, today admit frankly that some form of fairly radical redistribution was "overdue." Between the wars, as before 1914, most big landowners rigidly opposed curtailment of their landed monopoly. Some of these same persons now confine their criticisms of the March 1945 reform to the manner in which it has been applied — not questioning its principle or assailing its purposes. But realization of the imperative urgency for comprehensive agrarian readjustments came to too few among the landed upper class, and too late. A majority among them defended Hungary's extreme feudal lopsidedness to the bitter end.

Authorities have agreed on the basic facts of Hungarian feudalism, within narrow statistical margins, for a generation or more. In 1900 more than 55 percent of the country's total landowners occupied plots ranging from 1.42 acres to only seven acres. This meant that the families of 1,358,000 "dwarf farmers" were chained to land from $5\frac{1}{2}$ to 11 acres below a normal subsistence level.¹ In addition there existed a completely landless proletariat running into hundreds of thousands of farm laborers, many of whom had work only half the year or less. The law of 1898 had imposed such restrictions and penalties on this legion of unfortunates that it became known as the "Slavery Act." Peasant strikes, sabotage and local uprisings resulted intermittently up to the First World War; and the 1918 October Revolution in Hungary received perhaps its chief impetus from a multitude of peasants clamoring for partition of the big estates.

Count Michael Károlyi's government looked favorably upon the peasants' demands for redistribution. A decree for expropriation of all properties above 284 acres was issued. Count Károlyi himself set an example by giving one of his estates for early division. But the Károlyi Government, swamped by numerous difficulties, yielded place only a few weeks later (March 21, 1919) to the chaotic four-month régime of Béla Kun.

¹ Cf. "Hungary," by C. A. Macartney. London: Benn, 1934, p. 231.

The hopes which the despairing peasant masses first placed in Béla Kun, the Bolshevik, were soon deceived. Instead of giving them land to own themselves, Kun attempted to nationalize the economy wholesale and to convert the peasants to Communism by force of arms. His failure came swiftly; and the Magyar peasants' pronounced aversion to Communism persists vigorously to this day. After this second war collectivization is no more desired by Hungary's predominantly peasant population than it was by Russian peasants after 1917.

The counter-revolution of the "White Terror" won the support of most Hungarian peasants precisely because of their disillusionment with Communist Béla Kun. For the first time the peasants had now become sufficiently strong politically to make some action necessary, and the Agrarian Reform law of December 1920 resulted. Compared to the needs it was indeed a "modest instrument."² The purport of the law was vitiated by numerous exemptions and other loopholes. Although some 400,000 hitherto landless rural laborers received an average of approximately 2½ acres (12½ acres are a minimum for subsistence), the grip of the big landowners was scarcely shaken. Under Horthy and Bethlen the feudal groups remained well entrenched and politically supreme. The *Hungarian Quarterly*, presided over by Count Bethlen and virtually a mouthpiece for the Government, admitted as much in an article by Michael Kerek in the autumn issue for 1940. In 1930, this article stated, out of an agricultural population of 4,500,000, some 3,500,000 peasants possessed seven acres or less of land or had no land at all. "There were nearly 600,000 farm hands; nearly 1,000,000 laborers who neither owned nor leased land; and about 250,000 day laborers owning or leasing tiny plots of less than 1.42 acres. There were just over 1,000,000 small farmers who owned between 1.42 acres and 7 acres; and 50,000 who leased a similar area." An equally illuminating admission followed: that one-third of the agricultural population were dwarf farmers or tenants "also obliged to work for hire," while another third were "entirely landless farm hands."

In short, the 1920 Land Reform had been so extremely modest that 66 percent of Hungary's peasants had been left without any relief whatever. But what about the remaining one-third of agricultural holdings large enough to be listed as independent? In this category 29.5 percent of the medium-sized and large

² For details see Macartney, *ibid.*, p. 240-243.

estates have been reported as belonging "to roughly 500 land-owners, hardly 0.1 percent of the owners of agricultural holdings."³ Expressed in another way, close to one-third of Hungary's land was monopolized in some 4,000 estates, ranging upward from 2,500 acres in size.⁴

To any modern-minded investigator, but perhaps especially to an American, the discrepancy was shocking. It focused my immediate attention during my last previous sojourn in Budapest in 1940, when I learned from official sources that the 25 largest estates in Hungary were private domains ranging from the 298,000 acres possessed by Prince Paul Eszterházy down to that owned by the Hungarian Catholic Culture Fund totalling 45,000 acres. Among these 25 chief land monopolies, 16 were owned by the richest Hungarian nobles or were listed as Crown estates. The other nine were the property of Church orders or archbishoprics, mostly held from the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries.⁵ When one considers that hundreds of thousands of Hungarian peasants and their families remained landless, and hundreds of thousands of others remained in semi-serfdom as tenant farmers, it becomes apparent that in the 1930's (let alone the 1940's) the Hungarian agrarian revolution was indeed "overdue."

We must be fair enough to interject that the lot of sharecroppers in certain of our southern states has been similar to that of these Danubian peasants. But to make the picture complete, we must indicate how much Hungary's "sharecroppers" and tenant farmers earned. Few foreigners have investigated this matter on the spot, among the peasants themselves, as thoroughly as Theodore Andrica, the multi-lingual specialist of the *Cleveland Press*. As late as 1938, during his travels in Hungary, he learned that the average pay of farm laborers (in seasons when they could work) was only about 20 cents a day. He also found large regions in which tenant farmers reaped annual cash earnings of only \$30 to \$50 — for one year of unstinting effort. The official statistics which Mr. Andrica painstakingly gathered are equally illuminating.

³ Cf. "The Land and Its Owners: The Management of Farms in Hungary," by Jules de Konkoly Thege, President of the Royal Hungarian Central Bureau of Statistics, *Journal de la Société Hongroise de Statistique*, April-October, 1936.

⁴ Cf. M. W. Fodor, "Plot and Counter-Plot in Central Europe." Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1937.

⁵ For the complete list see Chapter VII of the author's "While Time Remains." (Knopf, 1946.)

What is vital to remember is that from one-third to one-half of the total population of Hungary were either directly or indirectly affected by these conditions. Like the half-starved and still feudally-chained Spanish people, the Hungarian peasants cried desperately for relief, but into unheeding ears. In 1944 the Red Army brought social revolution in its wake. What the landlord-dominated governments had refused to do through successive decades was seized on by the Soviets as a golden opportunity. The old feudal system became Hungary's greatest war casualty. Today in Hungary its mourners may be numbered by a few thousands in a population of nearly 8,500,000.

The sponsors of the 1945 land reform pulled no punches. Their bill provided: (1) The average farm was not to exceed 100 cadastral yokes (142 acres). (2) Citizens of peasant descent, already on the land, might be awarded 200 cadastral yokes (284 acres). (3) A special committee might award persons of notable anti-Nazi performance or of exceptional service in the liberation up to 300 cadastral yokes (426 acres). (4) All original estates totalling more than 1,000 cadastral yokes (1,420 acres), were to be expropriated, and former owners could not retain more than 142 acres. Thus the law was frankly and severely discriminatory against the great landowners, whether of the aristocracy or the Church. It was intentionally designed to shear off the privileges of those who had thrived on monopoly through many generations.

In the turmoil of liberation the Hungarian nobles had already suffered important losses. The majority of their ancient castles and baronial mansions had been systematically looted, either by Russian troops or by their own peasants, who stripped them of valuables and frequently even chopped up the antique furniture for firewood. Once-glittering halls were left empty hulks. It was a high price for having failed to comprehend that they really lived in the twentieth century.

On the heels of this the agrarian revolution stripped the nobility and the Church orders of their land. In the process the state took over 1,509 castles and manor houses and some 11,000 acres of adjacent private parks. The government proposed to convert them into hospitals, sanitoriums, schools or perhaps proletarian rest homes. But since many of them are gutted and unusable this will remain merely a project for a future day.

The Land Reform law contains promises of compensation, but it does not make specific commitments as to how much the com-

pensation will be. A special compensation fund will be set up, its source being the instalment payments which the new peasant owners will make over a period of 10 years. The peasants, however, were given three years of grace before the first payment comes due. Meanwhile members of the nobility are well-nigh penniless; and in Hungary's present economic straits the amount of compensation they can expect in the future is small indeed.

The redistribution of these vast lands inevitably created a great deal of economic dislocation. Yet what the long-landless peasants accomplished in their first season of ownership is truly surprising. Most of the tools and machinery belonging on the estates disappeared in the chaos of war. Half of the nation's cattle and horses had been taken, or eaten up. Fertilizer was lacking. It was a fairly common sight last spring to see peasant men and women drawing ploughs themselves, since they possessed no draft animals. To a remarkable degree, the incentive of personal ownership compensated for lack of equipment. As a result, 70 percent of the prewar acreage was planted in 1946. Due to the disastrous drought, lasting all summer, the harvest in principal crops was reduced to about half the prewar level.

The Land Reform was accompanied by some excesses. In many places the peasants did not wait for the law to come into operation, but simply seized the land they had labored on all their lives and divided it up among themselves. In this they often violated a provision of the law against splitting up any parcel of 142 acres or less. Once they had the land in their grasp, they refused to budge. The Government then weakly amended the law, legalizing illegal seizures made before January 1, 1946.

According to government statistics some 1,422,000 acres of the nation's land were owned, as of 1935, by Roman Catholic orders and organizations; and since then only slight changes had occurred. How much of these large and rich properties has the Church lost, and what changes have the losses imposed upon Church organizations? To obtain an authoritative answer to these questions I journeyed to the ancient ecclesiastical center of Esztergom to consult the Primate of Hungary, Jozsef Cardinal Mindszenty. He received me in his magnificent Palace overlooking the Danube — a slender and imposing figure with an ascetic face, swiftly intense speech and piercing dark eyes. Among Hungarians this extremely Magyar churchman has a reputation for great outspokenness, which is said sometimes to arouse

criticism in the Vatican. (Parenthetically, about 60 percent of the Hungarian people are Catholics.)

Cardinal Mindszenty confirmed to me that the Roman Catholic properties expropriated under the Land Reform totalled 1,108,700 acres, or one-seventh of all the expropriated feudal estates. Somewhat more than half of these church lands had been forests; the remainder were agricultural. Thus the church lands had been reduced to something more than 300,000 acres. The seizure of the forests by the state was, in the Cardinal's opinion, chiefly a pretext, since "the people couldn't use the forests." I learned, however, that the coal and other mines owned by church orders often were located in the wooded lands. These, with the orchards and vineyards and tillable soil, had provided the chief support for church institutions for several centuries. Now this predominant source of church funds has been cut off.

But the Roman Catholic Church's source of support in Hungary has been reduced in other ways also. The large Hungarian landowners had always contributed generously and through taxes to church institutions. The new peasant owners of small parcels of land cannot make profits like those formerly netted on the great estates. Thus the second largest source of church support has also disappeared. The only income for church colleges, schools, monasteries and other activities now remaining comes from the taxes which Catholic parishioners traditionally pay, from their modest special contributions, and from state subsidies. It is evident that the agrarian revolution has stripped the Church of its ancient wealth quite as radically as it has stripped the nobility.

The favored position of the Roman Catholic Church under feudalism meant that parochial education was exceptionally widespread in Hungary. Over 50 percent of the elementary schools were operated by orders like the Benedictines, Jesuits and Cistercians and by female religious orders. In the villages, elementary schools were supported by local Catholic parents' organizations, though the government also contributed. Church-directed secondary schools and Catholic seminaries were likewise very numerous. These educational institutions were well equipped and housed, and their adequate or abundant funds enabled them to provide relatively large numbers of pupils with free tuition and many with free rooms and board. A similar situation existed in the Church universities and in other institutions for training

teachers, priests and nuns. In general, church educational institutions were better off financially than almost any others in the country.

As a result of war and inflation, Catholic parents today are often too poor to supply their children even with the proper clothes to send them to a seminary or Church college. These institutions, in turn, have become so short of funds that free board or even free tuition is becoming impossible. Meanwhile there is agitation in Budapest for a sharp reduction in the number of religious educational institutions and an increase in non-sectarian state-supported schools. Thus the predominant educational position of the Church is, after many generations, being challenged both economically and in the name of modern democracy.

That this development was bound to come if land reform came was recognized early by many church leaders, who therefore opposed the breaking down of the great estates. During the decisive electoral campaign of 1945 Cardinal Mindszenty issued a pastoral letter in which he warned against "the vindictive nature" of the proposed land reform. I have heard a number of Hungarian Catholics say that the Cardinal, in defending the old order so ardently, committed a serious tactical error. He seemed to be denying the need for a redistribution of the land. Even the strongly Catholic peasants could not agree with that, and voted overwhelmingly the other way.

There are other changes in the situation of the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary. Until the Nazis closed down its publications in October 1944 there existed no less than 17 Catholic daily papers and more than 40 weekly or monthly publications. The postwar government has ruled that only political parties can publish daily newspapers. As a result the Church is now limited to two weekly publications. As with the land, the pendulum has swung from one great extreme to the other.

A Hungarian who has followed every aspect of the land reform with close attention made this comment to me: "I am a good Catholic and I think it is sad that church lands had to be taken. But I believe the Church renders a greater service where it is poor. In the course of the past century French Catholicism has demonstrated this most impressively. Here in Hungary the Church could have done more for the common people, but its leaders always had one eye on their properties. Very often they hesitated to take any strong stand for the people, for fear the

Government would expropriate their lands. I believe our Church now has a greater opportunity than before to serve the Hungarian people."

An official summary, prepared in the Hungarian Ministry of Agriculture and describing the land reform as virtually completed as of September 1, 1946, provides some interesting facts.

More than 34 percent of the present territory of Hungary has been redistributed. The total of expropriated and confiscated lands together is 7,962,000 acres. The key facts, however, are that 4,633,000 *tillable* acres have been redistributed and that 642,000 individuals and families have obtained separate parcels. Claims for 150,000 house plots were also legalized. As of the date mentioned, some 21,000 rightful claimants still awaited land allotments.

In spite of the foregoing, the number of landless peasants is still very large. The most needy categories of peasants were the hired farm hands and so-called agricultural laborers, and the owners of farm parcels so small that they were below subsistence levels (dwarf estates). In these three categories 584,000 persons received land. But according to 1930 census figures no less than 1,326,000 such persons were landless or in need of additional land. Consequently, for all the drastic provisions of the Land Reform, there remain today something like 750,000 peasants completely or largely unreached by the redistribution. The government summary frankly recognizes this insuperable obstacle — that there is not nearly enough agricultural land in Hungary to go around. "In view of the small sizes of the new farms," it states, "only a fraction of the landless peasants will find work with landowners. Therefore the number of persons who neither own land nor have an opportunity to obtain agricultural work can be estimated at 100,000."

A second observation is equally discouraging: "In consequence of the large number of claimants, the average size of allocations hardly exceeded 7.1 acres . . . to landless peasants and farm laborers but 6.9 acres, and to owners of dwarf farms but 5.54 acres. This unfortunate circumstance had the result that *the size of the majority of allotments is below the size required for the maintenance of an average peasant family.*"

The meaning of these hard facts is clear. It is recognized by agronomists that 12½ acres of average land constitute an absolute minimum upon which a farmer can make an adequate (sub-

sistence) living for himself and family. Yet even after all the vast acreage of the former feudal estates has been liquidated there simply is not enough tillable soil for Hungary's impoverished peasants. As a result, the great majority even of those who have received land could not be given enough to bring them up to the security minimum of $12\frac{1}{2}$ acres per individual. Some 109,000 farm hands may scrape by with their average of 11.9 acres. But 261,000 formerly landless agricultural workers could obtain an average of only 6.9 acres. The 213,000 dwarf farmers had their holdings augmented on an average by only 5.5 acres, leaving many of them short of a total of $12\frac{1}{2}$ acres. Moreover, there remain perhaps 100,000 farm workers who cannot now hope to be employed on the small parcels of the new landholders.

All this means that several hundred thousands of peasant families must struggle desperately along with less than the average which would put them on a subsistence level. When they find that they simply cannot make ends meet, what then? And supposing the Czechs send back to Hungary some 300,000 Hungarians, mostly peasants, now living within Czech borders? How can these people possibly be given land or work?

The Hungarian agrarian problem thus is still far from solved. Hungarian specialists confess they see only two alternatives: farm coöperatives; or national collectivization of the land as in the Soviet Union.

Up to now there have been no signs that the Communist-dominated government in Budapest plans to introduce collectivization. But many Hungarians have their fingers crossed. In their view the Communist leaders must regard redistribution of the land as a prelude to eventual establishment of collective farms, just as it proved to be in the U.S.S.R. When the under-acred peasants have tried the impossible for some seasons, these persons expect a propaganda drive for collectivization. They say the Communists must certainly have the Soviet pattern of agrarian economy in the back of their minds. They ask if there is any way to avoid its application in Hungary.

In the opinion of democratic-minded agrarian experts in Budapest the only hope of staving off establishment of a Soviet land system in Hungary is by building up a strong and broad network of farm coöperatives. If the peasants could be persuaded and taught to pool their work, resources and marketing — dividing equitably their group profits — certainly a much greater

measure of rural prosperity would be achieved. But the wise preachments in favor of a coöperative movement fall for the most part on very resistant ears. The task of selling the coöperative idea to peasants who have just got legal ownership of a piece of land for the first time, and after their forebears had been land-starved for centuries, is a colossal job. The Magyar peasant rates among the most confirmed of "rugged individualists" on earth. He has an acute distrust of anything "big people" or city folk — feudal landlords or government representatives — may propose for his benefit. He is convinced he knows better than anyone else how to grow his crops. He wants to grow what he wants to grow, and when and how he wants to. If he has good horses and good ploughs, why share them with his neighbor? Pooled marketing? Why trust some other peasant, as community representative, to get better prices than he himself could get?

In order to promote a large-scale coöperative farm movement three things are necessary: sizable government funds; a broad educational program; and a farming folk sufficiently enlightened to be receptive. In present-day Hungary all three of these conditions are lacking, and none of them can be secured except over a period of years of concentrated, planned effort.

The newly-created little farms do not have the benefit of modern machinery — tractors, threshing machines, reapers and the like. The feudal landlords seldom bothered to modernize their equipment. What has become commonplace to Russian peasants on the great Soviet collective farms remains utterly unknown to most Hungarians. They have always planted and harvested the hard, long, now outmoded way. Unless large groups of them pool their resources in collectives they cannot possibly afford tractors and reapers.

When you go out into the Hungarian provinces and inspect these miniature new farms and old-fashioned tools, and when you consider the crusty individualism of the peasants who work them, you wonder how coöperatives can possibly win out against such odds. In the long view collectivization after the Soviet pattern would seem a much more probable final solution. But Magyars who know the Magyar character and the peasant nature thoroughly are nevertheless convinced the Hungarian peasants would resist collectivization with bloodshed. They insist it could only be imposed by force.

The question arises whether the Budapest Communists,

backed by the Soviets, are quietly waiting for a propitious moment to introduce collectivization. So far their astute leader, Matthias Rakosi, has maintained a discreet silence; but he and his colleagues are regarded by their fellow-countrymen as Leninist-Stalinists who adhere very closely to the Moscow pattern and policy on every major issue. As ardent Marxists, they must necessarily be expected to envisage collectivization at the opportune moment. There seems no reason to suppose that the Soviet Government favors a different agrarian goal in Hungary or Rumania or Bulgaria than in its own neighboring homeland.

Thus the Hungarian Land Reform poses a question of very great political and sociological importance. Pointing to what happened to Russia's peasants in the first decade after the Bolshevik Revolution, observers feel that the liquidation of the big feudal landlords will prove simply the interim stage before collectivization. This viewpoint has been bolstered in recent weeks by the charges of "plots" made by Hungarian Communists and by their arrest of many deputies and members of the Smallholders Party. If this majority party can be split, Communist control of the Budapest Government might easily become almost absolute. In such circumstances collectivization of the land would seem a step nearer. Yet it still would risk peasant opposition and unpredictable disorders.

On the other hand, the worst drought in this century dealt a terrible blow to the newly-landed little farmers last summer, and now they have had a hungry, bitter winter. Tilling their inadequate parcels of soil, they are likely year by year to become increasingly more disillusioned. In this sense time puts a strong wind into Marxist collectivization sails.

A prominent professor of economics in Budapest assured me that Hungary's present tillable acres could produce twice as much in crops — thereby supporting the present population at a much higher level — *if* the country's farming were placed upon a modern, scientific basis. "Under the big landowners," he said, "Hungary's agriculture was very badly handled. Little money was spent on modern improvements. Vast acreages were permitted to decline or revert to pasture when they could no longer produce a fair crop. The average weight of produce per acre in Hungary is much below the European average. Irrigation is urgently needed. Much land could be put back into productivity if this were provided."

But how are hundreds of thousands of ill-educated former farm hands and former tenant farmers to learn the importance of such measures? And where would they get the capital, acting individually? Only an ambitious government program for coöperatives and a large-scale state-supported modernization project could make real progress in this direction. The Government's serious financial situation prohibits this. It will continue to prohibit it without western loans. But these in turn are prohibited by current Soviet policies in the Danubian countries.

Hungary's long-needed Land Reform thus emerges as an ironical and confounding paradox. The indefensible abuses of the feudal system have been removed but have been replaced with equally great problems. More than 600,000 peasants have land at last, or a little more land than the little they previously had; but they still do not have the decent and adequate livelihood of which they dreamed. Independent ownership of a few precious acres cannot begin to provide them with real or complete independence. If there were sufficient time, the coöperative way might bring them salvation and the first democracy they had ever known.

But the Danubian peoples are caught in the very center of a stern political and ideological struggle for the mastery of their destinies. Contrasted with this present intense struggle the period between the wars was one of relative tranquillity. Looking back, we see that it offered a unique opportunity for the establishment of a truly democratic agrarianism based upon broad individual ownership of the land. In Hungary that opportunity was not taken. Today it has dwindled to a shadow of what it was in the 1920's and 1930's.

NATIONALISM AND POLITICS IN MALAYA

By P. T. Bauer

THE controversial issues in Malaya which came to a head in 1946 were constitutional in character, bearing on the status of the Straits Settlements and the Malay States within the British Empire. But beneath the legal aspect of the question are complex political, economic and racial problems. They involve the relationship of Chinese and Indian immigrants to the native Malay population and the relation of all these to the white man, whose prestige, here as elsewhere in the east, was damaged considerably by the events of the Second World War.


The group of territories commonly called British Malaya comprised in 1941 the crown colony of the Straits Settlements and the British-protected Malay States. The Straits Settlements include the islands of Singapore and Penang, and Malacca and Province Wellesley on the mainland. These settlements are former British, Dutch and Portuguese trading posts which came under British rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As in all other crown colonies, the British Crown exercised full sovereignty. The chief administrative officer was the Governor of the Straits Settlements. A person born in the Straits Settlements (as in all other crown colonies) was *de jure* a British subject.

There were in 1941 four Federated Malay States and six Unfederated States.¹ They were not trading communities but producers of staple raw materials, notably rubber and tin ore, coconuts and palm oil. Formally, they were British protected states, not colonies. Their political relations with the British Empire date from the second half of the nineteenth century, when British intervention in the affairs of the almost wholly undeveloped Malayan mainland took place, generally in response to appeals by participants in local quarrels. The expeditions usually ended with the conclusion of a treaty with the local ruler. These treaties were the legal basis of the relation between Great Britain and the Malay States down to 1941.

With small variations the treaties provided that the local

¹ The four Federated States were Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang; the six Unfederated were Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, Perlis and Brunei — the last named, however, actually in Borneo.

rulers would retain legal sovereignty, but would accept the "advice" of a British officer in all matters, foreign and domestic, except those relating to the Mohammedan religion or to Malay custom. Since nominal sovereignty belonged to the Sultan, he was immune from process in English courts; and persons born in these states were not British subjects, but only "British-protected" persons. The senior British officer (whose advice the Sultans were treaty-bound to accept) was the Resident in each Federated State and the Adviser in each Unfederated State.



The chief civil officer for the territory as a whole was the High Commissioner; this post was held ex officio by the Governor of the Straits Settlements.

The decades following the conclusion of the treaties were a period of spectacular progress in the Malay States. Most of the treaties had been signed before a single rubber plantation was established in Malaya, but now the rubber and tin industries grew rapidly. This development was accompanied by a heavy influx of foreign capital (largely British and Chinese) and until

1930 by heavy Chinese and Indian immigration. Instead of Malay settlements along the rivers in the midst of uninhabited jungle, there appeared the thriving communities of western Malaya, with a cosmopolitan Chinese, Indian and Malay population.

The Chinese population appreciably exceeded the Malays by 1941 in British Malaya as a whole, as well as in the Federated Malay States and in Johore, the largest and most important of the Unfederated States. In the other Unfederated States the majority of the population was still Malay. In Malaya as a whole including the Straits Settlements, the Malays were about 41 percent of the total population of about 5,500,000, the Chinese about 43 percent and the Indians 14 percent. Industry and trade were largely in Chinese hands. Chinese capital and labor also played a pioneer part in tin mining and rubber planting. The industry, efficiency and toil of the Chinese capitalists and the workers were largely responsible for the economic development of the country. The Malays benefited materially from the general progress, but nonetheless were left far behind.

The economic growth of the country brought administrative centralization. The constituent states of the federation became shadowy entities, and political authority gradually shifted from the Residents to the Chief Secretary in Kuala Lumpur, the capital. Two schools of thought on the position of the Malays and on the duties of the British administration gradually appeared. According to one, Malaya (or at any rate the Malayan mainland) should still be viewed as a collection of states in which the Malays rightfully had a privileged position, where the Sultans were sovereigns and where, in other words, the Chinese and Indians were only tolerated guests in a country belonging to the Malays. This school favored political and administrative decentralization, and the broadening of existing Malay privileges such as a monopoly of land ownership in certain areas, a monopoly of posts in the Malay Administrative Service, special representation on the various federal and state councils, and so on. According to the rival school, the Malayan mainland was one country, created politically and economically during the half-century before 1930, and the Malays were only one of several nations or races composing it. The former was called the pro-Malay or devolutionist school; the latter was sometimes called the pan-Malayan school. There was much strenuous argument between them, in public and behind the scenes.

For a variety of reasons most of the British administrators belonged to the pro-Malay school. They considered that their primary duty was to the Malays, whose ancestors (even if not the original settlers of the country) had been in Malaya well before the masses of the Chinese and Indian immigrants. The majority of the British in the east have a decided preference for Malay manners and customs against those of the Chinese and Indians. This reinforced the natural sympathy for the weakest race; moreover, there were many undesirable elements and downright criminals among the immigrants, especially among the Chinese. There was also a conscious or unconscious economic basis for the pro-Malay attitude. The Malays, unlike the Chinese, were not economic competitors of the British in Malaya. Adequate Chinese substitutes could have been found without too much difficulty for many of the lucrative posts held by British businessmen or administrators in the east, and they would have done the work at half the price of the Europeans. The business community was divided on this issue, however, since the advantages of centralized administration told in favor of the pan-Malayan school.

When nationalist sentiment in China and India grew stronger in the 1920's and Kuomintang flags were flying from Chinese houses in Malaya and Congress flags from most Indian dwellings, the British administrators were especially reluctant to abandon the policy of strengthening the Malays through the grant of special privileges. The principal loyalty of the Chinese and Indians lay outside Malaya, they pointed out. It was true; but it was equally true that until the discrimination against the Chinese and the Indians was abandoned, these races could not be expected to consider Malaya their home. There was clearly no easy way out of this vicious circle.

After about 1925, the pro-Malay or devolutionist school made rapid headway. The right of the Malays to a privileged position was forcefully stated in two important government reports, one in 1928 by Mr. Ormsby Gore (now Lord Harlech), then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies,² and the other in 1932 by Sir Samuel Wilson, then Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the Colonial Office.³

At the same time a number of important pro-Malay speeches

² "Report by the Rt. Hon. W. G. A. Ormsby Gore, M.P., on his Visit to Malaya, Ceylon and Java during the year 1928." Cmd. 3235 of 1928, p. 17-18.

³ "Report of Sir Samuel Wilson on his Visit to Malaya in 1932." Cmd. 4276 of 1933, p. 12.

were also made by the leading Malayan administrators, notably by Sir Cecil Clementi, who was Governor and High Commissioner from 1930 to 1934. A number of pro-Malay and devolutionist measures followed swiftly. The most important of these were designed to assimilate the Federated Malay States to the Unfederated States, and to strengthen the Malay rule in each state by means of decentralization.

II

When the Japanese attacked Malaya in 1941 the British pledge to protect the Malay States was put to the test for the first time. It could not be honored, largely owing to insufficient resources and to heavy commitments elsewhere. More competent leadership might have retarded the swift Japanese progress on the mainland, but it is unlikely that the outcome could have been reversed with the resources available. The military defeat, and the unsatisfactory behavior of many members of the European population in Malaya, naturally resulted in a severe loss of prestige which has not yet been made good. While some of the sensational stories of the conduct of Europeans in Malaya were unfounded (as was obvious at the time) the element of truth in others was sufficient to engender much bitterness among the Asiatic population.

So far as is known, no official inquiry has yet been held into this matter, but it would appear to be true, for instance, that the great majority of the European population of Penang, officials and unofficials alike, were covertly evacuated before the fall of the island, while the Asiatics were not warned of its impending surrender, though for political and personal reasons many were very anxious to get away. This appears to have been only one instance among several of the kind. There were outstanding instances of Europeans who felt that their duty was to share the fate of the population entrusted to their care, and who stayed at their posts; but there were enough incidents of a contrary sort to make the loss of prestige even greater than it need have been if there had been only a severe military reverse.

The Japanese received comparatively little assistance from the Asiatic population in their advance, though there were some Malay fifth columnists. During the Japanese occupation, resistance groups were formed in various parts of the Malayan mainland, very largely by Chinese. The most important of these was

the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Association (M.P.A.J.A.), which received some kind of recognition from the allied military authorities and was supplied with arms by parachute. The control of this organization was largely in the hands of Chinese Communists. Its actual military operations were of no consequence, but its members did some good work in looking after the remnants of British forces who escaped capture, and in transmitting some military information to the Allies. The main activities of the organization, however, were directed to terrorizing the rural population, particularly the Malays. While the M.P.A.J.A. managed to kill an occasional Japanese, the arms were chiefly used to extort money and goods from the villagers or else were kept in store for postwar use.

The unexpectedly sudden collapse of the Japanese in August 1945 left the country without effective administration for several months. The M.P.A.J.A. and other Communist-sponsored organizations established an unbridled reign of terror, massacring their personal and political enemies and holding the population to heavy ransom. Their ranks were reinforced by thousands who had not even been nominal resisters during the Japanese occupation. The activities of these Communist groups were directed partly against wealthy Asiatics of all races and against Malays in general. They also conducted bitter anti-British and anti-American propaganda along established Communist lines.

Order had not yet been restored in large parts of the country when Sir Harold MacMichael, a former High Commissioner for Palestine, arrived in Malaya as special emissary of the Colonial Office to conclude a series of treaties with the Malay rulers to supersede the existing treaties between Great Britain and the several Malay States. He spent 82 days in Malaya, and arranged 10 treaties with the rulers of the 10 Malay States. In these the rulers abandoned their nominal sovereignty and agreed that the British Crown "shall have full power and jurisdiction" in their several states. In effect, they consented to direct rule by the British Crown. In legal terms, the Malay States ceased to be protected states and became colonial protectorates; the British Crown now exercises full sovereignty and the chief civil officer is the governor, not the high commissioner. In administrative matters there is no difference between a colonial protectorate and a crown colony, though a person born in a colonial protectorate is not a British subject.

The circumstances which led to the signing of these treaties are somewhat obscure, but it is very widely believed that the rulers acted under duress. Some of them have said this explicitly; and indeed, the MacMichael report itself contains a broad hint that duress was used in the State of Kedah. When it is remembered that most of the rulers had been on their thrones during the Japanese régime, and that their recognition by Great Britain was by no means a foregone conclusion, it will readily be realized that there was an opportunity for exercising pressure. Even if duress was not used, the legal validity of two of the treaties is doubtful, since the States of Johore and Trengganu were constitutional monarchies, and the monarch had no power to surrender any part of the nominal sovereignty.

The MacMichael report does not explain why new treaties had to replace the old ones. It states that the former treaties did not concede direct rights of jurisdiction in the Malay States to the British Government, but only the right to tender advice. "The resultant state of affairs," the report declares, ". . . rendered the processes of administration somewhat cumbrous and complex and His Majesty's Government had become convinced that some measure of simplification was required. . . . Moreover, it was clear that, although the special position of the indigenous Malays needed to be safeguarded, reforms were overdue in the system of representation in order to permit the claims of other races, Chinese and Indian for the most part, who even in the Peninsula and apart from Singapore, had come to form at least half the total population, to receive reasonable satisfaction."⁴

III

Implementing the avowed aim of the MacMichael report — to lead the Peninsula as a united country toward self-government — an official British White Paper of 1946⁵ proposed the supersession of the Straits Settlements and of the Malay States by two separate colonies, or rather by a crown colony and a colonial protectorate — Singapore and the Malayan Union. It confirmed the loss of the nominal sovereignty of the Sultans and envisaged complete administrative centralization within the

⁴ Sir Harold MacMichael, "Report on a Mission to Malaya." Colonial No. 194. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, February 1946.

⁵ "Malayan Union and Singapore." Cmd. 6724.

Malayan Union. The Union itself was to comprise the Malay States of the mainland and the former settlements of Penang, Malacca and Province Wellesley. It also visualized the creation of a Malayan Union citizenship, to be extended to all persons born in the Malayan Union or Singapore or who had resided there for ten years out of the 15 years preceding the establishment of the new citizenship; and in the future, Malayan Union citizenship would be acquired on five years' residence.

The MacMichael treaties, with the White Paper, represented of course a complete *volte face* of the pro-Malay policy, and aroused a storm of protest among the Malays. A United Malay National Organization (U.M.N.O.) was formed to agitate for a revision of these arrangements. In the northern Unfederated States the sentiment against the proposed policies was strengthened by the memories of the comparatively recent semi-independence of these territories under the nominal Siamese rule. In Johore, at the other end of the Peninsula, the feeling was fanned by the acute communal tension which had grown up, apparently as a result of the activities of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Association and the Communist terror of the autumn of 1945. The general revulsion of feeling engendered by the activities of the Chinese Communists has actually proved a great boon to the U.M.N.O. and to the Malay sympathizers generally, even though only a small fraction of the Chinese were active participants. The fact that under the new citizenship proposals it might no longer be possible to deport undesirable elements among the Chinese has influenced many to oppose them.

Although the U.M.N.O. is a nationwide movement and apparently well organized, it could not have made much headway had its leaders not had the astuteness to enlist the active support, as advisers, of several leading representatives of the former pro-Malay school. In particular, they succeeded in obtaining the assistance of Mr. Roland Braddell, a leading Singapore constitutional lawyer, and perhaps even more important, the help of Sir Theodore Adams, a former high officer of the Malayan Civil Service, who had had lifelong experience in Malaya and was well known both for his forceful personality and for his strong pro-Malay views. The British supporters of the U.M.N.O., and particularly Adams and Braddell, greatly enhanced its effectiveness.

Intense agitation against the MacMichael treaties and the White Paper proposals continued throughout the spring and

summer of 1946, and by the middle of the year it was clear that the policy would have to be altered. In August a constitutional conference was called in Kuala Lumpur. The Malays were represented by the leaders of U.M.N.O. and their chief European advisers, and the leading officers of the Malayan Union administration represented the Government.

The agreed recommendations of the constitutional conference were made public in Malaya toward the end of December 1946; at the time of writing, summaries only are available in London, and the proposals have not yet been incorporated in a White Paper or in a Government statement to the House of Commons. The proposals are much in accordance with expectations. The Malayan Union is to be replaced by a federation of the various Malay States and of the Settlements of Penang, Malacca and Province Wellesley. The Sultans are to remain rulers of their States and their nominal sovereignty will be restored, but they will have to accept the advice of the High Commissioner of the Federation on all matters except those touching on Mohammedan religion or Malay custom. It would appear from these proposals that the MacMichael treaties will be abrogated; and, of course, the Malayan Union White Paper will be withdrawn. The citizenship requirements are to be tightened up very considerably. The proposed qualifications include: 15 years' residence out of the previous 25 years; ability to speak English or Malay; a declaration of permanent settlement, as well as evidence of good character. There are also provisions for legislative and executive councils. While the retention of their nominal sovereignty by the Sultans is probably of considerable sentimental value and thus of political importance, the changes in the requirements for citizenship are probably of greater significance in substance.

These stricter conditions seem eminently reasonable. It is noted, however, that the proposals envisage the retention of dual citizenship; thus a British or a Chinese subject may acquire Malayan citizenship without renunciation of British or Chinese nationality. This seems, on the face of it, an important concession by the Malays and their advisers, and is a provision which may eventually prove troublesome. It should be noted that these are the proposals of the British-Malay constitutional committee only and will still have to be considered by the other communities before they can be accepted by the British Government.

IV

Whatever the final outcome of the constitutional discussions, the fundamental, economic, political and racial problems will not be greatly affected by such changes as the substitution of "union" for "federation," by changes in the requirements for citizenship, or changes in the degree of administrative centralization. It may not even matter very much whether the Malay States remain Protected States or become a Colonial Protectorate. The outstanding problem is and will remain that of finding a basis for a reasonable measure of unity and common sentiment in Malaya, and of ensuring for this community the loyalty of the Chinese population, its most active and vigorous section.

Malaya may be caught between two nationalisms: a Malay nationalism, centering in Indonesia, and a rival Chinese nationalism turning toward China. This is, of course, a threat to which multi-community countries are often exposed. Recent developments have enhanced this danger in Malaya. The growth of nationalism throughout Asia, the consolidation of various Chinese factions into the Kuomintang and the Communist groups; the Indonesian revolt, the strife engendered by the activities of the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Association, the fillip to Malay nationalism by the MacMichael procedure and proposals and the loss of European prestige following the temporary Japanese occupation of Malaya have all accentuated racial tension in Malaya and may continue to do so.

The activities of the Communists partly reinforce the communal tension and partly cut across the communal division. The Communist movement in Malaya is very largely Chinese, with some Indian participation. The Communists are intensely disliked by the Malays; but they are also disliked by the Kuomintang supporters among the Chinese, and these are still more numerous than the Communists among the Chinese in Malaya. As in so many other countries, it is difficult to gauge the strength of the Communists in Malaya. The offices of the Communist Party and of its numerous subsidiary organizations can be found in very many places in Malaya and often in quite small villages. Many of these organizations are of mushroom growth and are, indeed, often of the nature of a stage army. Yet it is difficult to accept the view widely held by Malayan administrators that when rice and consumer goods become more freely available the

Communist movement will be reduced to insignificance, or even disappear altogether. The Communists had some following among Chinese workers in Singapore in 1939-40, and it is certain that this influence has increased. Communists strength is, however, still insufficient to render them an important factor in the political life of the country during the next few years, and the opposition of the tens of thousands of small capitalists, traders and artisans among the Chinese (especially the Hokkien Chinese), as well as the hostility of the Malays, is likely to restrict their growth. But they may remain a disturbing factor in the economic life of the country and enhance the difficulties of the rubber estates, the tin companies, and the Malayan administrators.

In the future, communal tension in Malaya may also be exacerbated by economic difficulties. The prosperity of the country was an important reason for the comparative absence of communal tension before 1941. During the next few years the Malayan economy may have to contend with some unfavorable developments. The entrepot trade of Singapore and Penang would suffer as a result of a world-wide tendency toward regimentation and self-sufficiency, and it is likely to be adversely affected by the political disturbances in the Netherlands East Indies and in French Indo-China. The present shortage of supplies, besides curtailing the current consumption of all classes, also retards the rehabilitation of the tin industry and inflates the cost of production of both rubber and tin by leading to demands for higher money wages. But much the most important adverse changes from prewar days are likely to occur in the rubber industry. The production of synthetic rubber in the United States will set a lower ceiling to prices and profits than in the past, though it is not likely to oust the natural product. A graver threat to the Malayan rubber industry is implied in the dramatic rise of low-cost producers of natural rubber, among whom the native producers in Sumatra and Borneo are the most important. According to the latest official Dutch figures, the native rubber smallholdings in Sumatra and Borneo totalled 3,200,000 acres in 1940, equal to the total area under rubber in Malaya, estates and smallholdings together. Henceforth it will not be easy to suppress competition from these producers by restriction schemes operated by, and largely in the interests of, European-owned estates. The Malayan rubber industry may also have to face low-cost competition from Siam, Sarawak and French Indo-China. Even if restriction is re-

imposed, which is doubtful, its terms will be less favorable to Malaya, and especially to the Malayan estates, than they were before 1941.

In these conditions the administrators are faced with an extremely difficult task in trying to establish a common Malayan loyalty and sentiment among the three main races of Malaya. Reasonable access for Chinese to responsible positions in both the administrative and technical grades of the public service is probably the most important requirement of a wise approach to this overriding objective. Until Chinese are admitted to posts of responsibility and dignity in the public service, it will be hard to break down the almost general assumption of the Chinese in Malaya that financial success is the only test of ability. Here again, the present administrators may be confronted with a vicious circle, but it is one which must be broken and the Chinese should be given access to senior positions in the public service even at the risk of some failures. Free and adequate education for the children of all races, and not of Malay children only, is an important prerequisite. This has been a contentious issue in the past, but it is a reform which is overdue and to which the Malays would probably not object.

Questions of land tenure will raise difficult but not insoluble issues. The extensive Malay reservations should probably be retained, but otherwise the land should be alienated freely to Chinese and Indians already settled in Malaya. The transformation of a proportion of the landless Chinese and Indian workers in Malaya into peasant proprietors, especially into owners of rubber-growing smallholdings, would make an important contribution to the social and political stability of the country, again without damaging Malay interests.

This last point raises the whole question of the restrictionist rubber policies pursued in Malaya for the last 25 years. Since the introduction of the Stevenson scheme in 1922, a strong bias in favor of restriction manifested itself in statutory restriction of exports, output and planting, and in severe curtailment of the issue of land titles for rubber cultivation. Some of these policies were unilateral on the part of Malaya, and contributed largely to the spectacular rise of the low-cost producing territories which may come very near to squeezing Malaya out as a producer of natural rubber in a few years' time. The restrictionist policies impaired the competitive strength of the Malayan rubber in-

dustry; they also had important adverse effects on the social stability of the country by preventing the expansion of the small-holdings and favoring cultivation by large estates — high-cost producers operated with large alien labor forces.

The restrictionist bias of the rubber policy adopted in Malaya is again manifest today, as some key provisions of the defunct international rubber regulation scheme, notably the prohibition of new planting, are still in force unilaterally in Malaya. As this territory has now less than one-third of the world acreage under rubber, unilateral restriction is certain to be highly disadvantageous, and might even be disastrous. Its adoption is an eloquent tribute to the political power of the high-cost producers (the European-owned estates) in Malaya. A reversal of this policy is essential for the economic future of the country.

A policy of admission of Chinese into higher positions in the public service and of alienation of land for rubber growing by Chinese and Indian workers, while beneficial for the country as a whole, would infringe on European preserves. It would reduce the number of lucrative posts reserved for British administrators and, more important still, would adversely affect the capital value of the European rubber estates. But the issues at stake are too great to permit such considerations to exercise an undue influence.

It would also seem important that the authorities, as well as private employers, should exercise somewhat greater care than before in the selection of recruits, both for the public service and for private employment. Malaya has had many great public servants devoted to the country and to its people, for whom they felt a genuine affection which was often sincerely reciprocated. But the standard was not uniformly high, and in the years before the recent war there were officers in high position in the service who were mediocrities or worse. An official inquiry in 1939-40 uncovered widespread corruption among senior European officers of the Mines Department. Nor was the unofficial European community of the 1930's of a kind likely to inspire the respect or the confidence of the Asiatic population. In view of the loss of European prestige since 1941 and of the many difficulties to be faced over the next few years, it is most important that high standards of tact, competence, understanding and integrity should be demanded in the recruitment of European officials, commercial employees and planters. There are few signs that this is yet appreciated fully in Malaya. In fact the quality of some

officers appointed in 1946 after service with the British Military Administration is disappointing, and it is evident that some of these recruits accepted posts in Malaya only because they (rightly) considered their chances of good employment in Britain to be definitely poor.

v

There is reason to fear, then, that before very long Malaya may have to face great economic, political and social difficulties. Present conditions in Malaya are, however, in remarkable contrast to those in the Netherlands East Indies, or in French Indo-China, and some explanation of this contrast seems to be called for. Why is it that while large sections of the populations of those other areas are fighting desperately to prevent a return of the Dutch and the French, the inhabitants of Malaya have generally welcomed the British and have shown no signs of hostility, with the exception of the Communists and their affiliates?

According to a widespread Dutch opinion, the explanation lies solely in differences in power: while the British arrived in Malaya with large and well-armed forces at the time of the Japanese surrender, no ships could be found (possibly through half-intentional malice by the British) to take substantial Dutch forces to Java and Sumatra where, moreover, the Japanese distributed large quantities of arms to terrorist elements among the population. This explanation is quite inadequate. Not only did large sections of the Indonesian population in the Netherlands East Indies offer determined resistance even after the arrival of substantial forces, but the whole atmosphere in the country and the spirit with which the people received the Dutch were very different from that in Malaya. When one talks frankly and privately to the Asiatics in Malaya they sometimes criticize the British administration freely, and emphasize the social, political and economic discrimination against non-Europeans. But even in this criticism there is often a friendly undertone, and there is certainly a notable absence of the bitterness and hatred which is so often felt against the Dutch by the Indonesians, and which is a driving force behind the Indonesian resistance. This seems paradoxical, since in the Netherlands East Indies Eurasians and Asiatics have occasionally risen to high and responsible positions from which they were barred in Malaya. Again, unlike the British, the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies identified

themselves with the country whose fate they were prepared to share, as was shown in 1942 when with a few exceptions of hand-picked key-men, they stayed at their posts, or at least in the country when it was overrun.

But this is not the whole picture. While individual natives and Eurasians had better prospects for advancement in the Netherlands East Indies than in Malaya, the general run of the inhabitants were treated far worse, and indeed often with a brutality which was most unusual in Malaya. This difference in the treatment of the masses of the people may have flowed from differences in the national temperament or in the upbringing of the British and the Dutch; or it may have reflected the comparative scarcity of population in Malaya against the overpopulation of Java, which rendered Indonesian life and labor cheap. But whatever the underlying cause, there was a notable difference in the treatment of the people by the British and the Dutch, and the attitude of the latter to the native population was certainly at least partly responsible for the reception accorded to the Dutch in Java and Sumatra. Somewhat similar considerations probably apply to French Indo-China; there, too, individual members of the local population could rise to higher posts than in Malaya, but the people generally were treated more harshly than the population under British rule. Again, parts of Indo-China (where the present fighting is taking place) are very densely populated.

The composite population of British Malaya, and the large proportion of comparatively recent immigrants, may also have been partly responsible for the absence of such a violent reaction as has been displayed by the more homogeneous autochthonous populations of the Netherlands East Indies and of French Indo-China. The great majority of the Chinese in Malaya have no deep, sentimental roots in the country and could certainly not be expected to fight for its independence. The majority of the Malays rarely adopt a pan-Malayan attitude and would think more in terms of their own small states than of Malaya as a whole. Moreover, the Malays are genuinely fond of the British and would very much prefer to see the country administered by them than by the Chinese. Communal differences caused tension and trouble over the last 18 months and may raise acute problems in the future. But they may have been partly responsible for the absence of such violent clashes between the local population and the returning authorities as have occurred elsewhere.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

THE GREAT CHALLENGE. BY LOUIS FISCHER. New York: Duell, 1946, 346 p. \$4.00.

Though Mr. Fischer ranges rather widely over the world, his primary interest is Stalin's Russia — its betrayal, as he considers it, of the Socialist ideal at home and its embarking upon a course of imperialism abroad. He thinks the best way to counteract Soviet influence is for the democratic countries to make democracy work at home.

TIME OF DELIRIUM. BY HERMANN RAUSCHNING. New York: Appleton-Century, 1946, 369 p. \$4.00.

The message of this loosely written and carelessly thought-out work — the sixth by the author in a decade — is that Russia is preparing to conquer the world and that only the revival of Germany as a bulwark in our defense can prevent her succeeding.

KAPUTT. BY CURZIO MALAPARTE. New York: Dutton, 1946, 407 p. \$3.75.

Malaparte was a favored literary light in the early years of Fascism, and though eventually his brilliance got him into prison, he was free again to roam about Nazi-conquered eastern Europe during the war. In this horrible and fascinating work, he records the decadence of the *élite* whom we managed, by the skin of our teeth, to defeat.

YEARS OF WRATH. BY DAVID LOW. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946, 320 p. \$3.75.

This "cartoon history: 1931-1945" documents Low's uncommonly prescient understanding of his time, which is more than one can say of Quincy Howe (author in 1937 of "England Expects Every American to Do His Duty," and in 1939 of "Blood Is Cheaper Than Water") who has contributed some far from indispensable remarks.

WHILE TIME REMAINS. BY LELAND STOWE. New York: Knopf, 1946, 379 p. \$3.50.

A noted American correspondent looks at the state of the world and finds it far from good. His diagnoses of our ailments are acute, but his remedies may be simpler to apply on paper than on the hoof.

OUR SHARE OF NIGHT. BY DREW MIDDLETON. New York: Viking, 1946, 380 p. \$3.75.

An American newspaperman's impressions of six years of war in Europe, and the train of thought which this experience inspired.

LEVIATHAN IN CRISIS. COMPILED BY WALDO R. BROWNE. New York: Viking, 1946, 430 p. \$3.75.

"An international symposium on the state, its past, present, and future," chosen from the writings of some 54 contemporary thinkers and publicists.

MARXISM AND THE DEMOCRATIC TRADITION. By A. LANDY. New York: International Publishers, 1946, 220 p. \$2.50.

The story of the struggle for democracy in the western world, according to the author, is the story of the advance of Communism.

DECADÊNCIA E GRANDEZA DA DEMOCRACIA. By DARCY AZAMBUJA. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Globo, 1945, 174 p.

"A synthesized exposition of its [democracy's] bases and aims," in which is combined a consideration of the practical and the theoretical.

THE GREAT DILEMMA OF WORLD ORGANIZATION. By FREMONT RIDER. New York: Reynal, 1946, 85 p. \$1.50.

The Librarian of Wesleyan University proposes an ingenious plan for allocating representation in a world-state in such a way as to give extra weight to the more highly evolved or educated peoples.

PATTERNS OF PEACEMAKING. By DAVID THOMSON and Others. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, 399 p. \$6.00.

This scholarly treatise on the fundamental principles that should preside over the organization of a peaceful world is of long-range rather than topical interest.

FEDERALISM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE. By RUDOLF SCHLESINGER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1947, 533 p. \$6.00.

A studious review and appraisal of the experiments in federalism made during the last hundred years in Germany, the Hapsburg domains, and Russia. Dr. Schlesinger is a more reliable guide in the field of history than in that of philosophical analysis.

LANGUAGE AS A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FACTOR IN EUROPE. By STANLEY RUNDLE. London: Faber, 1946, 207 p. 12/6.

A fascinating study of the language problem of Europe, concluding with a discussion of the possibilities for a common international language.

INTERNATIONAL RAIL TRANSPORT. By SIR RALPH L. WEDGWOOD AND J. E. WHEELER. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1947, 162 p. \$3.00.

The fifth in a series of studies on international transport and communications problems prepared for Chatham House. In it the author surveys railroad developments during the inter-war period and puts forward proposals for future action.

FRONTIERS, PEACE TREATIES, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. By BRIG.-GEN. SIR OSBORNE MANCE. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1946, 196 p. \$3.00.

This is the concluding volume in the series mentioned in the previous comment. In addition to summarizing the conclusions of the earlier volumes, the present one relates the general subject to the transportation articles in the peace treaties and to the various international bodies concerned with transport and communications.

ACUERDOS INTERNACIONALES. Buenos Aires: Instituto Argentino de Derecho Internacional, 1945, 283 p. Pesos 5.

The texts (in Spanish) of the Bretton Woods, Civil Aviation (Chicago) and Chapultepec Agreements, and of the United Nations Charter.

THE PROBLEM OF PRE-WAR CONTRACTS IN PEACE TREATIES. By ERNST WOLFF. London: Stevens, 1946, 143 p. 12/6.

The author records his observations on the manner in which the contract clauses of the peace treaties concluding World War I were applied by the Mixed Tribunals.

THE NUREMBERG TRIAL AND AGGRESSIVE WAR. By SHELDON GLUECK. New York: Knopf, 1946, 121 p. \$2.00.

A professor of criminal law and criminology at the Harvard Law School presents the case of those who see legal justification for the Nuremberg proceedings.

DAWN OVER ZERO. BY WILLIAM L. LAURENCE. New York: Knopf, 1946, 274 p. \$3.00.

Mr. Laurence, science reporter for *The New York Times*, was chosen by the Army to write the official press releases on the atomic bomb, and for this he won a Pulitzer Prize. He was present at the explosion of bombs one and three. This is the story of the Manhattan Engineering Project and of the first three explosions, told in only moderately technical language.

WORLD POWER AND ATOMIC ENERGY. BY H. E. WIMPERIS. London: Constable, 1946, 87 p. 6/.

An English scientist, in charge of research at the Air Ministry from 1925 to 1937, views the atomic bomb and the problems it has brought.

OPERATION CROSSROADS. New York: Wise, 1946, 224 p. \$3.00.

This official photographic record of the atomic bomb tests at Bikini brings home the deadliness of this new weapon.

WEAPON OF SILENCE. BY THEODORE F. KOOP. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946, 304 p. \$3.50.

An analysis of censorship over all means of communication as a weapon in warfare, by an assistant director of our Office of Censorship.

THE STATESMAN'S YEAR-BOOK: 1946. EDITED BY M. EPSTEIN. New York: Macmillan, 1946, 1461 p. \$7.50.

Much of the material in this 83rd annual volume has been brought up-to-date after the wartime blackout on statistics.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1947. EDITED BY WALTER H. MALLORY. New York: Harper, for the Council on Foreign Relations, 1947, 220 p. \$3.50.

Essential but often elusive facts regarding the structure and composition of governments, the programs and leaders of political parties, the political affiliations of newspapers and periodicals. This 1947 issue — the 20th in the series — has been revised to take account of significant political developments in 1946, such as the establishment of the Fourth Republic in France, the adoption of new constitutions in China and elsewhere, the emergence of new parties in Germany and Japan. A reliable, conveniently arranged guide, which includes much information not easily obtainable elsewhere.

General: Economic and Social

THE CARTHAGINIAN PEACE OR THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF MR. KEYNES. BY ÉTIENNE MANTOUX. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, 210 p. \$4.50.

With minor exceptions, this interesting book is a political rather than an economic tract. It attacks Mr. Keynes' "Economic Consequences of the Peace" and maintains that the thesis which it establishes was an important factor in causing World War II. The author, a young scholar killed in the recent war, argues that Germany could have met her reparations payments, and denies that the Treaty of Versailles was vindictive. He warns against underestimating the recuperative powers of German militarism.

CONTROLLING WORLD TRADE: CARTELS AND COMMODITY AGREEMENTS. BY EDWARD S. MASON. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946, 289 p. \$2.50.

This is one of the best books in its field. Professor Mason of Harvard has had governmental experience in dealing with the problems he discusses in this study, prepared for the Committee for Economic Development. Half the book is devoted to international

business arrangements and half to intergovernmental commodity agreements. Professor Mason recommends several courses of international action to control cartels and discusses desirable United States policy in the absence of international agreement. After a concise analysis of the raw material problem, he concludes that intergovernmental commodity agreements should be subordinated to understandings about international trade in general.

MEASURING BUSINESS CYCLES. BY ARTHUR F. BURNS and WESLEY C. MITCHELL. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1946, 560 p. \$5.00.

A technical study of the factors producing business cycles in the United States, Britain, France and Germany during the last century or so. This second in a series on a much-argued subject is replete with statistical charts and graphs.

ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON. BY HENRY HAZLITT. New York: Harper, 1946, 222 p. \$2.00.

An editorial writer for *The New York Times* breaks several lances, and not a few heads, while jousting with many a current economic heresy. He himself would appear to be an unreconstructed Adam Smithite.

OUR THREATENED VALUES. BY VICTOR GOLLANCZ. London: Gollancz, 1946, 157 p. 5/.

Mr. Gollancz, British Socialist, is greatly concerned over the decay of the moral and spiritual standards which have typified western civilization. He spells out this concern in terms of current trends in Britain and of the treatment of Germany.

THREE WORLDS. BY N. S. TIMASHEFF. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1946, 263 p. \$2.75.

A professor of sociology at Fordham University rejects Fascism and Communism for a Christian Liberal Society.

THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD COMMUNISM. BY HAMILTON FISH. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1946, 224 p. \$2.50.

Communism is a greater enemy than Nazism ever was, avers the former Congressman, who exposes its machinations and calls for a crusade to destroy it.

THE JEWISH PROBLEM IN THE MODERN WORLD. BY JAMES PARKES. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, 242 p. \$1.25.

The first American edition of an excellent historical review of the problem in modern times — and of its concomitant, anti-Semitism.

UPROOTED. BY ZORACH WARHAFTIG. New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs, 1946, 219 p. \$2.75.

A report on the status of Jewish refugees in Europe and on the operation of organizations seeking to give relief.

COLOR BLIND. BY MARGARET HALSEY. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946, 164 p. \$2.50.

An intelligent and highly articulate writer, utilizing her wartime experience at the Stage Door Canteen, comes up with some ideas on what makes for racial conflict and what can be done about it.

The Second World War

IRON OUT OF CALVARY. BY WALTER PHELPS HALL. New York: Appleton-Century, 1946, 389 p. \$4.00.

This well-knit and readable "interpretative history of the Second World War" by a Princeton professor rests on a brief but cogent analysis of the forces that conspired to bring that conflict about.

THE BRERETON DIARIES. BY LEWIS H. BRERETON. New York: Morrow, 1946, 450 p. \$4.00.

Lieutenant-General Brereton commanded air forces in the Pacific, CBI, Middle East and European Theaters. Unhappily, though his diaries are interestingly written, they tell us less than we could have hoped for about higher strategy.

NOT SO WILD A DREAM. BY ERIC SEVAREID. New York: Knopf, 1946, 516 p. \$3.50.

The episodic autobiography of an alert and perceptive American radio correspondent who covered much of the world during the recent war.

SCIENTISTS AGAINST TIME. BY JAMES PHINNEY BAXTER, 3RD. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1946, 473 p. \$5.00.

This is the official history of the remarkable achievements of the Office of Scientific Research and Development during World War II, by the President of Williams College.

TRES ACCIONES NAVALES. BY LUIS CARRERO. Madrid: Escuela de Guerra Naval, 1945, 89 p.

An analysis of the naval battles of the La Plata River, Taranto and Cape Matapan, prepared for the Naval War College of Spain. Maps and illustrations.

AIR TRANSPORT AT WAR. BY REGINALD M. CLEVELAND. New York: Harper, 1946, 324 p. \$3.50.

This story of the Air Transport Command and the Naval Air Transport Service is based on official records and is well illustrated.

EUROPA A OSCURAS. BY ISMAEL HERRÁIZ. Madrid: Atlas, 1945, 332 p. Ptas. 20.

Observations by a Spanish journalist on events inside the Nazi Lebensraum — Belgium, Berlin, Transylvania, Croatia, etc. — during the early years of the war.

EL OCASO DE LOS DIOS NAZIS. BY RAMÓN GARRIGA. Madrid: Atlas, 1945, 332 p. Ptas. 20.

The disintegration of Nazi military and political power as seen by a Spanish journalist who served in Berlin from 1939 to 1945.

THE FINANCES OF EUROPEAN LIBERATION. BY FRANK A. SOUTHARD, JR. New York: King's Crown Press (Columbia University), 1946, 206 p. \$3.00.

This is a monograph on the experience acquired by the Allied Armies in financial matters in the liberated countries of southern Europe, by a Cornell professor of economics who served as financial adviser to the military government there.

HISTORY OF THE BRITISH RAILWAYS DURING THE WAR, 1939-45. BY R. BELL. London: Railway Gazette, 1946, 291 p. 25/.

An account of the remarkable record turned in by the four principal railroads and the London Passenger Transport Board, under government control throughout the war.

BRITAIN'S OTHER ARMY. BY EILEEN BIGLAND. London: Nicholson, 1946, 190 p. 8/6.

The story of the A.T.S., the women's auxiliary to the British Army.

RAVENSBRÜCK. BY SIMONE SAINT-CLAIR. Montreal: Variétés, 1946, 190 p. \$1.25.

A personal and intensely vivid description of conditions in a Nazi concentration camp.

THE 84TH INFANTRY DIVISION IN THE BATTLE OF GERMANY, NOVEMBER 1944-May 1945. BY LT. THEODORE DRAPER. New York: Viking, 1946, 260 p. \$5.00.

Though ostensibly a divisional history, Draper's well-informed and interesting account is useful for an understanding of the war on the western front in general.

CLIMAX IN CRETE. BY THEODORE STEPHANIDES. London: Faber, 1946, 166 p. 8/6.

An eye-witness account of the campaign in Crete, by an Anglo-Greek doctor.

THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGNS OF 1944-45. BY W. E. D. ALLEN and PAUL MURATOFF. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1946, 332 p. 1/.

A factual recital, continuing the authors' "The Russian Campaigns of 1941-43."

JUNGLE PILOT. By BARRY SUTTON. London: Macmillan, 1946, 127 p. 6/.

A Wing Commander in the R.A.F. chronicles the one-sided struggle in the air during the early part of the Burma campaign.

HIROSHIMA. By JOHN HERSEY. New York: Knopf, 1946, 117 p. \$1.75.

This simply written little book, justifiably a best-seller, describes with staggering impact what happened to six people in Hiroshima after the atomic bomb exploded.

PACIFIC VICTORY. By HUGH BUGGY. Canberra: Department of Information, 1946, 302 p.

An official account of Australia's part in the war against Japan.

The United States

SEEN FROM E.A. By HERBERT FEIS. New York: Knopf, 1947, 313 p. \$2.75.

As Economic Advisor in the State Department from 1931 to 1943, Mr. Feis enjoyed extraordinary opportunities for following the vacillating course of American foreign policy. As a person who does not suffer stupidity gladly, he was appalled at the failure of some of those who directed our foreign policy to foresee and prepare for those crises which Mr. Feis foresaw only too clearly. The three cases he has chosen are the efforts to stockpile rubber before the war, the scheme for acquiring American access to Middle East oil, and our "neutrality" legislation. Mr. Feis does not mention any names, but the identity of his heroes and villains is usually clear enough.

RUSSIAN-AMERICAN TRADE. By MIKHAIL V. CONDOIDE. Columbus: Bureau of Business Research, Ohio State University, 1946, 160 p. \$2.50.

An historical and statistical survey, with an appendix containing the texts of several documents concerning Russo-American trade.

THE STRENGTH WE NEED. By GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT. New York: Viking, 1946, 261 p. \$3.00.

The military expert of *The New York Herald Tribune* outlines the preparations we must make in order to put the United States in that position of "offensive readiness" demanded by the political and technical conditions of today.

FRONTIER ON THE POTOMAC. By JONATHAN DANIELS. New York: Macmillan, 1946, 262 p. \$2.75.

Washington during the war as seen by a press secretary to President Roosevelt.

AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS. By DAVID MITRANY. London: Contact, 1946, 123 p. 6/.

Essays on the current American political and social scene, by a Professor at the Institute of Advanced Study at Princeton.

THE CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMIC POWER. By DAVID LYNCH. New York: Columbia University Press, 1946, 423 p. \$5.50.

A well-written, descriptive study of the testimony presented before the Temporary National Economic Committee established in 1938 to investigate the concentration of economic power in American industry. Mr. Lynch describes the background and personnel of the investigation, presents a concise outline of the hearings, assembles the Committee's findings, analyzes the various recommendations made, and presents an over-all appraisal of the contribution of the investigation.

FULL PRODUCTION WITHOUT WAR. By HAROLD LOEB. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946, 284 p. \$3.50.

The gist of this book is that the occurrence of "non-production" in the United States economy is the result of insufficient effective demand to maintain the value of the supply at levels of full production. Maintaining that our economy is largely one of

monopolistic competition, unable to translate increased efficiency into lower prices, the author suggests adjustments to remove the existence of under-utilized resources.

TOMORROW WITHOUT FEAR. By CHESTER BOWLES. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946, 88 p. \$2.50.

The late head of the O.P.A. gives his prescription for insuring a balanced and prosperous economy in the United States.

MONETARY POLICIES AND FULL EMPLOYMENT. By WILLIAM J. FELLNER. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946, 268 p. \$3.50.

The author faces the technical and practical difficulties involved in using monetary policies to achieve levels of full employment within the framework of present American social and political institutions. His competent treatment shows that the dangers of an unconditional full employment guarantee stem mainly from the fact that such a policy would require a rigorous system of direct government controls. He argues that cyclical depressions may be counteracted without "guaranteeing" full employment.

FINANCING BUSINESS DURING THE TRANSITION. By CHARLES C. ABBOTT. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1946, 141 p. \$1.75.

An addition to the Research Series of the Committee for Economic Development, by an Associate Professor of Business Economics in the Harvard Business School.

ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY. By DONALD M. NELSON. New York: Harcourt, 1946, 439 p. \$4.00.

This is a rather carelessly composed record of Mr. Nelson's rôle in wartime Washington, where his final position was as head of the War Production Board.

FOR THIS WE FOUGHT. By STUART CHASE. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1946, 123 p. \$1.00.

At home, jobs, and abroad, peace — that is what Americans want, veteran and non-veteran alike, says Mr. Chase, and he gives some clues as to how we may get them in this unorthodox little book.

BY VOTE OF THE PEOPLE. By WILLIS J. BALLINGER. New York: Scribner, 1946, 381 p. \$3.00.

The author maintains that a nation's economy must be capitalistic if it is to be free and enjoy the blessings of democracy. Since "today capitalism is a disintegrating and dying system in America," he suggests immediate and drastic remedial action.

COLOR AND CONSCIENCE: THE IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT. By BUELL G. GALLAGHER. New York: Harper, 1946, 244 p. \$2.50.

An honest but not too penetrating search for the causes of racial antagonism in America.

REPRESENTATIVE AMERICAN SPEECHES: 1945-1946. SELECTED BY A. CRAIG BAIRD. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1946, 287 p. \$1.25.

Selected addresses, including a number of important ones dealing with various phases of American foreign policy.

THE WILSON ERA: YEARS OF WAR AND AFTER, 1917-1923. By JOSEPHUS DANIELS. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1946, 654 p. \$4.00.

Wilson's Navy Secretary continues his somewhat meandering recollections of that era. Here and there he has new light to throw on events and personalities.

THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW. By FRANCES PERKINS. New York: Viking, 1946, 408 p. \$3.75.

Among the growing company of books on the late President, this one is probably the most satisfactory. Miss Perkins' official association with Roosevelt, longer than that of any other important person, was sufficiently close to give her real insight into his

motives and methods. At the same time, her account has an objective tone lacking in some of the other Roosevelt items. Historians of the New Deal will find her book of first-rate value, and more casual readers will find it interesting and well-written.

AS HE SAW IT. By ELLIOTT ROOSEVELT. New York: Duell, 1946, 270 p. \$3.00.

The author accompanied his father on several of his historic trips, witnessed a number of important events, came at least within hailing distance of many a high personage, and acquired a large store of impressions and gossip, some of which have gone into this book. What he lacks is either a deep or broad perspective against which to project what he saw and heard and remembers that he saw and heard. As a reporter of his father's moods and *bons mots* he is interesting, all question of the propriety of his eavesdropping aside; but the accuracy of his reports is subject to discount since so many of them seem to be based on later recollection, and the total impressions he conveys of F.D.R. and others in his *dramatis personae* are often quite personal.

NOTHING TO FEAR. EDITED BY B. D. ZEVIN. Boston: Houghton, 1946, 470 p. \$3.75.

Here are some of the best of Roosevelt's speeches delivered between his acceptance of the Democratic nomination in 1932 and his undelivered Jefferson Day address of April 1945. They give an admirable panorama of his political ideals and principles.

DINNER AT THE WHITE HOUSE. By LOUIS ADAMIC. New York: Harper, 1946, 276 p. \$2.50.

This imaginative piece is a beautiful example of a mouse giving birth to a mountain. On January 13, 1942, the author and his wife were guests at a brief dinner in the White House, at which by chance Winston Churchill was also present. On the basis of the casual conversation of this evening, Mr. Adamic engages in all sorts of "afterthoughts"—sentimental, prejudiced, irrelevant and now and again perceptive.

BERNARD M. BARUCH, FINANCIAL GENIUS, STATESMAN AND ADVISER TO PRESIDENTS. By HARRY IRVING SHUMWAY. Boston: Page, 1946, 110 p. \$1.25.

A friendly portrait of our elder statesman.

THE SHORE DIMLY SEEN. By ELLIS GIBBS ARNALL. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1946, 312 p. \$3.00.

The ex-governor of Georgia interprets the needs of the South in terms of a more robust democracy throughout America.

RED GALLUSES. By ALLEN LUMPKIN HENSON. Boston: House of Edinboro, 1945, 269 p. \$3.00.

The hero of this "story of Georgia politics" is the late Gene Talmadge, and it is dedicated to his son, Herman.

Western Europe

FRANCE BETWEEN THE REPUBLICS. By DOROTHY M. PICKLES. London: Contact, 1946, 247 p. 10/.

A Socialist writer informatively describes political and economic developments in France from 1940 to 1945.

DEMOCRACY IN FRANCE. By DAVID THOMSON. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1946, 283 p. \$4.00.

The author examines the function of democratic processes under the Third Republic and evaluates the lessons which this experience has to offer.

PIERRE LAVAL. By MANUEL TARIN-IGLESIAS. Madrid: Editorial Alejo Climent 1945, 187 p.

This review of the wartime rôle of Laval gives him the benefit of the doubt.

LE BÂILLON DÉNOUÉ APRÈS QUATRE ANS DE SILENCE. BY FRANÇOIS MAURIAC. Montreal: Variétés (for Grasset), 1946, 204 p. \$1.00.

Articles written for *Figaro* during the months following the liberation of France, by a member of the French Academy.

AU NOM DES SILENCIEUX. BY ALFRED FABRE-LUCE. Montreal: Variétés, 1945, 155 p. \$1.10.

A heated tract, from a source not above reproach, against De Gaulle and against the unwillingness of the Resistance to see any good in anyone who served the Vichy régime.

BÉLGICA PROTEGIDA Y LIBERADA. UN AÑO ENTRE LOS BELGAS (1944-45). BY LUIS CLIMENT. Madrid: Editorial Alejo Climent, 1945, 217 p. Ptas. 18.

A Spaniard observes the last days of the Nazi occupation of Belgium and the opening phases of revival after liberation.

ASSIZE OF ARMS. BY J. H. MORGAN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, 357 p. \$3.50.

General Morgan was attached to the Inter-Allied Military Commission on Control in Germany from 1919 to 1923. In this first of two volumes he begins his story of how the German Army made a mockery of the disarmament clauses in the Treaty.

DOKUMENTY MINISTERSTVA INOSTRANNYKH DEL GERMANII. Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1946, 3 v. Rubles 4.50.

This compilation contains 138 documents selected from German Foreign Office materials now in Soviet possession. The documents deal with German policy in regard to Hungary 1937-42 (vol. i), Turkey 1941-43 (vol. ii), and Spain 1936-43 (vol. iii). In general they confirm previous suppositions concerning Nazi aims with respect to those countries. Though the purpose behind their publication would seem to be to convict the governments of these three Powers of full complicity in Nazi policy, this promise is not borne out in the cases of Turkey and Spain. In selecting documents for inclusion, the compilers omitted important accompanying telegrams and despatches to which reference is made in the texts published. The documents, originally all in German, appear here in Russian translation.

EXPERIMENT IN GERMANY. BY SAUL K. PADOVER. New York: Duell, 1946, 400 p. \$3.75.

Padover's job was to analyze the attitudes of German civilians for the Psychological Warfare Division of SHAEF. This he did with professional skill and real understanding in that part of the Rhineland first invaded by American troops.

CONFUSION OF FACES. BY ERICH MEISSNER. London: Faber, 1946, 136 p. 10/6.

A conservative interpretation of the struggle between religious and secular forces in Germany since the beginning of the Reformation.

THE REBIRTH OF THE GERMAN CHURCH. BY STEWART W. HERMAN. New York: Harper, 1946, 297 p. \$2.50.

The Rev. Stewart W. Herman, who is an American, was pastor of the American Church in Berlin prior to World War II and returned to Germany on the heels of the conquering Allied armies. He reports a revival and rededication of German Protestantism.

THE HISTORY OF THE JEWS OF ITALY. BY CECIL ROTH. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1946, 575 p. \$3.00.

A solid history covering the whole period from the Roman Republic to the present.

COMPLACENT DICTATOR. BY SIR SAMUEL HOARE. New York: Knopf, 1947, 318 p. \$3.50.

Sir Samuel Hoare, now Lord Templewood, was sent to Madrid during the dark days of June 1940 with the specific task of keeping Franco from joining his allies in their war against Britain. This is Hoare's own story of how he accomplished this mission. Considering his reputation for compromise, he has presented a remarkably frank account, though of course it is not complete. It is really fascinating to see, as his chapters unfold, how Franco was bluffed, cajoled and threatened into withholding full support from the Axis. His régime did, of course, accord all sorts of favors — military, diplomatic and economic — to his Axis partners, and on this Hoare supplies much evidence. Hoare's performance will be compared by critics with that of his American colleague, Ambassador Hayes — to whom, incidentally, he hardly makes even passing reference.

WIND IN THE OLIVE TREES — SPAIN FROM THE INSIDE. BY ABEL PLENN. New York: Boni and Gaer, 1946, 350 p. \$3.00.

Mr. Plenn was sent to Spain in 1944 as chief of propaganda analysis attached to the American Embassy. His book is an indictment of the Franco régime and a refutation of the arguments of those who have favored appeasing the Caudillo. Unfortunately not all of his assertions are supported by convincing evidence.

MIS CUADERNOS DE GUERRA 1936-1939. BY ALFREDO KINDELÁN. Madrid: Editorial Plus-Ultra, 1945, 210 p. Ptas. 16.

Rather brief notes on various phases of the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), by a Spanish general who was recently reported to have returned from exile in the Canary Islands where he had been consigned by Franco for his Royalist proclivities.

GEOGRAFÍA E HISTORIA DE ANDORRA. BY JUAN CORTS PEYRET. Barcelona: Editorial Labor, 1945, 165 p. Ptas. 12.

A systematic, illustrated treatise, unique in its treatment of the tiny republic's geography.

Eastern Europe

BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN. BY GEORGE MOORAD. Philadelphia: Fireside Press, 1946, 309 p. \$3.00.

A not particularly revealing account of the author's six months in the Soviet Union during the winter of 1944-45.

A GUIDE TO THE SOVIET UNION. BY WILLIAM M. MANDEL. New York: Dial Press, 1946, 511 p. \$5.00.

A handbook crammed with up-to-date information about practically all aspects of Soviet life. The author is research associate at the American-Russian Institute.

THE SOVIET IMPACT ON THE WESTERN WORLD. BY EDWARD HALLETT CARR. New York: Macmillan, 1947, 113 p. \$1.75.

These cogent essays are based on six lectures delivered by Professor Carr at Oxford University, and they deal with the ideological as well as the practical.

SOVIET PHILOSOPHY. BY JOHN SOMERVILLE. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946, 269 p. \$3.75.

Primarily a theoretical analysis, but based on the author's study in Russia as to how Soviet ideas operate in the concrete.

BEYOND THE URALS. BY ELMA DANGERFIELD. London: British League of European Freedom, 1946, 94 p. 2/.

A summary of information from Polish sources, official and unofficial, concerning the unhappy fate of the million or so Poles who were deported from eastern Poland to Siberia and elsewhere by the Soviet authorities between September 1939 and June 1941.

CO-OPERATION IN THE SOVIET UNION. BY N. BAROU. London: Gollancz, 1946, 123 p. 6/.

A friendly summary and appraisal of the coöperative movement in Soviet Russia, prepared for the Fabian Society.

A WINDOW IN MOSCOW, 1944-1945. BY ALARIC JACOB. London: Collins, 1946, 320 p. 15/.

A Leftist newspaperman finds that Soviet "public relations" are stupid and self-defeating, but in general gives a friendly account of affairs in Russia at the end of the war.

FROM A POLITICAL DIARY. BY ARNOLD D. MARGOLIN. New York: Columbia University Press, 1946, 250 p. \$3.00.

These memoirs of a Ukrainian-American lawyer deal with East European affairs as well as with American policy during recent decades.

EASTERN EUROPE BETWEEN THE WARS 1918-1941. BY HUGH SETON-WATSON. New York: Cambridge University Press (Macmillan), 1946, 445 p. \$6.50.

A review and appraisal of inter-war political developments in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Jugoslavia and Bulgaria, by the son of Professor Seton-Watson of London University.

MYTHS AND REALITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE. BY WALTER KOLARZ. London: Drummond, 1946, 274 p. 12/6.

The author dwells on the wide contrast between, on the one hand, the political and ethnic realities in the band of border states between Germany and Russia, and on the other, the conflicting "myths" propagated by the ardent nationalists in each.

POLAND: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER 1772-1939. BY HENRYK FRANKEL. London: Drummond, 1946, 191 p. 12/6.

A social and economic interpretation in which the author stresses the oppression of the Polish masses by officials and gentry as a primary cause of the country's weakness.

EL MARTIRIO DE POLONIA. BY SOFÍA CASANOVA and MIGUEL BRANICKI. Madrid: Atlas, 1945, 302 p. Ptas. 20.

Notes and reminiscences on Poland, invaded first by the Nazis and then by the Soviets, by a Spanish lady married to a Pole.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA. BY COMMANDER EDGAR P. YOUNG. London: St. Botolph Publishing Co., 1946, 118 p. 5/.

A brief summary of the social and economic advances made by the Czechoslovak Republic between the wars and of recent progress under the post-Nazi régime.

EDVARD BENEŠ. BY FRANTIŠEK M. HNÍK. Prague: Melantrich, 1946, 205 p. Kč. 90.

A systematic analysis of President Beneš' social and political philosophy.

ŠEST LET EXILU. BY EDUARD BENEŠ. Prague: Orbis, 1946, 479 p. Kč. 130.

Lectures, broadcasts and documents relating to Beneš' activities while he was in exile between 1938 and 1945.

A KEY TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA. BY MILIČ ČAPEK. New York: New York Listy, 1946, 153 p.

A history of the strategic importance of the Glatz district in Silesia, which the author holds should be awarded to Czechoslovakia.

A KDO VÁS ZABIJE. BY BEDŘICH HOFFMANN. Přerov: Společenské Podniky, 1946, 572 p. Kč. 300.

A documented account of the treatment accorded Czech clerics at Dachau.

LAS NACIONES BALCÁNICAS. SUS PROBLEMAS Y VICISITUDES. BY A. MAESTRO DE LÉON. Madrid: Saturnino Calleja, 1945, 309 p. Ptas. 16.

A political history of the Balkan peoples since the Congress of Berlin. The last three-quarters of the book treat the period since the outbreak of World War I.

MISS FIRE. BY JASPER ROTHAM. London: Chatto and Windus, 1946, 224 p. 12/6.

Colonel Rootham parachuted into Serbia on a mission to Mihailovich in May 1943. This is his record of that unsuccessful attempt to keep the Chetniks in the field as an effective force against the Germans. He reveals the many appalling difficulties under which Mihailovich operated and presents evidence of the propaganda devices by which the Nazis largely nullified Chetnik activities or deflected them against the Partisans.

ALLY BETRAYED. BY DAVID MARTIN. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1946, 372 p. \$3.50.

A Canadian journalist presents the evidence in favor of Mihailovich as a patriot, democrat and loyal ally of Britain and the United States, who in the end betrayed him.

JUGOSLAVIE 1945. BY GEORGES SORIA. Prague: Orbis, 1946, 176 p. Kč. 60.

Pro-Tito journalistic impressions of Yugoslavia in 1945.

SIMIOMATA. BY RICHARD CAPELL. London: Macdonald, 1946, 224 p. 10/6.

The diary of a London *Daily Telegraph* man in Greece from October 1944 to March 1945. He is relentlessly pro-Royalist and anti-EAM, and is proud of it.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

VICTORY. BY WINSTON S. CHURCHILL. Boston: Little, Brown, 1946, 307 p. \$3.50.

The last of Churchill's wartime speeches, delivered between January 1 and August 15, 1945, and including several on the issues of the 1945 parliamentary campaign.

WINSTON CHURCHILL'S SECRET SESSION SPEECHES. COMPILED BY CHARLES EADE. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946, 114 p. \$2.00.

Three of these five addresses at critical moments in the war have already been published — those dealing with the Battle of the Atlantic, Singapore and Darlan. Of the other two, the one delivered at the Fall of France is based on Churchill's notes, while the second concerns the imminence of invasion in September 1940.

BEVIN OF BRITAIN. BY TREVOR EVANS. New York: Norton, 1946, 282 p. \$3.00.

A sympathetic but not uncritical portrait, by the labor editor of the *Daily Express*.

AN AMBASSADOR IN BONDS. BY SIR LANCELOT OLIPHANT. London: Putnam, 1946, 227 p. 17/6.

The reminiscences of a British diplomat, covering his experiences before World War I, as Ambassador to Belgium in 1939-40 and during his subsequent sixteen-month imprisonment by the Nazis.

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF FULL EMPLOYMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN. BY ALLAN G. B. FISHER. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946, 201 p. \$3.50.

Professor Fisher of Chatham House is apparently convinced that the British Government's commitment to maintain full employment is incompatible with its commitment to join in upholding an "open international economic order," and that of these two conflicting aims, the latter is preferable. He prepared this study in collaboration with a group of economists, some of whom have contributed two unsigned dissenting opinions appended at the conclusion.

MUST ENGLAND FALL? BY H. BENNETT. London: Allen and Unwin, 1946, 244 p. 10/6.

Mr. Bennett fears for civilization in this era of egalitarianism and the omnipotent state.

MY ANSWER. BY OSWALD MOSLEY. Ramsbury (Wiltshire): Mosley Publications, 1946, 123 p. 7/6.

The leader of the British Union of Fascists restates his political aims, which have not changed, and accuses the government of unjustly persecuting him during the war.

THE IRISH TANGLE FOR ENGLISH READERS. BY SHANE LESLIE. London: Macdonald, 1946, 254 p. 10/6.

Well turned phrases but not always crystal clarity, by an Anglo-Irish stylist.

THE FRENCH-CANADIAN OUTLOOK. BY MASON WADE. New York: Viking. 1946, 192 p. \$2.00.

What makes the French Canadians different, and why, explained by an American Catholic who knows and likes them.

INTRODUCTION TO NEW ZEALAND. Washington: New Zealand Legation, 1946, 271 p. \$3.00.

An officially-sponsored handbook of data concerning the Dominion, its people, and their political, economic and social organization. There are numerous illustrations.

INDIA'S HINDU-MUSLIM QUESTIONS. BY BENI PRASAD. London: Allen and Unwin, 1946, 152 p. 6/.

In this posthumous work a young Indian scholar and teacher sought to analyze the conflict of Moslems and Hindus on both the historical and philosophical planes.

FASCIST INDIA. BY PATRICK LACEY. London: Nicholson, 1946, 150 p. 7/6.

Mr. Lacey bases the case for Pakistan on the assertion that the Congress Party manifests many Fascist tendencies and that its insistence on a unitary India is contrary to the principle of self-determination.

THE MAHATMA AND THE WORLD. BY KRISHNALAL SHRIDHARANI. New York: Duell, 1946, 247 p. \$3.50.

Mr. Shridharani seeks to put Gandhi's philosophy and ideas into terms comprehensible by Occidentals.

AMERICAN SAHIB. BY JOHN FREDERICK MUEHL. New York: Day, 1946, 242 p. \$3.00.

This member of the American Field Service arrived in India with a prejudice against British rule, and his sojourn there only confirmed it.

The Near East

THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST WHO'S WHO. VOL. I. PALESTINE: TRANS-JORDAN, 1945-1946. EDITED BY ALEXANDER AUREL AND PERETZ CORNFELD. Jerusalem: Near and Middle East "Who's Who" Publishing Co., 1945, 480 p. £P5.

In addition to brief biographical notes on a thousand or so persons, Jewish and non-Jewish, there is a considerable store of factual and statistical information about the country's government, economics and cultural life.

AN ARAB TELLS HIS STORY. BY EDWARD ATIYAH. London: Murray, 1946, 229 p. 12/6.

The autobiography of a Christian Lebanese gentleman who knows the middle east well and who has much of interest to say about its relations with the west.

EGYPT AND WORLD WAR II. BY JEAN LUGOL. Cairo: Société Orientale de Publication, 1945, 402 p. 16/.

An account of the wartime political and diplomatic situation in Egypt, with emphasis on the early and dark years, by the editor of *La Bourse Egyptienne* of Cairo.

LIFE LINE TO A PROMISED LAND. BY IRA A. HIRSCHMANN. New York: Vanguard, 1946, 214 p. \$2.75.

Mr. Hirschmann relates the amazing story of how he and others working on behalf of the War Refugee Board, created early in 1943 by President Roosevelt, rescued a great many Jews from southeastern Europe during the war.

AMERICANS IN PERSIA. BY ARTHUR C. MILLSPAUGH. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1946, 293 p. \$3.00.

Dr. Millspaugh has headed two financial missions in Iran, the first in 1923-28 and the second in 1943-45. It is about the failure of his second attempt to introduce modern fiscal methods that he writes here, with some heat. As in the case of Morgan Shuster before World War I, his endeavor at reform was defeated by vested interests in Persia and by Russian opposition to American interference.

The Far East

THUNDER OUT OF CHINA. BY THEODORE H. WHITE AND ANNALEE JACOBY. New York: Sloane, 1946, 331 p. \$3.50.

This provocative book, which has aroused a great deal of attention and comment pro and con, has the value of being straightforward and grounded on the authors' own experience in China as members of the Chungking bureau of *Time*. It was not written in a judicial spirit, but in the angry tone of a crusader. In their review of recent Chinese history and in their suggestions for American Far Eastern policy, Mr. White and Mrs. Jacoby tread on many toes, personal and ideological. Perhaps their strictures on the Generalissimo and the old guard in the Kuomintang will sound less extravagant today, after the Marshall report, than they did when first published in the fall of 1946.

CHINA. EDITED BY HARLEY FARNSWORTH MACNAIR. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946, 573 p. \$6.50.

A distinguished panel of 33 experts, Chinese and Occidental, deal with practically all phases of Chinese life in this latest volume in the "United Nations Series." In the chapters on contemporary political and social questions, both Kuomintang and anti-Kuomintang viewpoints are represented.

THE CHRYSANTHEMUM AND THE SWORD. BY RUTH BENEDICT. Boston: Houghton, 1946, \$3.00.

A prominent American anthropologist reconstructs the pattern of Japanese intellectual, social and cultural life as it was before the war. How much defeat has changed all this will be interesting to see.

THE LOST WAR. BY MASUO KATO. New York: Knopf, 1946, 264 p. \$2.75.

The author, for many years a journalist, represented Domei, the official Japanese news agency, in Washington at the time of Pearl Harbor. After a period of internment, he returned to Japan where he continued to work for Domei. The story he unfolds here is chiefly important for its picture of life in Japan during the war and because it reveals the author as unaware of any sense of national responsibility for the calamities brought about by Japanese expansionist policy.

JAPAN IN DEFEAT. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, 132 p. \$1.75.

This is the report of a study group at Chatham House which before the Pacific victory sought, on the basis of its members' intimate knowledge of Japan, to forecast the behavior of the Japanese people when vanquished.

ASPECTS DE L'ÉVOLUTION GOUVERNEMENTALE DE L'INDOCHINE FRANÇAISE. BY ROGER PINTO. Paris: Sirey, 1946, 201 p.

A scholarly and amply documented monograph on the government of Indo-China, the degree of "native" participation in it, and suggestions for further reform. The author is professor of law at the Universities of Lille and Hanoi.

Africa

THE NATIVE ECONOMIES OF NIGERIA. BY DARYLL FORDE and RICHENDA SCOTT. London: Faber (for Nuffield College), 1946, 312 p. 25/.

In this scholarly study Professor Forde treats the economic system of the natives, while Dr. Scott analyzes the colony's production of items for trade.

THE INDIAN QUESTION IN SOUTH AFRICA. BY VIOLET WETHERELL. Capetown: Unie-Volkspers Boekhandel, 1946, 71 p. 7/6.

The author advises the Indian community in South Africa to accept the land tenure and parliamentary representation arrangements in the legislation passed by the South African Parliament last year.

Latin America

THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN LATIN AMERICA. BY ROBIN A. HUMPHREYS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, 176 p. \$3.00.

A compact, well-informed review and interpretation of Latin American history during the Republican period, by a Reader at the University of London.

CARIBBEAN: SEA OF THE NEW WORLD. BY GERMÁN ARCINIEGAS. New York: Knopf, 1946, 464 p. \$3.75.

A romanticized history of the "American Mediterranean."

THE STRICKEN LAND. BY REXFORD GUY TUGWELL. Garden City: Doubleday, 1947, 704 p. \$4.50.

The stricken land is Puerto Rico, our stepdaughter in the Caribbean, where Mr. Tugwell recently completed a five-year term as governor. He is by instinct a thinker and planner rather than a diplomat or promoter, and it is small wonder that his efforts, however honest and socially conscious, should have raised up a host of enemies, even among those who agreed with him on fundamentals. To all of these he here pays his respects and provides us with an authoritative analysis of the island's troubles.

PUERTO RICAN PUBLIC PAPERS OF R. G. TUGWELL, GOVERNOR. San Juan: Government of Puerto Rico, 1945, 378 p.

Some 30 messages, statements, addresses and other papers from 1941 to 1945.

LA CONTRIBUCIÓN DE VENEZUELA AL PANAMERICANISMO DURANTE EL PERIODO 1939-1943. BY EDUARDO PLAZA A. Caracas: Tipografía Americana, 1945, 225 p.

A doctor's thesis presented at the Central University of Venezuela.

HISTÓRIA ECONÓMICA DO BRASIL. BY CAIO PRADO JUNIOR. São Paulo: Editôra Brasiliense, 1945, 218 p.

A general review, organized chronologically into eight fairly homogeneous epochs.

SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States*: Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington 25, D. C. *Great Britain*: British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York 20. *United Nations*, *League of Nations*, *Perm. Court of Int. Justice*, *Int. Institute of Intellectual Cooperation*: Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York 27. *Int. Labor Office*: 734 Jackson Pl., Washington 6, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

COMMERCIAL POLICY AND TRADE

SUGGESTED Charter for an International Trade Organization of the United Nations. Informal commentary to accompany full text. Washington, Dept. of State, 1946. 57 p.

LIST of products on which possible tariff concessions by the Government of the United States will be considered in reciprocal trade agreement negotiations with foreign countries. Washington, 1946. 82 p. (Dept. of State Publication 2672. Commercial Policy Series 96.)

UNITED STATES import duties, June, 1946. Washington, 1946. 437 p. (Dept. of State Publication 2540. Commercial Policy Series 87.) 70¢.

ESPIONAGE

THE REPORT of the Royal Commission to investigate the facts relating to and the circumstances surrounding the communication, by public officials and other persons in positions of trust of secret and confidential information to agents of a foreign power. Ottawa, King's Printer, 1946. 733 p. \$1.00.

FINANCIAL POLICY AND EXCHANGE

INTERNATIONAL Monetary Fund. Board of Governors inaugural meeting, Savannah, Ga., March 8-18, 1946. Selected documents. Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1946. 60 p.

INTERNATIONAL Monetary Fund. Articles of agreement. Washington, International Monetary Fund, n.d. 49 p.

INTERNATIONAL Bank for Reconstruction and Development. First annual meeting of the Board of Governors, Washington, D. C., September 27-October 3, 1946. Proceedings and related documents. Washington, 1946. 149 p.

THE COURSE and control of inflation; a review of monetary experience in Europe after World War I. Geneva, League of Nations, Economic, Financial and Transit Department, 1946. 136 p. (1946.II.A.6.)

FINANCIAL agreement and agreement on the settlement of war claims between the governments of the United Kingdom and of Canada. London, 1946. 8 p. (Cmd. 6904.) 2d.

INDO-CHINA

COMMENT la révolution a triomphé de la famine. République du Viêt-Nam, Office d'Information, 1946. 35 p. 5 piastres.

VIÊT-NAM, république démocratique. République du Viêt-Nam, Office d'Information, 1946.

LABOR

PUBLIC investment and full employment. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1946. 348 p. (Studies and Reports. New Series no. 3.) \$2.25.

INTERNATIONAL Labour Conference, 29th session, Montreal, 1946. Reports. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1946.

2. (1) Constitutional questions. Supplement. 3 p. 3. Protection of children and young workers. Supplement 2. 9 p. 4. (2) Proposed international labour obligations in respect of non-self-governing territories. Supplement 1. 8 p. Supplement 2. 3 p. 5. Reports on the application of conventions (Article 22 of the Constitution.) 121 p. Supplement. 42 p. Appendix. 8 p.

INTERNATIONAL Labour Conference, 30th session, Geneva, 1947. Reports. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1946.

3. (1) Non-metropolitan territories; proposed conventions. 119 p. 5. (1) Employment service organisation. 350 p.

LATIN AMERICA

INTER-AMERICAN Conference for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Washington, Pan American Union, 1946. 143 p. 50¢.

NETHERLANDS

FIRST memorandum on the Central Economic Plan 1946 and National Budget 1947. The Hague, Central Planning Bureau of the Netherlands, 1946. 65 p.

PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

DRAFT peace treaty with Bulgaria. London, 1946. 23 p. (Cmd. 6895.) 6d.

—, Finland. 19 p. (Cmd. 6897.) 4d.

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